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1 Introduction
The population trends of the 21st century are unprecedented. For the first time
in human history, the elderly population will exceed the number of children,
while the world population will grow from roughly 7 billion today to nearly
11 billion in 2100. In the more developed regions of the planet people aged 60
or older have already outnumbered the young under 20 years of age, and less
developed regions will follow suit by the end of the century (United Nations,
2014, 2013a,b).
The ongoing demographic trends constitute a tremendous challenge for
societies and economies that is attracting research in economics and other dis-
ciplines. This thesis adds to this research by investigating several economic
research questions related to demographic developments empirically. The aim
of this introductory chapter is to disclose the relevance of this thesis. I start
with outlining the historical origins, the current and future characteristics and
the economic implications of population aging to illustrate why research on
the topic is urgently needed. I conclude with a presentation of the contribu-
tions over the existing economic literature and the policy implications of each
chapter, whereby also outlining the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Population Aging
The origins of population aging go back far into the past. Around 1800, de-
clining mortality in Europe marked the start of a demographic transition that
spread to all parts of the world. The typical course of the transition was a
decline in death rates which was after some time accompanied by decreasing
birth rates. This combination led to initially increased and then decreased pop-
ulation growth and finally to the onset of population aging (Lee, 2003). The
associated shifts in the population age structure have important economic im-
plications (Harper, 2014). In particular, the threats from population aging
include old-age poverty, economic growth slowdowns and intergenerational in-
justice. To conquer these threats, political action is inevitable and urgent.
In the following, the problem of population aging is explained in more de-
tail, starting from its historical origins and concluding with a presentation of
potential solution strategies.
1.1.1 Mortality Decline
The world average of human life expectancy at birth was roughly 30 years,
when around 1800 declining mortality in Europe marked the start of a revolu-
tionary change. Within only three centuries, global life expectancy at birth is
rising by 50 years to a level of at least 80 in 2100 (Lee, 2003). As Figure 1.1
indicates, the strongest gains were attained in the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury. Nowadays, life expectancy at birth in developed countries amounts to 82
years for women and to about 76 years for men. In less developed countries, life
expectancy equals 63 for women and around 60 years for men (WHO, 2014).
While today’s high-income countries experienced the survival gains in par-
allel, mortality in the developing world started to fall only in the early twentieth
century. However, poorer countries accelerated their survival rates sharply in
the middle of the century, profiting from spreading knowledge of the medical
experiences in richer countries. Life expectancy at birth in China, for example,
increased from 41 in the early 1950s to 70 years in the late 1990s. The av-
erage gains in low-income countries stagnated when the HIV/AIDS epidemic
spread and became the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa. For the
35 most affected African countries, life expectancy at birth even decreased by
on average 6.5 years in the late 1990s (Lee, 2003).
Future increases in life expectancy might be subject to biological limits
regarding human longevity (Lee, 2003). However, experiences of countries
with many very old people such as Japan suggest that these limits have not
yet been touched. We therefore might experience a future increase not only
in the numbers of centenarians but also of supercentenarians (Harper, 2014;
Vaupel, 2010).
How could the extraordinary gains in life expectancy be achieved? Initially,
medical advances, such as the development of the smallpox vaccine, allowed re-
11
Figure 1.1: Global Life Expectancy and Global Total Fertility 1800–2100
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ductions in contagious and infectious diseases. Spreading medical knowledge,
such as that of the germ theory of disease, induced an awareness of health
threats and the utilities from personal hygiene and proper nutrition. Health
care, nourishing food, insulated housing and appropriate clothing became more
affordable with growing wealth levels in the course of the emerging Industrial
Revolution. Improved nutrition early in life and throughout the life cycle al-
lowed the development of stronger organ systems and improved the ability to
resist disease. Wealth was also associated with higher educational attainments
which in turn have been observed to correlate with health-preventing behav-
iors and to foster a more stress-free life in general. Technological advances
also helped to reduce mortality. Examples are improvements in food storage,
transportation and trade which allowed a regional smoothing of food shortages
and therefore a reduction of famine mortality (Lee, 2003; Barker, 1990; Vaupel,
2010).
Throughout the nineteenth century, high-income countries realized sub-
stantial declines mostly in infant and child mortality (Lee, 2003). In the early
12
twentieth century, still most of the gains in life expectancy were achieved early
in the life cycle, with less than 20 percent being gained after age 65. However,
the continued gains shifted from youth and working ages to later stages of
the life cycle (Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012). Cardiovascular disease mortality
and falling tobacco use were the main factors contributing to the rise in life
expectancy at older ages in recent decades (Mathers et al., 2015). Nowadays,
more than 75 percent of the additional years are attained after age 65, while
this share is asymptotically approaching 100 percent (Eggleston and Fuchs,
2012).
1.1.2 Fertility Decline
Throughout the nineteenth century, the global total fertility rate amounted to
at least six children per woman. Marital fertility started to decline in most
parts of Europe between 1890 and 1920 (Lee, 2003). Birth rates are declining
globally ever since, apart from few interruptions. After World War II, many
high-income countries experienced baby booms (e.g. Germany and Sweden),
leading to a temporary overall increase in birth rates, as Figure 1.1 shows. The
strongest fertility reductions occurred subsequently between around 1970 and
2000. In 2012, the total fertility rate in high-income countries amounted to
only 1.7 children per women, while in low-income countries it was on average
still as high as 4.1 children per woman (WHO, 2014). Globally, total fertility
is predicted to fall to a level as low or even below the replacement level of 2.1
children per woman by 2100.
While in high-income countries birth rates started to fall around 1900, less
and least developed countries began their fertility transitions only around 1970.
They reduced their birth rates, however, at a much higher speed than the more
developed countries before them. India, for example, reduced its total fertility
rate from 4.7 children per woman in 1980 to only 2.5 children in 2013. Over
the same period, Vietnam’s total fertility dropped from a level of even 5.0 to
only 1.7 children per woman (World Bank, 2015c).
The exact reasons for the fertility decline are still not fully understood.
However, the recent economic literature discusses six main hypotheses (Guin-
nane, 2011). First, the drop in mortality, that is always preceding the fertility
13
decline, is a suspected cause. The argument is that declining infant and child
mortality reduces the number of births necessary for a couple to achieve a
desired number of surviving children (Canning, 2011; Guinnane, 2011). Sec-
ond, the availability of contraception and abortion allowed couples who wanted
smaller families to reduce their fertility (Van Bavel and Reher, 2013). Con-
traceptive technologies have likely accelerated the fertility decline, especially
during the second half of the twentieth century when the birth control pill be-
came available. However, ways of birth control, albeit less reliable, have existed
at all times (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). Contraception may therefore not
explain why couples wanted to reduce their fertility in the first place. Third,
the decline in birth rates may have happened due to rising costs of children as-
sociated with rapid urbanization or by child-labor restrictions that reduced the
expected family income. Fourth, changing economic conditions and expecta-
tions may have reduced fertility when in the course of the Industrial Revolution
technological progress, increasing human capital and associated higher wages
raised the opportunity costs of time investments into child rearing (Harper,
2014; Guinnane, 2011; Canning, 2011). Fifth, rising returns to child quality
or decreasing education costs due to the creation of primary schools may have
incentivized parents to make higher investments into a smaller number of chil-
dren. Finally, with the establishment of social insurance and old-age support
children lost their role as a form of old-age assurance (Guinnane, 2011).
1.1.3 Aging Populations
Declining mortality followed by falling fertility characterized the typical course
of the demographic transition all over the world. Changes in fertility and
mortality have consequences for population size and age structure (Preston and
Stokes, 2012; Canning, 2011). In early stages of the transition, the mortality
decline prior to fertility decline led to a substantial growth of young cohorts
because it mostly translated into higher infant and child survival rates. In
combination with the onset of fertility decline after some decades, this resulted
in strong increases of the working-age population relative to the dependent
population of young and elderly.
During the twentieth century the continued gains in life expectancy shifted
14
Figure 1.2: Median Age by Region, 1950–2050
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from youth and working ages to later stages of the life cycle, initiating a new
kind of demographic transition with mortality gains concentrated among the
elderly (Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012). In recent years, total fertility has fallen
below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman in many high-income
countries. Consequently, successive cohorts are smaller and smaller and pop-
ulations are shrinking as a whole. At the same time, large longevity gains
are being realized. Rich countries therefore have rapidly rising numbers of old
and oldest-old people, in absolute and in relative terms. As a result, a mas-
sive population aging is progressing in these countries that is associated with
an ongoing shrinkage of the working-age population relative to the dependent
population.
Population aging is mirrored by the median age, the threshold dividing the
younger from the older half of the population. As illustrated in Figure 1.2,
the global median age has risen from 24 to 29 between 1950 and 2010 and
is expected to increase by another seven years until 2050. However, the ag-
ing process does not evolve uniformly across regions (Gerland et al., 2014).
While the societies of the developed world have aged rapidly since 1950, the
strong aging in the decades to come will be mostly driven by less and least
developed countries (United Nations, 2013a). This reflects the late onset of
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the demographic transition in developing countries only a century ago, while
in more developed nations the demographic variables may already approach
their extremes.
Overall, population aging is more pronounced in the more developed re-
gions of the world (Bloom et al., 2011). Germany, for example, is among the
countries with the lowest reproductivity of all. In 2012, it had a total fertility
rate of only 1.4 children per woman, while its life expectancy at birth was 78
years for males and 83 years for females. With a total fertility of 1.9 children
per woman in 2012, Sweden exhibits slightly higher birth rates, but with a life
expectancy at birth of 80 years for males and 84 years for females it is one of
the leading countries in terms of longevity (WHO, 2014).
1.1.4 Labor Market Implications
How does population aging interact with labor markets? From an aggregate
perspective, shifts in the relative supplies of people of different age have im-
plications for economic growth and intergenerational justice. During the origi-
nal demographic transition, the strong increase in the working-age population
relative to the dependent population after the onset of fertility decline was
typically associated with a boom in per-capita incomes and strong economic
growth and therefore referred to as the “demographic dividend” (Bloom et al.,
2003; Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012; Canning, 2011).1 In contrast, the strong
growth of the elderly population relative to the working-age population ob-
served in recent decades is referred to as a “demographic deficit” (Harper,
2014) because it raises the the per-capita demographic burden on individuals
in working age (Bengtsson and Scott, 2011), as measured by the dependency ra-
tio.2 Pay-as-you-go retirement and long-term care systems which redistribute
financial measures from workers to retirees even worsen the demographic bur-
1It remains questionable though to which extent this growth was actually attributed to
the demographic developments. First, the Industrial Revolution may have been a major
driver of economic growth at the time (Canning, 2011). Second, for many developing coun-
tries experiencing demographic transitions today it is still unclear to which extent they will
economically catch up.
2The dependency ratio is typically defined as the number of children under age 15 plus
older persons aged 65 years or over (assumably reflecting the economically inactive pop-
ulation) divided by the number of persons aged 15 to 64 years (assumably reflecting the
productive population; United Nations, 2013a).
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den as they oblige workers to provide for the elderly while pushing down the
labor force participation of the latter (Canning, 2011). Many countries rely on
pay-as-you-go based social security systems.
Focusing on intergenerational justice, relatively large generations bear a
low per-capita burden when they are in working age because their size de-
presses the dependency ratio. When they enter retirement, they raise the
per-capita burden on a subsequent smaller generation because their size then
raises the dependency ratio. This implies that large generations benefit at
the cost of small generations. On the other hand, large generations may face
higher competition levels throughout their life cycles which may suppress their
educational, occupational and labor market outcomes and finally also retire-
ment entitlements. Hence, population aging induces important concerns of
intergenerational injustice (Harper, 2014), although it is not clear if there is a
net gain or loss for larger cohorts relative to smaller cohorts.
What are the future economic implications from ongoing demographic
change? In order to a keep pay-as-you-go system financially balanced, ei-
ther the social security contributions paid by workers must rise, the tranfers
to elderly must shrink, or both. Raising the contributions of workers is likely
associated with productivity losses, because it decreases their net labor income
and therefore likely demotivates them to be productive. In combination with
the overall declining workforce this might seriously slow down economic growth
(Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012; Harper, 2014). A decrease in the retirement and
long-term care payments to the elderly or even a financial breakdown of the
whole system may be associated with a growing threat of old-age poverty, but
might also raise the labor force participation of elderly.
Demographic developments may affect labor markets also via behavioral
changes at the individual level (Smeeding, 2014). Possible mechanisms are
that fewer children may be associated with a greater labor market participa-
tion of women (Canning, 2011; Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012), that a higher life
expectancy may raise the returns to education and therefore educational at-
tainment, or that insecurity regarding future retirement payments may affect
patterns of savings and consumption (Harper, 2014).
While behavioral changes at the individual level may stimulate or decelerate
economic growth, overall shifts in the age structure imply inevitable threats
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from population aging, namely old-age poverty, economic growth slowdowns
and intergenerational injustice, if no actions are taken (Eggleston and Fuchs,
2012). The following subsection surveys possible measures to conquer these
threats.
1.1.5 Solution Strategies
How may the threats from population aging be conquered? In order to release
the financial pressure on social security systems, obviously either the aggregate
amount of contributions must be raised, the dependency of elderly on transfers
has to be reduced, or both (Eggleston and Fuchs, 2012), while at the same time
productivity losses and old-age poverty need to be avoided. In the following,
potential policy parameters in achieving these goals are listed.
Increasing total contributions without raising the per-capita burden on
workers may be reached by either increasing the number of contributors or by
enhancing labor productivity. The number of contributors may be increased
by fostering fertility or immigration, raising female labor market participation,
reducing unemployment or lowering the job entry age (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al.,
2014). Labor productivity may be enhanced by investments into education,
health or technological research (Harper, 2014).
Altering fertility, education or health may affect the contribution sum only
after several decades because successive cohorts enter the labor market only
many years after birth, education improvements within the workforce may also
take several years and health interventions might be most effective very early
in the life cycle (Barker, 1990). In contrast, immigration may increase the
working-age population immediately. However, the potential of immigrants
to raise aggregate social security contributions depends on their productivity
in the host countries’ labor markets, which in turn relies on factors such as
language barriers and the transferability of foreign human capital. Raising
female participation, lowering unemployment or decreasing the labor market
entry age would also be effective in the short-run, however, the latter mea-
sure reduces the time available for educational attainment, possibly negatively
impacting productivity. Finally, technological progress may show immediate
effect as well, but successful innovation is difficult to predict.
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Reducing the dependency of elderly on retirement transfers while prevent-
ing old-age poverty may be reached by increasing elderly’s labor force participa-
tion or by finding alternative sources of funding. The labor force participation
of older people could be increased by extending their working careers. For
this purpose, the legal retirement age could be raised or more flexible ways
for gradual transitions into retirement may be found. In addition, investments
in health could maintain older people’s ability to execute job tasks (Harper,
2014), while further education may enable them for job changes. Alternative
financial sources might be given by private pensions and savings.
Since alterations of health and private savings should be realizable only
after several decades, they might affect the labor market participation of older
people only in the long-run. Also, further training of elderly may show effect
only after a couple of years. In contrast, raising the normal retirement age and
allowing for more flexible exit transitions may be effective immediately.
Lowering elderly’s need for long-term care payments may be reached by
improving their health, by substituting formal by informal care or by increasing
the efficiency of the long-term care system. Again, overall health improvements
among the elderly may take their time. In contrast, raising informal relative to
formal care provision may release long-term care costs immediately. However,
informal care providers will not be available to the labor market and may
even become dependent on financial support themselves for the time of care
provision. Efficiency improvements in the long-term care system may therefore
be a more promising way to reduce expenses in the short-run.
Policy reforms are generally difficult to enforce in democratic systems and
their implementation is often time-consuming and costly. Since a release of the
financial pressure on the workforce from the rising share of elderly is urgently
necessary, good arguments and effective policy designs are needed to imple-
ment some combination of the described solution strategies. This requires
sound knowledge, first, on the interactions between population aging and la-
bor markets, and second, on the effectiveness of potential policy interventions.
Empirical economic research can provide qualitative and quantitative evidence
on both these aspects. The following section presents the contributions of this
thesis to this research.
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1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
This subsection gives an overview of the structure of the thesis and briefly
summarizes content, literature contributions, policy implications and empiri-
cal findings of each chapter. The countries chosen for analysis are Germany
and Sweden, both having rapidly aging populations, while their social secu-
rity systems function, at least partly, on pay-as-you-go basis, qualifying them
perfectly for analyses of demographic change and labor markets.
Chapter 2
The fertility changes of recent decades have created birth cohorts of very dif-
ferent size. As these cohorts grow older, they are constantly shifting the age
structure of the workforce, whereby potentially affecting labor market out-
comes. Chapter 2 of this thesis presents estimates of cohort size effects on
wage, employment and work time. The analysis contributes to the literature
by generating evidence on cohort size effects in Germany, which is an excellent
case study for its large and rapidly aging population and still lacks compre-
hensive insights on the topic to date. Moreover, empirical evidence on the
response pattern of different economic outcomes in the presence of restrictive
labor market institutions is generated. Finally, to account for an expected ef-
fect heterogeneity by level of occupational specialization, a measure of actual
task content is exploited rather than educational attainment which was used
by former studies.
Analyzing cohort size effects on economic outcomes provides insights on the
effects that population aging has on labor markets as well as on competition
effects in general. While labor market effects of a changing age structure have
important implications for the income distribution as well as the employment
structure and the organization of work (Fertig et al., 2009), politicians may
also view them as an inequitable redistribution of economic success between
generations. The main findings of Chapter 2 are that a larger cohort size
reduces the wages of workers with medium and high degrees of occupational
specialization, while employment effects are detected for highly specialized
males only. Work time rises in response to an increase in cohort size for medium
specialized males and decreases for highly specialized males and females.
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Chapter 3
During the past decades, Germany experienced several phases of strong im-
migration which were affecting size and age structure of the population. In
contrast to other immigration countries, the literature has found very little
evidence for an economic integration process of immigrants for the German
case. Former studies, however, typically employe cross-section models, which
suffer from the serious drawback that they do not account for cohort effects.
The analysis presented in Chapter 3 provides a first application of a double co-
hort model to earnings assimilation processes. The model accounts for cohort
effects and is therefore arguably superior to the conventional method.
Fostering immigration is considered a potential strategy to raise the working-
age population and to hereby address the financial pressure on the social secu-
rity systems induced by population aging. The analysis presented here delivers
insights on the effectiveness of this strategy because it answers the question of
whether an economic integration process of immigrants takes place. The em-
pirical results of Chapter 3 do not provide evidence of an earnings assimilation
process of immigrants, confirming the results of the existing literature and
suggesting that the potential of immigration in addressing the threats from
population aging may be limited.
Chapter 4
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 examines the labor market exit behavior
of older manual and non-manual workers in Germany and quantifies the pro-
portion of their retirement age difference that is explained by circumstances
beyond individual influence. The analysis contributes to the retirement litera-
ture by providing a detailed empirical description of the labor force dynamics
and retirement patterns of older manual and non-manual workers. Moreover,
it adds to the growing literature on equality of opportunity which distinguishes
legitimate inequalities, as arising from different individual effort levels, from
illegitimate inequalities, as determined by circumstances beyond individual in-
fluence, and provides a first application of the framework to retirement timing
(e.g., Roemer, 1993; Jusot et al., 2013).
Raising the normal retirement age to extend working lives is a potential
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strategy to change dependency ratios and to hereby relieve the growing fi-
nancial pressure on social security systems associated with population aging.
However, occupational differences in the capacity to extend working careers
give reason for equity concerns, because retiring before reaching the normal
retirement age often reduces benefit entitlements. Against this background,
analyzing inequalities in the retirement dynamics of workers with different
physical job demands contributes to detecting age limitations in the execution
of particular tasks. Furthermore, evaluating the proportion of differences in
retirement timing which are predetermined and thus beyond individual influ-
ence delivers valuable input to the normative discussion on the justness of a
uniform increase of the normal retirement age. The results of Chapter 4 in-
dicate that among individuals aged 55 to 65 non-manual workers have a 20%
lower instantaneous risk of entering retirement than manual workers, while
the latter are more likely to become unemployed during the transition process.
Furthermore, it is estimated that circumstances explain at least one third of
the observed differences in the retirement age between workers with different
degrees of physical job demands.
Chapter 5
The final chapter of this thesis investigates the impacts of a reform of 1938
in Sweden which introduced universal access to free ante- and neonatal health
care to the Swedish population on demographic, health and socioeconomic
outcomes. By provoking sustainable health improvements, the reform may
have been an important contributor to the ongoing extension of longevity.
Moreover, by creating fertility incentives, it may have been a driver of Swe-
den’s baby boom of the 1940s. The analysis presented here contributes to
a growing strand of the literature suggesting that early-childhood conditions
predetermine later-life health and socioeconomic outcomes, whereby establish-
ing a social gradient in health which is widening in age (e.g., Barker, 1990;
Currie and Stabile, 2003; Case et al., 2002). The study is among the first to
measure the causal effects of a universal early-life health intervention on adult
outcomes, contributing over existing studies that are often confounded because
many policies target only disadvantaged subgroups.
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Evaluating early-life health interventions delivers insights on their effec-
tiveness as measures to foster fertility in times of low birth rates. In addition,
interventions of this kind may be a way to prevent health deteriorations up to
older ages which might in turn contribute to maintain older workers physical
ability to execute job tasks and to counteract the rising demand for long-term
care associated with population aging. The implications from evaluating his-
torical reforms may be of particular relevance for developing countries which
often exhibit comparable health measures today as did richer countries in the
past. The empirical results presented in Chapter 5 indicate negative effects
on mortality which are increasing in age, positive effects on several long-run
health outcomes and considerable improvements in income, but no effects on
fertility.
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2 Cohort Size Effects on Wages, Working
Status, and Work Time
Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of cohort size on wages, employment and work
time for workers in Germany. The empirical findings suggest that male workers
with medium and high degrees of occupational specialization who were born
at the peak of the baby boom earn at least 5.3% lower wages than comparable
workers born during the subsequent baby bust. Highly specialized females born
into large cohorts earn 2.5% lower wages than their counterparts from small
cohorts. Employment effects are detected only for highly specialized males.
The effects on work time are mixed and invariably larger when actual work
time is considered rather than contractual work time. It is argued that the
restrictive labor market institutions in place are key in shaping the response
pattern across the different economic outcomes.
2.1 Introduction
Most regions of the planet experience rapidly rising numbers of elderly both
in absolute and relative terms (United Nations, 2013a). Various studies inves-
tigate the consequences of this development for labor markets (e.g., Bo¨rsch-
Supan, 2003, 2008; Feyrer, 2007, 2011) and social security systems (e.g., Bo¨rsch-
Supan, 2000, 2005; Hirazawa et al., 2010). Several papers focus on shifts in the
age structure of the workforce and estimate effects of relative cohort size on
economic outcomes such as wages (e.g., Macunovich, 1999; Card and Lemieux,
2001; Araki et al., 2013) and employment (e.g., Korenman and Neumark, 2000;
Macunovich, 2012). The rationale behind this approach emanates from the
theoretical concepts of factor substitutability and competitive pricing: To the
degree workers of different age are imperfect substitutes on the labor market,
the number of rivals individuals face in job competition is reflected by the num-
ber of individuals of similar age. Because the degree of competition influences
outcomes, cohort sizes are expected to have a negative impact on economic
success.
This paper analyzes wage, employment and work time responses to shifts
in the relative labor supplies of workers of different age. The empirical anal-
ysis is based on individual-level data and age-specific population numbers for
Germany. The results are interpreted in the context of discussing the response
pattern across different labor market outcomes and occupation types, first, be-
cause the effects of cohort sizes on different outcomes are likely dependent, and
second, because Germany’s restrictive labor market institutions may shape this
pattern in a certain way by imposing rigidities upon some economic outcomes
and some types of workers but not upon others.
The paper contributes to the literature in several respects. First, the Ger-
man labor market is examined. The existing evidence on Germany lacks com-
prehensive insights on the topic to date because relatively few studies estimate
cohort size effects on labor market outcomes using German data. While some
papers provide evidence for employment effects (Zimmermann, 1991; Schmidt,
1993a; Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2002; Fertig and Schmidt, 2004; Bi-
agi and Lucifora, 2008; Garloff et al., 2013), only one study (to the best of
my knowledge) examines cohort size effects on wages using cross-country data
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including Germany (Brunello, 2010). Although wages and employment may
be rigid as a result of restrictive labor market institutions, only Garloff et al.
(2013) investigate work time as an alternative response variable. This lack
of evidence for the German case is surprising, firstly, because Germany has
the largest labor force in the European Union (World Bank, 2015a), and sec-
ondly, because demographic change is particularly marked in Germany. In
2013, the German population happened to be the second oldest in the world
in terms of median age (45.5), closely behind the Japanese population (45.9;
United Nations, 2013b).
A second contribution of this study is the usage of a measure of actual job
content rather than educational attainment to account for different degrees of
worker substitutability. Plausibly, the substitutability of workers within and
across birth cohorts determines how strong economic outcomes respond to
cohort size changes. To account for the expected effect heterogeneity, former
studies proxied worker substitutability by educational level. As will be argued
below, the educational level is a poor indicator of worker substitutability for
a range of occupations, such as emergency physicians or low-educated workers
in experience-based positions. In the present study, worker substitutability is
proxied by the physical demandingness of occupations measured on a ten-point
scale, an indicator that is arguably superior to the educational level.
Finally, the present study generates empirical evidence on the interplay of
the effects on different labor market outcomes in the presence of restrictive
labor market institutions. For instance, the dismissal of a worker may be
difficult under dismissal protection legislation, in which case an employer might
instead lower the worker’s wage. On the other hand, collective bargaining
agreements may impede wage and work time adaptions, which incentivizes
employers to adapt employment instead. Hence, rigidities in one outcome may
be responsible for a relatively strong response in another outcome due to a
rerouting of the effect. In contrast to previous studies, which mostly focus on
a single economic outcome, the approach chosen here accounts for institution-
induced ridigities in outcomes and the possibility of diverted effects across
outcomes.
The empirical results reveal a robust response pattern across the different
labor market outcomes. Large cohort sizes are found to depress economic suc-
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cess in terms of wages for male and female workers with medium and high
degrees of occupational specialization. Specifically, a medium (highly) special-
ized man born at the peak of the baby boom earns on average 5.8% (5.3%)
lower wages than a comparable man born during the subsequent baby bust.
Highly specialized females born into large cohorts earn 2.5% lower wages than
their counterparts from small cohorts. In addition, the employment probabili-
ties of highly specialized males born at peak fertility are 0.3 percentage points
lower than those of comparable workers born into later-born, small cohorts.
For males with a medium degree of occupational specialization, weekly work
time rises in response to an increase in cohort size, while it decreases for highly
specialized males and females. The estimated effects on actual work times are
stronger than those on contractual work times.
These results are broadly in line with the theoretical considerations. Ger-
many’s restrictive dismissal protection legislation covering all occupational spe-
cialization groups equally (while excepting workers in small establishments)
lowers the probability of employment adaptations in general, which may ex-
plain why medium and highly specialized males and females respond in terms
of wages and work times but only highly specialized males are slightly affected
in terms of employment. The positive cohort size effect on work time mea-
sured for medium specialized males may result from an increased pressure to
succeed on the individual worker when faced with intensified competition or
from a worsening of working conditions enforced by employers as a reaction
to increased labor supply. In contrast, the negative effects on work time for
highly specialized males and females may indicate that in this group increased
labor supply leads to a relief of the individual worker because a given amount
of work is allocated among a larger number of workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly illustrates the de-
mographic trends in the German workforce and infers expectations regarding
its effects on labor market outcomes. Section 2.3 details the empirical iden-
tification strategy. Section 2.4 describes the data. The empirical findings are
presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Workforce Aging and Competitive Labor Market
Outcomes
Over the past century, the German population was subject to substantial de-
mographic transformation resulting from a permanent decline in fertility and
a steady growth of life expectancy. The changes, which entail a rapid aging
of the population, are ongoing and will continue in the future. The German
population share of 20 to 65 year-olds is predicted to decline from 61% in 2008
to 50% in 2060 (Federal Statistical Office, 2009), which indicates that by 2060
an average worker will have to provide for herself as well as for at least one
non-working person. However, the labor force population is not only shrinking
relatively to the rest, it also ages in itself. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relative
labor force shares by age group over time and reveals considerable shifts in
the age structure of the workforce with the labor supply of younger workers
declining relatively to the supply of older workers. In particular, high shares
of people in their 20s observed in 1990 shift to people in their 30s in 2000, and
finally to people in their 40s in 2010.
How do wages, employment and working time respond to these shifts? The
size of a cohort may influence individuals’ labor market outcomes through
various channels as it ages. School outcomes, educational track, occupational
choice and further training may be subject to competition among individuals
of similar age, all of which may affect later-life economic outcomes, before
workers in the same occupational tracks compete for the same jobs on the
labor market. In particular, the larger a cohort and the more restricted the
educational capacities for popular professions, the more individuals will be
forced into another than their desired occupation, which might decrease the
quality of occupational matches and in turn affect later-life outcomes. At the
same time, the quality within popular occupations should rise, since only the
best matches prevail.3 Regarding competition for jobs on the labor market,
the size of a cohort may affect outcomes because an increase in labor supply
3Fertig et al. (2009), basing their study on SOEP data and actual population numbers,
find that an increase in the relative cohort size of 1 percentage point is associated with a
reduction in the probability of receiving a high schooling degree of at least 1.5 percentage
points. In the present study, the sample utilized in the data description (Section 2.4) exhibits
a correlation between the number of live births in the birth year and occupational prestige
(magnitude-prestige-scale), which is negative and significant at 1%.
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Figure 2.1: Labor Force Shares by Age over Time
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will either lower equilibrium wages, increase unemployment, or both.
Both the direct competition effects and the indirect mechanisms via edu-
cation and occupational sorting establish a theoretical impact of cohort size-
related competition on economic outcomes and are therefore arguably part
of the impact this study aims to measure. Besides competition, networking
may play a role because a large cohort size may foster the formation and size
of social networks. Networks may affect economic outcomes e.g. by enhanc-
ing information sharing during education or because jobs are found through
friends rather than by undergoing regular application procedures. The lit-
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erature suggests mixed network effects on economic success (e.g., Beaman,
2012; Anderberg and Andersson, 2007). Social networks may therefore enforce
or counteract the negative cohort size effect on economic success induced by
competition.
As for wages and employment, the expected cohort size effect on work
time is ambiguous. High competition levels may incentivize workers to invest
more effort by working more hours. In addition, it strengthens employers’
bargaining positions, which may lead to an increase in working hours. On
the other hand, in a situation with high labor supply employers may prefer
to allocate a fix amount of work among more employees, possibly because a
reduction in total work time per worker increases individual productivity per
hour or a more diverse pool of skills is created and the potential for innovative
ideas is enhanced. Furthermore, in large cohorts more workers may get actively
involved in unions and hereby strengthen the bargaining power of unions which
indicates a negative effect on work time.
The strength of the measured cohort size effect will not only depend on the
competition-sensitivity of individual outcomes and variations in the propen-
sity to formate networks but also on the potential of the utilized cohort size
measure to reflect the number of relevant competitors. Age cohort sizes reflect
the competitors well when workers are easily substitutable within but not be-
tween age cohorts. This would be the case in a situation where workers pass
through different stages throughout their working careers (labor market entry,
promotions) at which they compete for jobs mainly with individuals of similar
experience levels (Welch, 1979). Employers on the German labor market tend
to rely relatively strongly on signals in terms of vocational and diploma degrees
which underlines the importance of career phases in the context of the present
study (Bol and van de Werfhorst, 2011; Spence, 1973). In addition, chang-
ing job content within occupations over time may reduce the substitutability
between age cohorts even further.4
Probably most occupations are characterized by career phases and changing
job content (Biemann et al., 2012), which indicates that the size of a cohort
4Spitz-Oener (2006) shows that the complexity of skills within occupations rose since
1979 and that the changes in skill requirements have been most pronounced in rapidly
computerizing occupations.
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indeed reflects the number of relevant competitors. However, these factors
are presumably of lesser relevance if the ability to execute job tasks is rather
independent of age. This might be the case for a range of low-skilled occu-
pations that can be carried out without experience-based knowledge.5 Also,
cohort size does not reflect competition levels well when workers are not even
replaceable by individuals of similar age because their job duties require deep,
position-specific knowledge. Autor and Dorn (2013) argue that the creative,
problem-solving, and coordination tasks performed by highly educated work-
ers such as professionals and managers can not as easily be automated as the
routine, codifiable job tasks executed by many lower educated workers. In the
most extreme, less specialized workers compete with individuals from all age
groups, while highly specialized workers compete with nobody. If it is true
that cohort sizes reflect the number of relevant competitors best for medium
degrees of occupational specialization, the measured cohort size effect is likely
to be strongest for this group.
The degree of substitutability between workers also depends on market
flexibility. The German labor market is characterized by a rather restrictive
employment protection legislation6 as well as a system of unionized wage and
work time bargaining.7 Dismissal protection, on the one hand, lowers the prob-
ability of employment responses and suggests wages and work times to react
instead. Collective bargaining agreements, on the other hand, cause rigidi-
ties in wages and work times promoting employment responses. Dismissal
5Low-skilled occupations often exhibit physically demanding job duties which indicates a
negative relationship between age and the ability to execute job tasks because work-related
health impairments likely accumulate over time and human physical capacity declines nat-
urally with increasing age. Chapter 4 of this thesis discusses occupational differences in the
labor market behavior of older workers in detail and concludes that among 55–65 year-olds
non-manual workers have a 20% lower risk of exiting the labor market than manual workers.
Although not examined in this thesis, occupational differences in employment probabilities
arising from a limited ability to execute physically demanding tasks should be less prevalent
among younger age groups. Therefore, since the present analysis focuses on individuals aged
26–55, the argument that high physical job demands reduce the substitutability of workers
across age cohorts might be negligible.
6According to a comparison of 34 OECD countries regarding the OECD Indicators of Em-
ployment Protection, which measure the protection of permanent workers against dismissal,
Germany is ranked 4th in terms of individual dismissal and shares rank 5 with Hungary and
Switzerland in terms of collective dismissal. After summarizing the two indicators, Germany
ranks 1st (OECD, 2013).
7The share of unionized employees amounted to 30% in 1985, to 27% in 1993 and declined
to 20% in 2003 (Fitzenberger et al., 2011).
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protection covers all dependent employees in establishments with at least a
certain number of full-time equivalent employees equally.8 In contrast, collec-
tive labor agreements are most likely more effective for less specialized workers,
firstly, because they are more often organized in unions, and secondly, because
universally binding collective agreements cover mostly physically demanding
occupations.9 Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005) show that strong unions are as-
sociated with a lower wage level as well as a compression of the lower part of
the wage distribution. According to Franz and Pfeiffer (2006), German firms
regard labor union contracts and implicit contracts as important reasons for
the wage rigidity of the less skilled, while considering specific human capital
and negative signals for new hires as responsible for wage stickiness of the
highly skilled.
As soon as having chosen an occupation and entered the labor market, it is
plausible that individuals compete for jobs mostly with individuals in the same
occupational track, which indicates that the number of relevant competitors
is not given by the overall size of an age cohort but rather by the number of
individuals of similar age in the same occupational track, i.e. the occupation-
cohort size. All above-mentioned arguments should therefore be thought of to
apply within occupational tracks.
In summary, cohort size effects are expected to be strongest for medium
specialization degrees because the size of the own age cohort should reflect
the number of relevant competitors of this group best. Medium and highly
specialized occupations can be expected to respond in terms of wages and work
times rather than employment due to dismissal protection, while employment
effects may be rerouted provoking accordingly higher responses in the other
8The exemption threshold from dismissal protection was lifted from five to ten full-time
equivalent employees in 1996, which was returned to five employees in 1999. Bauer et al.
(2007) do not find effects of these law changes on employment dynamics. In 2004, the
threshold was lifted again to its current value of ten employees.
9The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2013) declared 506 collective agree-
ments as universally binding (July 1, 2013), i.e. applicable even if neither the employee
nor the employer belongs to the bargaining parties. Less than 1.5% of these agreements
cover occupations in science and journalism. The remaining agreements refer to occupa-
tions in agriculture and forestry, cement and lime/ceramics, mining, metal and electrical
trades, wood craft, leather and footwear, textile and clothing, food and beverage, construc-
tion, trade, transport, hotels and restaurants, cleansing and body care, and other public
and private services (care sector, security services).
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outcomes. In comparison, less specialized workers tend to have more rigid
wages and work times due to collective agreements, which establishes a higher
pressure on employment to respond. In such a situation, dismissal protection
might be circumvented by employment adaptations via hiring or non-hiring at
initial labor market entries in the first place. Finally, competition intensity
should be better reflected by occupation-cohort sizes rather than by overall
cohort sizes.
2.3 Estimation Strategy and Identification
To study the response of individual economic success to changes in the co-
hort size, individual economic outcomes are assumed to be a function of the
population of similar age in the same occupational track, which is used as
an approximation of an individual’s number of competitors for job positions.
Accordingly, the regression equation is formulated as follows:
Y = β0 + β1OCS + X
′β2 + ε , (1)
where Y denotes the economic outcome, i.e. wage, employment status, or
working hours, respectively. X represents a vector of covariates, such as educa-
tion and labor market experience, which are likely to affect economic outcomes.
ε is an error term for which E(ε) = 0 is assumed. OCS denotes the popula-
tion number in an individual’s occupation-age cell, the occupation-cohort size,
which proxies the number of relevant competitors. Its coefficient β1 reflects
the effect of competition in the labor market on economic outcomes. This is
the parameter of interest which this study aims to identify.
Equation (1) gives reason for an endogeneity concern. If workers migrate to
locations with comparably favorable expected outcomes, economic outcomes
influence the occupation-cohort size at different locations rather than the other
way around. The mechanism at work is one of demand and supply: If, on the
one hand, labor supply rises due to an increase in the occupation-cohort size,
this depresses economic outcomes (which can be thought of as the price for
labor) and raises labor demand. If, on the other hand, demand for labor rises
(for whatever reasons), expected labor outcomes become more favorable, and
in turn attract economic migration which increases the occupation-cohort size
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(reverse causality). Hence, OCS and Y are simultaneously determined by the
movement of labor supply and demand into an equilibrium.
If internal migration is sizeable, this simultaneity is potentially confounding
an OLS estimate of β1. According to data from the Federal Statistical Office
(2004, 2014a), a yearly average of 1.1 million moves across Germany’s internal
borders was observed between 1991 and 2012 with a spike of close to 1.2 million
moves in 2001. These numbers are equivalent to a situation with about 1.4% of
all German residents moving across federal state borders once a year, a num-
ber which may matter for the validity of an OLS estimate of β1. Figure 2.A1
illustrates the total number of moves by year, while Figure 2.A2 reveals con-
siderable state and time variation in the net influx rates. Apparently, some
federal states are more attractive destinations than others and attractiveness,
at least of some states, changes over time. These migration patterns are pos-
sibly determined by regional and temporal variation in expected economic
outcomes.
To address the potential bias caused by internal migration empirically,
Equation (1) is estimated employing 2SLS regressions.10 Overall cohort size
and educational capacities should be strong predictors of the number of indi-
viduals of similar age in the same occupation.11 I instrument OCS with proxies
of both measures, namely, the number live births in the birth year as well as
the nationwide share of workers in the own occupation at age 15. The original
number of children born in the birth year should be strongly correlated with
overall age cohort size throughout the life cycle. Current overall occupation
shares reflect past educational capacities, which I assume to be correlated with
current educational capacities.12 Both of these measures capture competition
10In the empirical analysis, regressions are estimated applying the Stata command ivreg2
(Baum et al., 2010).
11Section 2.5.1 below presents correlations of indicators for overall cohort size and educa-
tional capacities with the realized degree of occupational specialization. The results suggest
that educational capacities are more important for occupational sorting than overall cohort
size.
12Besides, individual occupational choice is influenced by many further factors including
personal talents, preferences regarding e.g. risk (Grazier and Sloane, 2008) and intended ef-
fort (Demiralp, 2011), individual knowledge of occupational task content (Bonin et al., 2007;
Saniter and Siedler, 2014), social networks and peer groups (Bentolila et al., 2010; Drost,
2002) as well as parental occupation and wealth (Nicolaou and Shane, 2010; Mookherjee
and Ray, 2010).
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intensity in the occupational sorting process: Given fixed educational capac-
ities, a larger cohort size intensifies competition. Given fixed cohort sizes,
tightening educational capacities intensifies competition as well. I argue that
both these variables are exogenous to individuals in the occupational sort-
ing process but relevant to the final realization of occupation-cohort sizes. I
assume that their influence via OCS is their only link to later-life economic
outcomes. Both variables are determined long before later-life individual labor
market outcomes are realized, eliminating the reverse causality concern.
Finally, the age-period-cohort identification problem needs to be addressed.
In order to identify the effect of occupation-cohort size on economic outcomes
β1, age and time effects have to be controlled for to eliminate e.g. age-specific
productivity differences and business cycle effects. Methods to effectively iso-
late cohort effects from age and period effects are a frequently debated topic in
cohort analyses (e.g. Fukuda, 2006; Luo, 2013), as the three variables are con-
nected in a perfectly multicollinear relationship (birth year + age = period).
The strategy chosen here to address this issue is to avoid an overlap of the
intervals of age, period, and cohort (following Kaushal and Kaestner, 2013). I
define age fixed effects to comprise three consecutive age cohorts (26-28, 29-
31, ... , 50-52, 53-55) and year fixed effects to vary by year. The measure for
cohort size OCS is constructed to additionally vary by occupation and federal
state.
As the effect of cohort size likely depends on the substitutability of workers
within and between age cohorts (see Section 2.2), I estimate Equation (1)
separately for three degrees of professional specialization. Furthermore, three
different specifications are defined. In the baseline specification, vector X solely
comprises age, year, occupation and region fixed effects. Occupation (region)
fixed effects are included to isolate all constant occupation-specific (region-
specific) differences in the outcome variables. Additional specifications are
defined by gradually adding further control variables.
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2.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.4.1 Data Sources and Sample Restrictions
The empirical analysis of this paper uses data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal study, which started
in 1984. It annually collects household information from about 12,000 house-
holds since 2000 as well as individual data from all household members above
age 15.13
The present analysis uses a range of socioeconomic characteristics provided
by the SOEP. The utilized sample is restricted to individuals in prime labor
force age, i.e. ages 26 to 55, to exclude age cohorts with large shares in
education or already retired. The data is further restricted to West German
residents observed between 1990 and 2012 to eliminate potential distortions
due to different labor market situations in the Eastern states or before the
reunification, respectively.14 These restrictions leave the birth cohorts 1935 to
1986 for empirical investigation. Furthermore, civil servants, soldiers and self-
employed persons are excluded as their wage and employment determinations
should function differently from those of the salaried workforce in the private
sector. In addition, individuals in vocational training, marginal irregular part-
time employment or in a sheltered workshop are removed from the sample.
Finally, observations with missing values on relevant variables are excluded.
Population and birth numbers by birth cohort and federal state as well
as population numbers by occupation are provided by the German Federal
Statistical Office. As the latter information is available for a limited number
of years,15 only data for the birth cohorts 1955 to 1976 are exploited in the
regression analysis.
Taken together, three samples are being used in the empirical analysis.
The descriptive statistics presented in the present section are based on 43131
13For documentations of the SOEP database, see Kroh (2011) or Haisken-DeNew and
Frick (2005).
14Due to east-west heterogeneity, also an exploitation of the German reunification as an
exogenous shock to occupation-cohort size might be unsuitable.
15In particular, population numbers by occupation are available only for the years 1970,
1973, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1989 and 1991. Numbers for the years in between
are imputed based on the available numbers. The data are at KldB 2 digits level. KldB
(“Klassifizierung der Berufe”) denotes the German classification of occupations of the Federal
Employment Agency.
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records from 9266 individuals (Sample 1). The employment analysis uses
28985 records from 5803 individuals (Sample 2). The analysis of occupational
sorting is also based on Sample 2 but uses time-constant variables only. The
wage and work time analysis, which is restricted to employees, includes 28277
records from 5272 individuals (Sample 3).
2.4.2 Variable Definitions
2.4.2.1 Economic Outcomes
The SOEP questionnaire asks individuals for their current employment sta-
tus and, in case they are employed, for their exact gross amount of labor
income, their contractual working hours excluding overtime, as well as their
actual working hours including overtime. From this information, the following
four outcomes are generated and used as dependent variables in the regression
analysis: (a) the natural logarithm of real hourly gross wages, (b) a binary
variable indicating employment status, (c) the number of contractual working
hours per week, and (d) the number of actual working hours per week.
2.4.2.2 Occupation-Cohort Size
As job competition in the labor market should take place mainly among in-
dividuals of similar age in the same occupational track, I attempt to measure
competition intensity by the population numbers within occupation-age cells,
i.e. the occupation-cohort size. Because these population numbers appear to
be unavailable, I estimate them by weighting actual overall cohort sizes with
occupation shares estimated from my sample using weights provided by the
SOEP. The SOEP reports the detailed current occupation and the first occu-
pation ever worked in according to the International Standard Classification
of Occupations (ISCO-88; 4 digits level).
The relevant competitors of an individual are unlikely to be sharply con-
centrated within a single age cohort. Rather, they are probably spread to some
extent over the surrounding cohorts (Welch, 1979). In addition, the most rele-
vant competitors often reside geographically close. In order to account for all
these aspects, occupation-cohort size is calculated as a weighted moving aver-
age of the sizes of the own and the surrounding age cohorts where cohort sizes
are given by age-specific population numbers at federal state level. Finally, to
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Figure 2.2: Cohort Size Measures by Birth Cohort
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also account for changes in the size of the labor force over time, the measure
is normalized by the number of individuals in core workforce age (26–55).
To formalize, occupation-cohort size (OCS) is calculated in each year (1990–
2012) for each age cohort j as a weighted moving average of population num-
bers N by federal state s, multiplied by the estimated national share of workers
ws in occupation o, and divided by the total size of the labor force at federal
state level Ns:
OCSjso =
(
1
9
N(j−2)s + 29N(j−1)s +
3
9
Njs +
2
9
N(j+1)s +
1
9
N(j+2)s
)× wso
Ns
(2)
Figure 2.2 illustrates occupation-cohort size (OCS), overall cohort size,16
and the number of live births by birth year. All three measures rise during the
baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s and decrease in the subsequent baby bust
of the 1970s. Due to the sample restrictions, OCS is more noisy for relatively
old and relatively young birth cohorts, because observation numbers drop at
the tails of the distribution over birth years. Moreover, the representativeness
16Overall cohort size is calculated as OCS with wso equal to 1.
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of OCS and overall cohort size for the original cohort size at birth deteriorates
with decreasing birth year because the share of cohort members who already
died increases.
The values taken by OCS are rather small in size. For the sake of an easy
interpretation of a one unit change in the regression analysis, I rescale OCS
by dividing it by factor 0.00015, which roughly equals the average difference
in OCS between birth cohorts born at the peak of the baby boom (around
1964) and cohorts born in the subsequent bust (around 1975), to obtain a
rescaled occupation-cohort size measure (OCS∗). As a consequence, a one unit
change in OCS∗ refers to the average difference between baby boomers and
baby busters.
2.4.2.3 Occupational Specialization
Economic theory implies that the effect of cohort size varies by degree of pro-
fessional specialization (see Section 2.2). In order to account for this hetero-
geneity, previous studies divided their samples based on educational attain-
ment, assuming occupational specialization to be increasing in education (e.g.,
Freeman, 1979; Brunello, 2010). Although education should be positively cor-
related with the degree of specialization, it is probably not a perfect measure
of substitutability. For example, an emergency physician exhibits a high level
of education but may be easily replaceable by any other physician of the same
expertise since her daily job content consists of a series of practical routine
tasks. In contrast, a less educated clerk who executes planning and organizing
works may be indispensable in her position if she strongly relies on experience
and position-specific knowledge in her daily work.
A more accurate measure of specialization would reflect the actual content
of occupational duties. Rather than education, I utilize a 1-10 ordinal scale
for physical job demands developed by Kroll (2011) to categorize my sample.
The index was constructed based on a large-scale representative survey for
Germany collected in 2006 which focused on workplace characteristics (i.e., job
requirements, main tasks, working conditions and job demands). I hypothesize
the relevance of experience and position-specific knowledge for the execution
of everyday job tasks to be decreasing in physical job demands. To the extent
physical job demands are superior in reflecting workers’ substitutability to a
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Figure 2.3: Education by Degree of Occupational Specialization
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measure of educational attainment, the present study categorizes specialization
groups more precisely than former studies did.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between the number of years in edu-
cation and the index of physical job demands, based on Sample I. While the
overall relationship may be negative, there is high variation at the occupational
level.
To illustrate the extent to which a categorization based on the index of
physical job demands differs from an assignment based on education, I define
groups of occupational specialization using each of the two measures and com-
pare the deviations in group assignment. In particular, using the index, I divide
the sample into low (index values 8-10), medium (index values 4-7), and high
specialization (index values 1-3). Using education, I define individuals with
7-10 years of education as less specialized, 10.5-13 years as medium special-
ized and 13.5-18 years as highly specialized. Only 47.1% of all observations
in Sample 1 are assigned to the same specialization group by both measures.
3.3% of the observations even exhibit a deviation of two, i.e. they are assigned
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the lowest specialization degree by one measure and the highest degree by the
other measure.17 The deviations are also illustrated in Figure 2.3, where a
darker dot color indicates a larger average deviation in group assignment.
2.4.3 Correlations
Table 2.1 reports correlations of occupation-cohort size as defined by Equa-
tion (2) with the economic outcome variables. As discussed in Section 2.2, both
positive and negative relationships are plausible. An increase in occupation-
cohort size intensifies competition for jobs, which may depress wages and em-
ployment probabilities. On the other hand, a larger occupation-cohort may
be associated with higher social interaction which may foster knowledge shar-
ing and networking with potentially positive wage and employment effects.
According to Table 2.1, a negative correlation with wage and employment is
found for medium and highly specialized males. In contrast, the coefficients
for less specialized males are positive. For females, a negative relationship
is measured only for wages of medium and highly specialized workers, while
employment status is positively correlated with occupation-cohort size for less
and medium specialized females. The remaining correlations with females’
wages and employment status are insignificant.
Considering working hours, intensified competition may incentivize workers
to invest more effort by working more hours, inducing a positive relationship
with occupation-cohort size. On the other hand, the distribution of a fixed
amount of work among a larger number of workers may be associated with
potential productivity gains due to reduced individual work loads or enhanced
innovation potential due to a more diverse pool of workers, which would suggest
a negative relationship with occupation-cohort size. According to Table 2.1,
all correlations are negative for females. For males, the picture is more mixed.
While the coefficients are mostly negative for low and high specialization de-
17Examples with a deviation of two for low education and low physical job demands (ISCO-
88 classification in parantheses): directors and chief executives (121), architects, engineers
and related professionals (214), physical and enginieering science technicians (311), finance
and sales associate professionals (341), secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks (411), client
information clerks (422). Examples for high education and high physical job demands: travel
attendants and related workers (511), building finishers and related trades workers (713),
blacksmiths, tool-makers and related trades workers (722), machinery mechanics and fitters
(723), wood treaters, cabinet-makers and related trades workers (742).
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Table 2.1: Correlations with Occupation-Cohort Size
Degree of Occupational Specialization
Low Medium High
Males:
Real hourly gross wage 0.066*** -0.181*** -0.096***
Employed 0.030*** -0.038*** -0.014
Contractual work time -0.107*** 0.015 -0.009
Actual work time -0.022** 0.053*** -0.043***
Females:
Real hourly gross wage -0.061 -0.089*** -0.146***
Employed 0.046* 0.023** -0.003
Contractual work time -0.398*** -0.166*** -0.137***
Actual work time -0.403*** -0.164*** -0.154***
Correlation coefficients. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
grees, the correlation between actual work time and occupation-cohort size
exhibits a positive sign for medium specialized workers.
2.5 Results
This section presents the estimation results for cohort size effects on occupa-
tional sorting, wage, employment and work time. To test the results for ro-
bustness, all regressions were also estimated releasing the sample restrictions
described in Section 2.4 by including civil servants, soldiers and self-employed
into the sample. As this changes the size of the estimated coefficients slightly,
but not the quality of conclusions, these results are not reported here.18
2.5.1 Occupational Sorting
Table 2.2 shows the effects of the instruments, i.e. the number of live births in
an individual’s birth year and educational capacities as measured by the share
of workers in the own occupation at age 15, on occupational sorting. The
dependent variables are categorical variables reflecting the degree of occupa-
tional specialization, inferred from the index of physical job demands described
18Results are available upon request.
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in Section 2.4.2.3 and differing only by categorical depth. The estimated ef-
fects of the number of live births indicate that belonging to a larger cohort
decreases the probability for an occupation with a higher as compared to a
lower specialization level. However, the estimated coefficients and odds ratios
are insignificant for both genders. In contrast, educational capacities have
significant positive effects in all regressions. In particular, considering the
binary regressions, the OLS coefficient for males (females) indicates that a
one percentage point increase in the occupation share at age 15 increases the
probability for an occupation with a high specialization as compared to a low
specialization by 6.2% (4.8%). Focusing on three categories of specialization
(ordered logit I), a one percentage point increase in the occupation share raises
the odds for males (females) to end up in a higher specialization category than
the considered one or a lower category by factor 1.57 (1.41). When subdivid-
ing occupations into ten categories of specialization (ordered logit II), the odds
ratios for males (females) decrease to 1.22 (1.18) but remain larger than one
and highly significant.
Table 2.2: Occupational Sorting
Males Females
OLS Ordered logit OLS Ordered logit
I II I II
Live births in birth year / 105 -0.006 0.957 0.961 -0.007 0.964 0.981
(0.010) (0.042) (0.038) (0.011) (0.050) (0.041)
Occupation share at age 15 (%) 0.062*** 1.569*** 1.219*** 0.048*** 1.413*** 1.183***
(0.003) (0.045) (0.014) (0.002) (0.025) (0.009)
Observations 3116 3116 3116 2687 2687 2687
Dependent variables (DV) measure degree of occupational specialization. OLS: DV has 2
categories; coefficients reported. Ordered logit I: DV has 3 categories; odds ratios reported.
Ordered logit II: DV has 10 categories; odds ratios reported. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Assuming that a higher degree of occupational specialization is associated
with higher economic success, the findings seem to indicate that restricted
educational capacities force individuals into less prestigious occupations. Al-
though the effects of the overall size of a cohort exhibit the expected signs,
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they are not significant. Instead, educational capacities seem to be the more
important predictor of occupational choice.
2.5.2 Wage
Table 2.3 presents the estimates of occupation-cohort size effects on wages.
In all regressions, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic exceeds the Staiger and
Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb threshold of 10, indicating that the models are
identified (Baum et al., 2007; Dickson, 2013). Because two instruments are
exploited in the regressions, overidentification tests are reported. The p-values
of the Hansen J statistics exceed 0.05 in all regressions, indicating that the
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. The test
results do therefore not raise overidentification concerns.
As Table 2.3 shows, the coefficients of occupation-cohort size (OCS∗) are
negative and significant for medium and high specialization degrees, indicating
that a larger number of competitors on the job market depresses wages. In
particular, considering the specification with additional covariates, males in
medium (highly) specialized occupations who were born at the peak of the
baby boom are estimated to earn 5.8% (5.3%) less than their counterparts
born during the subsequent baby bust. The coefficients are insignificant for
males in less specialized occupations.
The picture is similar for females, although the negative effect for medium
specialized women is significant at the 10% level only. In particular, medium
(highly) specialized women born at the peak of the baby boom are estimated
to earn 6.2% (2.5%) lower wages than comparable women born during the
baby bust.
These findings are largely in line with the theoretical expectations devel-
oped in Section 2.2. Less specialized workers are unlikely to respond in terms
of wages, first, because they are probably more easily replaceable by work-
ers of different age groups, and second, because their wages are more often
subject to unionized wage-bargaining which causes rigidities in wages.19 In
contrast, considering medium specialized workers, the size of the own age co-
hort might reflect the number of relevant competitors well, because according
19Figure 2.A3 in the Appendix shows union membership shares by degree of specialization
based on the SOEP data used here.
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to the career-phase model workers are easily substitutable within but not be-
tween age cohorts. Finally, for highly specialized occupations, the potential
of the size of a cohort to reflect the number of relevant competitors may be
lower, because these workers might not even be substitutable with other work-
ers of similar age. This argumentation provides a plausible explanation for the
finding of smaller cohort size effects for highly than for medium specialized
workers (although the difference is small for males).
The corresponding first stage results are reported in Table 2.A2 in the
Appendix. As expected, the number of live births in the birth year is posi-
tively associated with occupation-cohort size in all regressions and, except for
medium specialized males and less specialized females, its effects are also sig-
nificant. The effects of the occupation share at age 15 are even positive and
significant in all regressions.
Reduced form results are given in Table 2.A5. Surprisingly, the effects of the
number of live births in the birth year do not exhibit the expected negative sign
but are insignificant instead. In contrast, the occupation share at age 15 has
a negative effect for medium and high degrees of occupational specialization.
In particular, a one percentage point increase in the occupation share at age
15 decreases the wage level by 3.1% (1.3%). Following the argumentation
throughout this study, the mechanism behind these effects may be that a larger
occupation share reflects larger educational capacities which in turn increase
the occupation-cohort size. A larger occupation-cohort size is associated with
intensified competition for jobs on the labor market and a depression of the
wage level.
2.5.3 Employment
Table 2.4 presents the estimation results from the employment regressions.
The findings are to be interpreted with caution because, as a consequence
of restricting the sample to individuals in core labor force age, the shares of
unemployed individuals are quite low in all subsamples.
As for the wage regressions, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic exceeds a value
of ten in all regressions. With the exception of medium specialized males, none
of the overidentification tests is rejected. Hence, there are nearly no concerns
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of model overidentification. The second stage results for medium specialized
males will not be interpreted in the following.
The estimation results presented in Table 2.4 suggest a significantly neg-
ative effect of occupation-cohort size on employment for highly specialized
males. Specifically, males in occupations with high degrees of occupational
specialization who were born at the peak of the baby boom are predicted to
have a 0.3 percentage points lower employment probability than comparable
males born during the subsequent baby bust. While the coefficient for less
specialized males exhibits a negative sign too, the effect is not significant.
Considering females, there is no evidence for significant employment effects at
all.
These findings are partly in line with the expectations inferred in Sec-
tion 2.2. Employment responses are unlikely in general due to Germany’s
restrictive dismissal protection legislation, which comprehensively applies to
workers from all specialization groups equally. However, employment may
adapt to variations in occupation-cohort size via hiring or non-hiring at ini-
tial labor market entry in the first place. As low-skilled workers are often
additionally covered by universally binding collective agreements which pre-
vent their wages and work times from responding, the pressure on employment
to respond should be comparably higher for this group. Nevertheless, highly
specialized males are the only group which is estimated to respond.
The first stage results reported in Table 2.A3 in the Appendix are very
similar to the first stage results for the wage regressions presented in the pre-
vious section. Again, the number of live births in the birth year has a positive
effect on occupation-cohort size in most of the regressions, while educational
capacities have a positive impact in all regressions.
Table 2.A6 presents the reduced form regressions for employment. The es-
timated results reveal that the negative effect on employment measured in the
second stage regression for highly specialized males is driven by the occupation
share at age 15. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the occupa-
tion share at age 15 decreases the employment probability for males in high
specialization occupations by 0.1 percentage points. Additionally, the reduced
form regressions suggest that the live births in the birth year have a positive
employment effect for medium specialized males. In particular, increasing the
48
number of live births by 100,000 increases the probability for this group to be
in employment by 0.7 percentage points. This may support the networking
hypothesis described in Section 2.2 which suggests that a larger cohort may be
associated with higher social interaction which may in turn have positive ef-
fects on education as well as on the probability to be employed. The remaining
effects of the instruments on employment are insignificant.
2.5.4 Work Time
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the results from regressions of individual work time,
whereby Table 2.5 refers to weekly work time agreed upon with employers and
Table 2.6 refers to actual work time per week. As for wages and employment,
the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics pass the rule-of-thumb threshold of ten for
all reported regressions. With the exception of medium specialized females,
the overidentification test is never rejected. In the regressions for medium spe-
cialized females, the p-values of the Hansen J statistics are slightly below the
threshold of 0.05, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the instru-
ments are valid and inducing overidentification concerns. These regressions
will not be interpreted in the following.
According to Table 2.5, males in medium specialized occupations exhibit
higher contractual work times when they belong to a large occupation-cohort,
possibly indicating that intensified competition either incentivizes them to
invest more effort by working longer hours or demotivates employers to of-
fer favorable working conditions in the form of short working hours. Specifi-
cally, males in medium specialized occupations born at the peak of the baby
boom work 0.8 hours more than comparable males born during the bust. In
contrast, the work times of highly specialized males decline as a result of
larger occupation-cohort sizes, suggesting that as labor supply increases a fixed
amount of work is distributed among a larger number of workers. In particu-
lar, when a highly specialized worker was born at fertility peak instead of its
low, he works on average 0.2 weekly hours less. The work time effect for less
specialized males is not statistically significant. For females, there is a negative
effect on contractual working hours for less specialized workers, which is, while
large in size, significant at the 10% level only. It suggests that less specialized
49
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females born during the baby boom work 1.6 hours per week less compared to
females born during the baby bust. The remaining coefficients for females are
insignificant.
Considering actual work time as an outcome variable instead of contrac-
tual work time (Table 2.6) barely changes the quality of results. However,
the coefficients increase considerably in size. Medium specialized males born
at the peak of the baby boom are predicted to work 1.8 weekly hours more
than comparable males born during the subsequent bust, while highly skilled
males in large occupation-cohorts work 0.9 hours less. Also the negative effect
for less specialized female workers increases slightly from 1.6 to 1.7. In addi-
tion, the coefficient for highly specialized women, which was insignificant for
contractual work time, becomes significant at the 10% level. It suggests that
highly specialized women born at fertility high work 0.4 weekly hours less than
comparable women born at fertility low. The overall finding of stronger effects
on actual work time than on contractual work time may reflect that actual
work hours are generally more flexibly adaptable since they are not subject to
contractual agreements.
The corresponding first stage regression results on effects of the instru-
ments on occupation-cohort size (Appendix Table 2.A4) again barely differ
from those for wage and employment discussed above. The reduced form re-
gressions reported in Tables 2.A7 and 2.A8 reveal that the estimated second
stage effects on contractual work time are driven by the occupation share in
the own occupation at age 15. For example, a one percentage point increase
in the occupation share at age 15 increases contractual weekly work time of
medium specialized males by 0.4 hours. In contrast, Table 2.A8 shows that the
negative second stage effect on actual work time for highly specialized females
is driven by the number of live births in the birth year. While the second
stage estimates for medium specialized females could not be interpreted due
to rejection of the overidentification tests, the reduced form estimates reveal
a negative work time effect of overall cohort size for this group. In particular,
increasing the number of live births in the birth year by 100,000 reduces the
weekly contractual work time of medium specialized females by 1.0 hour. The
corresponding effect on actual work time is a decrease of 1.2 weekly hours.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I present new evidence on cohort size effects on wages, employ-
ment and work time. The German labor market is considered as a case study
because the existing evidence for this country lacks comprehensive insights on
labor market effects based on recent data, although the German population
ages particularly rapidly in international comparison. In contrast to previous
studies, professional specialization levels are measured by an index reflecting
actual job content rather than by educational attainment.
The empirical results indicate that belonging to a large cohort depresses
economic success. In particular, male and female workers in medium and highly
specialized occupations respond with wage reductions. Specifically, all other
things equal, a medium (highly) specialized man born at the peak of the baby
boom earns on average 5.8% (5.3%) lower wages than a comparable man born
during the subsequent baby bust. Highly specialized females from the largest
cohorts have 2.5% lower wages than their counterparts from small cohorts.
Highly specialized male workers additionally adapt in terms of employment.
Employment probabilities of highly specialized males born at peak fertility are
estimated to be 0.3 percentage points lower than those of comparable workers
belonging to later-born, smaller cohorts. Weekly work time is estimated to rise
in response to an increase in cohort size for males with medium occupational
specialization, which is reversed for highly specialized males. These findings
are confirmed for both contractual and actual work times, while the effects on
the latter outcome are stronger. In particular, medium (highly) specialized
males born into boom cohorts work 0.8 (0.2) contractual working hours and
1.8 (0.9) actual working hours longer (shorter) than comparable males born
into low-fertility cohorts. Highly specialized females work 0.4 weekly hours
less when born into large instead of small cohorts.
The estimated response pattern in the considered labor market outcomes
is well in line with the expected role of Germany’s restrictive labor market in-
stitutions. Institution-induced rigidities in one outcome might be responsible
for a relatively strong response in another outcome due to a rerouting of the
effect. In particular, the German dismissal protection legislation may hinder
employment to adapt but instead foster wage and work time responses. How-
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ever, further research is needed to supplement the findings presented in this
article and to disclose the exact mechanisms at work.
How does demographic change affect labor market outcomes? A satisfac-
tory answer to this question is clearly beyond the scope of this article as shifts
in the age structure of the workforce remain a single mediator out of a range of
potential mechanisms through which population aging might influence labor
markets. However, the estimated effects happen to be robust with some of
them being relatively large in size. Since population aging implies the supply
of older workers to rise relatively to the supply of younger workers (at least for
the initial period of demographic transition), the results of the present anal-
ysis suggest that younger workers benefit in terms of wages and employment
probabilities at the cost of older workers.
Figure 2.4 presents projections of future relative cohort sizes and predicted
wage differentials for the age groups 25 to 29 and 50 to 54. As the left panel
shows, the supply of older workers exceeds the supply of younger workers
already in 2015, which points at the shifts in the age structure that have taken
place during the past decades. Furthermore, the projected workforce share
of older workers remains larger throughout the whole period from 2015 until
2060. This indicates that when small young cohorts today age into small old
cohorts tomorrow, tomorrow’s young cohorts will be even smaller. Hence, the
labor force as a whole will continue to decline since coming generations will
be smaller and smaller. As the left panel of Figure 2.4 reveals, the relative
supply of older and younger workers will not remain constant over the coming
decades. In particular, while the difference in relative cohort size amounts to
about 5 percentage points in 2015 and 2020, it drops to about 2 percentage
points in 2025. Thereafter, it rises to 5 percentage points in 2040 again before
declining to below 3 percentage points in 2060.
The right panel of Figure 2.4 presents predicted wage differentials for the
two age groups over time, calculated by entering projected cohort sizes from
the Federal Statistical Office (2015), estimation coefficients presented in Ta-
ble 2.3 and variable group averages from Sample 3 into Equation (1). Medium
specialized females are predicted to have the largest wage differential of all
considered groups amounting to nearly 0.8, which indicates a very moderate
wage growth throughout their working careers. Highly specialized females,
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Figure 2.4: Predicted Young/Old Wage Differentials until 2060
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
W
or
k 
fo
rc
e 
sh
ar
e
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Year
Age group 50-54
Age group 25-29
Difference
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 w
ag
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
l
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Year
Medium specialization, males
Medium specialization, females
High specialization, males
High specialization, females
Own calculations based on population projections from the c. Left panel: percentages
aged 25–29 and 50–54 of population in core workforce age (25–54). Right panel:
predicted young/old wage differentials (age groups 25–29 vs. 50–54) by gender and
occupational specialization. Wages were predicted by entering projected cohort
sizes, estimation coefficients presented in Table 2.3 and variable group averages from
Sample 3 into Equation (1).
in contrast, exhibit the lowest differential close to 0.5, suggesting that they
experience the strongest wage growth over time among the considered groups.
The comparison of the left and right panels of Figure 2.4 suggests a positive
relationship between the difference in cohort size and the wage differentials
between the two age groups. For example, the rise in the cohort size difference
of about 3 percentage points from 2025 to 2040 is associated with a rise in
the wage differential for medium specialized males (females) of about 1.7 (2.5)
percentage points. Regarding highly specialized males (females), the increase
amounts to 1.4 (0.6) percentage points.
These results suggest that increasing the workforce share of older relative to
younger workers benefits younger workers in terms of wages at the cost of older
workers. Especially in the past, at the onset of workforce aging when initially
balanced workforce shares have shifted to become more and more unbalanced
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(compare Figure 2.1), younger workers may have profited at the disadvantage
of older workers. This might be interpreted as an inequitable redistribution of
economic success between generations (Harper, 2014).
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Appendix 2
Table 2.A1: Means and Standard Deviations
Degree of occupational specialization
Low Medium High
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Males, Sample 2:
Age 37.88 7.04 38.82 6.97 38.44 6.70
Education 10.75 1.39 11.10 1.87 13.97 2.80
Labor market experience 16.44 7.78 16.52 7.96 13.87 7.88
Employed† 0.98 0.15 0.99 0.12 1.00 0.07
German native† 0.72 0.45 0.79 0.41 0.92 0.27
Household size 3.15 1.38 3.05 1.33 2.82 1.34
Observations 6695 5260 6222
Males, Sample 3:
Real hourly gross wage 15.02 4.45 15.14 5.78 21.10 7.69
Full-time employed† 0.99 0.08 0.96 0.19 0.98 0.14
Contractual work time 38.42 3.07 38.46 5.26 38.44 3.23
Actual work time 42.16 6.18 42.81 8.35 44.64 6.90
Observations 6574 5193 6199
Females, Sample 2:
Age 39.14 7.25 39.02 7.22 37.98 7.06
Education 10.10 1.54 11.35 2.17 12.95 2.58
Labor market experience 10.08 7.69 10.41 7.62 10.70 7.16
Employed† 0.94 0.23 0.94 0.24 0.96 0.21
German native† 0.56 0.50 0.77 0.42 0.91 0.29
Household size 3.12 1.28 2.89 1.26 2.61 1.15
Observations 1143 4107 5558
Females, Sample3:
Real hourly gross wage 10.54 5.14 11.96 5.68 15.76 7.05
Full-time employed† 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.49
Contractual work time 27.93 12.05 30.15 10.01 31.51 9.39
Actual work time 29.80 13.14 32.67 11.50 34.78 11.34
Observations 1086 3886 5339
SD: standard deviation. † binary indicator variable. Weights provided by the SOEP are
used.
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Figure 2.A1: Internal Migration over Time
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Figure 2.A2: Net Migration Influx by State
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Figure 2.A3: Union Membership by Degree of Specialization
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3 Estimating Earnings Assimilation of
Immigrants to Germany: Evidence from a
Double Cohort Model
Abstract
Following the seminal work of Chiswick (1978), many studies have examined
the extent to which earnings of immigrants vary over the settlement process.
While these studies usually find that the initial earnings gap between native
and immigrant workers in traditional immigration countries disappears as the
duration of residence in the host country increases, empirical evidence mostly
suggests that immigrants to Germany experience persistent earnings disad-
vantages and, if at all, only a moderate earnings assimilation process for some
immigrant groups. However, due to variations in the economic performance of
different immigration cohorts, estimates derived from cross-sectional models
may be biased (Borjas, 1985). Against this background, this paper employs a
double cohort model to revisit the existing evidence on earnings assimilation
processes of immigrants to Germany. In line with this literature, no evidence
for a robust assimilation process for immigrants is found, even after accounting
for potential cohort effects.
3.1 Introduction
Given the increasing number of immigrants worldwide, the social and eco-
nomic integration of immigrants into the societies of their host countries is
of particular importance. The economic literature on the integration of im-
migrants focuses especially on exploring the convergence of immigrant earn-
ings to the earnings of (comparable) natives. Following the seminal work of
Chiswick (1978), a broad literature measures the economic performance of im-
migrants by estimating cross-section earnings regressions. In general, these
studies interpret the coefficient of the variable “years since migration” as earn-
ings assimilation pattern, starting from an initial earnings differential between
immigrants and natives.
In this context, cohort effects and selection processes are of special interest
in the empirical discussion. Borjas (1985) argues, that cross-section estimates
might be biased, when basic differences between immigration cohorts exist or
the composition of immigration cohorts has changed over time (e.g. due to
systematic return migration). In this case, the parameter estimate of the vari-
able “years since migration” does not solely measure the assimilation effect,
but might also reflect differences in trajectory paths between immigration co-
horts. If, for example, earlier immigration cohorts follow a flatter assimilation
path than more recent cohorts, the assimilation effect might be underestimated
in a cross-section regression. Myers and Lee (1996) and Myers et al. (1998)
state, that the same argument holds when trajectory paths vary by birth co-
hort, since these differences are carried by the age or labor market experience
variable, respectively, which is normally included as a regressor as well. The
coefficient of this variable, which is meant to measure the trajectory path of
the reference group, is then potentially distorted. In spite of this fundamental
critique, existing studies on earnings assimilation nearly exclusively focus on
the estimation of cross-section models,20 while cohort effects are rarely taken
into account.
In the decades after World War II, Germany experienced an intensive im-
migration history. In the 1960s and 1970s the government recruited a large
number of guestworkers mainly from Southern Europe. Although these work-
20For a literature overview, see Bauer et al. (2005).
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ers were expected to return to their home countries after some years, many of
them decided for a permanent residence in Germany. After the oil crisis started
in 1973, migration inflows were due to family reunions, the immigration of
“Aussiedler” (ethnic Germans residing in East European countries), refugees
and asylum-seekers. In 1992, Germany experienced a historical peak with 1.5
million new immigrants (Bauer et al., 2005). Since the mid 1990s the foreign
population equals about 9% of the total population (Federal Statistical Office,
2010). Given this impressive immigration history, Germany provides an emi-
nent case study for analyses of the economic and social integration of immi-
grants.
While for other traditional immigration countries like the U.S., Canada
and Australia a clear earnings assimilation process is empirically confirmed
by cross-sectional studies, empirical evidence mostly suggests that immigrants
to Germany experience persistent earnings disadvantages and, if at all, only
a moderate earnings assimilation process for some immigrant groups. Given
the rather pessimistic picture drawn by the existing empirical evidence for
Germany and the fundamental critique in the literature regarding cross-section
regressions, the question arises, whether the existing literature underestimates
the economic performance of immigrants to Germany.
The current paper reexamines the question of earnings assimilation of im-
migrants to Germany under exploration of the relevance of cohort effects for
the validity of cross-sectional estimates. The empirical analysis is based on
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the time period 1990
to 2012 and is restricted to men residing in West Germany or Berlin. Both
a traditional cross-section design and a double cohort model, which controls
for potential distortions due to cohort effects, are estimated in order to allow
for direct comparisons of the model predictions regarding the economic perfor-
mance of immigrants over the settlement process. The estimation results of the
cross-section regressions confirm the frequent finding of no assimilation pro-
cess for immigrants to Germany. Likewise, cohort model estimates from several
specifications deliver either insignificant or, for some immigrant groups, even
slightly negative duration effects. Hence, no evidence for an earnings assimi-
lation process for immigrants to Germany is found, even after accounting for
potential cohort effects.
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The paper contributes to the empirical migration literature by providing a
first application of a double cohort model to earnings assimilation processes.
This model circumvents the identification problem of age, cohort and period ef-
fects in a more convincing way than traditional cross-section models. Further,
empirical evidence is provided, which confirms the frequent finding of no uni-
versal assimilation process for immigrants to Germany, even after accounting
for potential cohort effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. Referring to the respective literature, Sec-
tion 3.2 briefly surveys the age-period-cohort identification problem, different
models of assimilation as well as the existing empirical evidence for Germany.
Section 3.3 describes the utilized data and the descriptive statistics. In Sec-
tion 3.4 the empirical strategy is outlined. Section 3.5 reports and discusses
the empirical results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature
3.2.1 The Classic Age-Period-Cohort Identification Problem
The problem of separating age, period and cohort effects is well discussed in
the literature on cohort analysis (e.g. Heckman and Robb, 1985; Mason and
Fienberg, 1985). Applying the problem to the context of earnings determi-
nants, all three temporal dimensions might have separate effects on earnings.
First, earnings are determined by age, since they typically grow positively at
decreasing rates over individuals’ life cycles. Second, earnings levels depend
on period-specific economic conditions like the business cycle. Third, trajec-
tory paths might be birth cohort-specific, that is, the speed of earnings growth
might vary by cohort structure, size or cohort-specific economic optimism. All
three variables can therefore be considered as eligible for inclusion as covari-
ates in earnings regressions. An identification problem arises, however, due to
perfect multicollinearity:
P = BC + A ,
where P denotes period, BC denotes birth year, and A denotes age.
When focusing on immigrants, two additional temporal earnings determi-
70
nants become obvious. Typically, immigrants earn significantly lower wages
immediately after their immigration than comparable natives. This may be ex-
plained by imperfectly transferable human capital between countries (Chiswick,
1978; Friedberg, 2000). Basilio et al. (2014) empirically confirm the hypothesis
of imperfect transferability of human capital between countries for the case of
Germany. If immigrants gain host country-specific human capital over time
(like language skills and information on labor market conditions), an additional
earnings growth process is implemented by the event of immigration, which is
not related to age but to the duration of stay in the host country (Myers and
Lee, 1996). Again, trajectory paths might vary between immigration cohorts
because of different cohort sizes and structures, or because the composition
of immigration cohorts has changed over time (e.g. due to systematic return
migration, Borjas, 1985). In this context, an identification problem arises from
the following relation:
P = MC + D ,
where P again denotes period, MC denotes year of immigration, andD denotes
the duration of stay in the host country.
As a consequence of the perfect multicollinearity, effect identification for all
temporal variables by including them simultaneously as regressors in a cross-
section regression is impossible. The omission of variables, however, leads to
biased effect estimates. As Bell and Jones (2013) show, there is no solution to
the age-period-cohort identification problem which does not rely on any kind
of assumptions. The following section discusses different strategies taken in
the earnings assimilation literature and their implicit assumptions.
3.2.2 Relating Models of Earnings Assimilation
Studies on the economic and social integration of immigrants constitute an
important strand of the economic literature. In this context, empirical studies
on earnings assimilation processes focus on comparisons between natives and
immigrants regarding their speed of earnings growth. Theoretically, due to
imperfect transferability of human capital between countries, immigrants have
lower opportunity cost of investments in (host country-specific) education than
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comparable natives (Regets and Duleep, 1999). Therefore, immigrants are ex-
pected to have higher earnings growth rates than natives, such that their initial
earnings disadvantage is expected to narrow over time. The question of inter-
est in empirical analyses of earnings assimilation processes is whether such
an adaptation process indeed takes place. Based on the assumption that na-
tives and immigrants follow the same aging trajectory path over time, existing
empirical studies deduce an earnings assimilation process, when the earnings
growth path related to duration of stay (which is followed by immigrants but
not by natives) is estimated to exhibit positive growth rates (e.g. Chiswick,
1978; Borjas, 1985).
In his seminal paper on the earnings assimilation of immigrants to the U.S.
Chiswick (1978) undertakes the first empirical attempt to measure the effect of
duration of stay on earnings. He estimates a cross-section earnings regression
including, besides other socioeconomic characteristics, labor market experience
(as calculated from age) and years since migration as independent variables.
Considering natives as reference group, he interprets the coefficient of years
since migration as earnings assimilation path. The coefficients of experience
and years since migration reflect earnings differences between individuals with
different age and duration of stay, respectively. But as pointed out above,
earnings differences between individuals at a specific point in time might be
due to both age differences and birth cohort differences. Hence, the coefficient
of labor market experience captures both aging effects and birth cohort effects.
Likewise, the coefficient of years since migration reflects duration effects and
immigration cohort effects. Hence, while Chiswick’s approach assumes na-
tives and immigrants to follow the same aging trajectory path, another strong
implicit assumption behind it is the absence of any cohort-specific earnings
differences.
In Borjas’ (1985) famous reply study he criticizes the potential bias in a
cross-section comparison of immigrants from different immigration cohorts.
Exploiting data for natives and immigrants from two periods, he decomposes
the cross-section effect of years since migration into two parts, the first mea-
suring earnings differences of immigrants from the same immigration cohort
over time, the second measuring differences of immigrants from different co-
horts but with identical durations of stay. Borjas interprets the first part, de-
72
noted as earnings growth within a cohort, as earnings assimilation effect, while
the second part, denoted as earnings growth between cohorts, is interpreted
to capture immigration cohort-specific differences. Borjas’ method controls
for immigration cohorts but not for birth cohort-specific earnings differences,
since, as Chiswick, he includes labor market experience (as measured from age)
as a cross-sectional variable into his regression. While Borjas recognizes the
necessity of controlling for immigration cohort differences, his approach makes
the implicit assumption of a non-existence of birth cohort-specific earnings dif-
ferences. If birth cohort-specific earnings differences are present, the estimated
aging trajectory path of natives, who serve as reference group, might be biased
(Myers and Lee, 1998).
Hence, both of the described approaches rely on strong assumptions that
may be unrealistic. A superior strategy to estimate the duration effect of inter-
est would be one that makes more reasonable assumptions and recognizes the
presence of both birth and immigration cohort-specific earnings differences.
Myers and Lee (1996) and Myers et al. (1998) provide such a strategy which
controls for age, duration, period, birth cohort and immigration cohort simul-
taneously. As Borjas, they exploit data from several periods.
The implicit assumptions made by this model are the following: Period
effects apply to all individuals equally. Members of the same birth cohort have
the same birth cohort effect and follow the same aging path. Natives and
immigrants from the same birth cohort have identical birth cohort and aging
effects. Members of the same immigration cohort have the same immigration
cohort effect and follow the same duration path. Finally, the model allows
for wage effects that are specific to immigration cohorts nested within birth
cohorts.
Applying these assumptions, the model identifies changes over time ap-
plying to all individuals equally as period effects. To account for potential
cohort differences, aging and duration effects are allowed to vary by birth and
immigration cohort, respectively. Aging effects are identified as changes over
time applying to natives from a specific birth cohort, and duration effects are
estimated for each immigration cohort as the difference in changes between
natives and immigrants from the same birth cohort. Technically, the method
isolates dynamic effects from constant cohort effects by regressing on both
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cohort dummy variables and interaction terms between cohort and period.21
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence for Germany
Although the presence of the age-period-cohort identification problem in cross-
section regressions has long been recognized, a wide range of studies on earnings
assimilation patterns adopts the estimation strategy of Chiswick (1978). While
for other traditional immigration countries like the U.S., Canada or Australia
an earnings assimilation process is empirically confirmed by cross-sectional re-
gressions, studies for immigrants to Germany, which are based on data mainly
from the SOEP, deliver ambiguous results (Bauer et al., 2005).
Only few studies find evidence confirming an assimilation process. Based
on the first wave of the SOEP, Schmidt (1993b) estimates an initial earnings
disadvantage for guestworkers of 12% relative to comparable Germans. On
average 17 years after immigration guestworkers reach income equality with
Germans. Constant (1998) finds an initial earnings disadvantage for female
guestworkers, using the first 10 waves of the SOEP. After 10 years they overtake
the earnings of comparable German women. Basing their study on the first 14
SOEP waves, Constant (2005) conclude that immigrants reach income equality
with Germans after 23 years.
In contrast to these results, Pischke (1992) measures, based on the first six
waves of the SOEP, an initial earnings differential between 20% and 25%, which
does not significantly decline over time. He finds evidence for an assimilation
process only for immigrants from guestworker countries, who immigrated af-
ter 1976. Dustmann (1993) estimates different specifications of a cross-section
regression on the basis of the first wave of the SOEP and finds a persistent
earnings disadvantage of 13% to 19% for guestworkers relative to comparable
Germans. After control for potential distortions due to systematic selection
into the labor market and the return migration decision, Licht and Steiner
(1994) also find, based on the first six waves of the SOEP, a large initial earn-
ings disadvantage for immigrants, which is not narrowing over time. However,
for immigrants with relatively short durations of stay they find similar earnings
levels and higher earnings growth rates as for Germans. Schmidt (1997) as well
21Myers and Lee (1996) apply the model to residential overcrowding, while Myers et al.
(1998) explore homeownership attainment.
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finds a persistent earnings disadvantage of 20% for guestworkers compared to
Germans. He concludes, that this earnings differential is caused by long-run
differences in education. Based on the first 10 waves of the SOEP, Constant
(1998) finds a significant and persistent earnings disadvantage for male guest-
workers compared to Germans. However, she also finds an initial but short-
lived earnings advantage for immigrants. Fertig and Schurer (2007) investigate
assimilation patterns for different immigrant groups regarding earnings as well
as unemployment probability. They find evidence for an earnings assimilation
process only for ethnic Germans and the youngest immigrant group immigrated
between 1969 and 2002. The results of Zibrowius (2012) suggest that although
immigrants in Germany experience wage growth, their earnings profiles are
mostly flatter than those of Germans and a persistent earnings differential re-
mains. Taking a slightly different perspective, Gathmann and Keller (2014)
detect wage returns to citizenship for female immigrants to Germany, while
there are no returns for men and traditional guestworkers.
Summarized, the majority of studies arrives at rather pessimistic con-
clusions, mostly predicting persistent earnings disadvantages for immigrants,
while an earnings assimilation process can be confirmed, if at all, only for
specific immigrant groups. Given these pessimistic results, the question arises
whether unconsidered cohort effects might have caused an underestimation of
the economic performance of immigrants to Germany in existing cross-sectional
studies of earnings assimilation patterns.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal study for Germany
collecting information on native and foreign households. All household mem-
bers above 15 years of age are questioned individually in face-to-face interviews.
In addition, household-related questionnaires are answered by household heads
(Kroh, 2011; Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005). The yearly repeated survey
started in 1984 with about 6,000 interviewed households and samples about
12,000 households per year since 2000 (Goebel et al., 2008).
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The empirical analysis of this paper is based on data from the waves 1990
to 2012. To focus on a population with a high share of full-time employed,
the sample is restricted to male individuals aged from 18 to 65 years who
are employed and no apprentices. Immigrants are defined as foreign-born
individuals who immigrated to Germany since 1948. Since the population share
of immigrants is relatively small in East Germany (Federal Statistical Office,
2010), only individuals residing in West Germany or East or West Berlin are
included. Foreign-born ethnic Germans who received German citizenship after
immigration are excluded from the sample because it is unclear whether they
should be assigned as natives or as immigrants.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports average labor earnings by birth and immigration cohort.22
As expected, the mean wages of immigrants are lower than that of natives
in most categories, implying earnings disadvantages for immigrants compared
to natives. The overall earnings increase from 1990-96 to 2004-12 is higher
for immigrants than for natives, suggesting that an assimilation process over
the considered time period may potentially take place. However, dividing the
sample into birth cohorts confirms this picture only for individuals born before
1955. Within the two younger birth cohorts, immigrants experience a lower
wage growth than natives. A comparison by immigration cohort reveals that
wages tend to be higher and to increase stronger the earlier is the period of
immigration.
Comparing immigration cohorts by birth cohort shows that the wage in-
crease for immigrants before 1974 is mainly driven by the strong increase for
the youngest birth cohort born after 1965 of 3.69e. These individuals have
immigrated during childhood, meaning that their human capital was mostly
attained within Germany, which might explain their comparably high economic
success. However, also immigrants from this birth cohort who immigrated later
in their life cycles experienced a wage growth of more than 2e. Considering the
22Inconsistencies between the means result from the weighting of the observations with
weights provided by the SOEP. (For example, the absolute increase from 1990-96 to 2004-
12 is larger for natives from all birth cohorts separately than it is for the whole group of
natives.)
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oldest birth cohort born before 1955, there is a strong heterogeneity in wage
growth. In particular, within this birth cohort, immigrants between 1974 and
1989 experience an increase of over 6e, while the wages of immigrants after
1989 decrease by more than 6e. However, the observation numbers for these
groups are relatively low. In summary, the reported variation in earnings levels
and in changes over time by birth and immigration cohort indicate that earn-
ings levels and earnings growth paths might differ remarkably between birth
and immigration cohorts, underlining the necessity to control for both in the
empirical analysis.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to explore the relevance of cohort effects for the validity of cross-
sectional earnings assimilation estimates, the empirical analysis focuses on a
comparison of the results of a cross-section regression model after Chiswick
(1978) and a double cohort regression model after Myers and Lee (1996) and
Myers et al. (1998), respectively. Only the latter model allows an estimation of
assimilation effects undistorted by cohort effects. The current paper provides a
first application of this estimation strategy to earnings assimilation processes.
To appropriately apply the double cohort regression model, observations
from several points in time are needed, which cover a sufficiently long time
span for an earnings assimilation process to potentially take place. The present
analysis exploits all years from 1990 to 2012. To account for the possibility
that assimilation patterns differ by country of origin, the regressions are run
separately for immigrants from OECD countries, which are relatively highly
industrialized, and other countries of origin. Moreover, to exclude the pos-
sibility that substantial variation by educational level between immigration
cohorts may distort the results (most immigrants before 1974 were relatively
low educated guestworkers), the regressions are also run separately for indi-
viduals with less than 11 years of education and individuals with at least 11
years of education, such that only the latter group includes individuals who
received at least an upper secondary degree or technical school degree.
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3.4.1 Cross-Section Regression Model
Chiswick (1978) extended the Human Capital Earnings Function (Mincer,
1974) to application on datasets containing immigrants. The following variant
of this extended specification is estimated:
ln Y = α0 +
∑
i
α1i Pi + α2 exp+ α3 exp
2
+mig
[
α4 + α5 ysm+ α6 ysm
2
]
+ α7 educ+ ε , (3)
where Y is gross hourly earnings in nominal terms, Pi are year dummy vari-
ables, which equal one for observations from the particular year i, exp is years
of labor market experience in full-time employment and ysm is years since
migration. mig is a dummy variable, which equals one if an individual immi-
grated to Germany since 1948, zero otherwise. educ is education in years and
ε is a random error with expectation value zero.
Following Chiswicks interpretation, which derives from the human capi-
tal theory, αˆ4 measures the initial earnings differential between natives and
immigrants after immigration, which is under the assumption of imperfectly
transferable human capital between countries expected to be negative. The
coefficients of labor market experience are interpreted to capture the concave
aging trajectory path of natives, who serve as reference group. The coefficients
of years since migration should capture all deviations of immigrants from the
natives’ trajectory path and are therefore interpreted to measure the earnings
assimilation process. However, as pointed out above, both the coefficients of
years since migration and experience might also carry cohort differences, such
that they might not reflect the pure effects of duration of stay and aging,
respectively.
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3.4.2 Double Cohort Regression Model
Adopting the estimation strategy of Myers and Lee (1996) and Myers et al.
(1998), the following regression equation is estimated:
ln Y = β0 +
∑
i
β1i Pi +
∑
j=2,3
[
β2j BCj + β3j (BCj · T )
]
+mig
{ ∑
k=1,2,3
[
β4kMCk + β5k (MCk · T )
]
+
∑
j=2,3
∑
k=1,2,3
[
β6jk (BCj ·MCk) + β7jk (BCj ·MCk · T )
]}
+ β8 educ + ε, (4)
where Y is again gross hourly earnings in nominal terms and Pi are year dummy
variables, which equal one for observations from the particular year i, zero
otherwise. BCj are dummy variables for different birth cohorts, which equal
one for observations of individuals born during the corresponding time period,
zero otherwise (BC1: born before 1955 [serves as reference group]; BC2: born
between 1955 and 1965; BC3: born after 1965). The birth cohorts have been
chosen such that the medium-aged birth cohort roughly comprises the baby
boomers. MCk are dummy variables for different immigration cohorts, which
equal one for observations of immigrants during the particular time period,
zero otherwise (MC1: immigrant before 1974; MC2: immigrant between 1974
and 1989; MC3: immigrant after 1989; natives serve as reference group). The
earliest birth cohort includes the guestworkers, who were recruited by the
German government until the beginning of the oil crises in 1974. The most
recent immigration cohort comprises immigrants who entered the country after
the German reunification in 1989. T gives the observation year with 1990 set to
zero. mig is a dummy variable, which equals one if an individual immigrated
to Germany since 1948, zero otherwise. educ is education in years, the terms
in parentheses are interaction terms and ε is an error term with expectation
value zero.
The coefficients of Pi measure year-specific effects, which occur to all obser-
vations equally (e.g. because of changes in macroeconomic conditions). The
coefficients of BCj measure the initial average earnings level of the particular
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birth cohort compared to BC1. This differential partly results from the dif-
ferent initial age levels of the birth cohorts, but also captures, for example,
differences in the cohort structure between BCj and BC1. The interaction
terms between birth cohort and period (BCj · T ) represent the cohort-specific
linear time trends in earnings, such that βˆ3j can be interpreted as the aging
effect of birth cohort BCj compared to BC1. The coefficients of MCk quantify
the initial earnings differential between the particular immigration cohort and
natives, which is not explained by birth cohort-specific earnings differences.
Besides earnings differences due to different initial durations of stay, these co-
efficients also capture immigration cohort-specific differences. The coefficients
βˆ5k measure the average earnings change of the particular immigration co-
hort compared to natives, net of birth cohort-specific changes, such that these
coefficients provide estimates for the duration effects of interest. The inter-
action term between birth and immigration cohort (BCj ·MCk) controls for
the case that specific birth cohorts within immigration cohorts have effects on
earnings, which appear neither for the whole birth cohort nor the whole im-
migration cohort (age-at-arrival effect). The highest interaction term, finally,
(BCj · MCk · T ) represents dynamic effects specific to birth cohorts nested
within immigration cohorts and therefore captures duration effects, which do
not appear for a whole immigration cohort, but only for a specific birth cohort
within an immigration cohort. In contrast to the assimilation effects derived
from a cross-section regression model like Equation (3), the estimated dura-
tion effects derived from Equation (4) are not potentially distorted by birth or
immigration cohort effects.
3.5 Empirical Results
Table 3.2 reports cross-sectional estimates of Equation (3) for both natives
and immigrants from OECD countries as well as natives and immigrants from
other countries. The coefficients of labor market experience have the expected
signs in both regressions, indicating that the individuals follow a concave aging
trajectory path over time.
For immigrants from OECD countries the coefficient of the immigrant
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Table 3.2: Cross-Sectional Earnings Regressions
OECD Other
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Labor market experience 0.029*** 0.001 0.030*** 0.001
Labor market experience2/102 -0.046*** 0.002 -0.048*** 0.002
Immigrant -0.101*** 0.034 -0.248*** 0.032
Years since immigration 0.004 0.003 0.008* 0.004
Years since immigration2/102 -0.005 0.006 -0.006 0.008
Education 0.070*** 0.001 0.070*** 0.001
Full-time employed 0.119*** 0.021 0.120*** 0.022
Married 0.081*** 0.007 0.080*** 0.007
Constant 1.131*** 0.042 1.093*** 0.042
R2 0.37 0.38
Observations 64340 60186
OLS. Year, county and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard
errors (SE) are clustered at the household level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
dummy variable exhibits a negative and significant sign, suggesting an initial
earnings disadvantage for these immigrants compared to Germans of about
10%. For immigrants from countries not participating in the OECD, this dif-
ferential amounts to even 25%. Immigrants from non-OECD countries may
have a larger initial earnings disadvantage because human capital may be more
easily transferable within the OECD than across OECD borders. At the same
time, the coefficients of years since migration are either insignificant or, for
immigrants from non-OECD countries, significant only at the 10% level. This
result suggests that the dynamic growth path of immigrants does not signif-
icantly deviate from the native trajectory path. Hence, the estimated initial
earnings disadvantage may be persistent over time, so that there is no evidence
for an earnings assimilation process. This confirms the results of most existing
cross-sectional studies for Germany.
Table 3.3 reports cross-sectional estimates separately for individuals with
low and high education levels. As before, the coefficients of the immigrant
dummy are significantly negative in all regressions. A higher education level
as well as originating from a country other than an OECD country seem to
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increase the initial earnings disadvantage compared to German natives. Again,
the estimated coefficients of years since migration are either insignificant or
significant at the 10% level only. Hence, the results by education confirm the
results reported in Table 3.2.
Table 3.4 shows results from cohort regressions of Equation (4) by country
of origin. Both regressions predict an earnings disadvantage of about 12.4%
for the medium-aged birth cohort and of about 22.4% for the youngest birth
cohort both compared to the oldest birth cohort, reflecting that earnings are
increasing in age. The estimated aging effects suggest that over time the
earnings of the medium-aged birth cohort grow at a significantly higher rate
than the earnings of the oldest birth cohort.
The average earnings differential between natives and immigrants from
OECD countries is insignificant for the immigration cohort after 1989, while
it is negative and significant for immigrants between 1974 and 1989 and immi-
grants before 1974. However, positive age-at-arrival effects of different size are
measured for these immigration cohorts, mostly offsetting the negative overall
effects. Hence, there may not be an earnings disadvantage for immigrants from
OECD countries after all. Also, the duration effects are insignificant for all
immigration cohorts and may be even negative for some nested cohorts.
For immigrants from countries other than OECD countries there is a sig-
nificantly negative earnings differential between natives and all three immi-
gration cohorts. In particular, immigrants before 1974 earn 5.5% less, immi-
grants between 1974 and 1989 earn 13.5% less and immigrants after 1989 earn
even 24.1% less than comparable Germans. While for the earliest immigra-
tion cohort, the positive age-at-arrival effects may offset the overall earnings
disadvantage, this is not the case for immigrants between 1974 and 1989 and
immigrants after 1989. As the duration effects suggest, a narrowing of these
differentials does not take place at all. On the contrary, there is a negative
effect for the most recently immigrated group that is significant at 5%, sug-
gesting that the earnings disadvantage may be even growing. However, within
this immigration cohort the duration effect of nested cohorts is significantly
positive for individuals born after 1965, offsetting the widening of the overall
disadvantage for younger immigrants. Overall, a convergence of immigrant
wages to the wages of natives is not predicted.
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Table 3.4: Double Cohort Earnings Regressions
OECD Other
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Birth cohort
Born before 1955 (reference group)
Born 1955-1965 (BC2) -0.124*** 0.013 -0.125*** 0.013
Born after 1965 (BC3) -0.225*** 0.015 -0.224*** 0.015
Aging effect
Born before 1955 (reference group)
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 · T ) 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
Born after 1965 (BC3 · T ) -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Immigration cohort
Natives (reference group)
Immigrant before 1974 (MC1) -0.044*** 0.017 -0.055** 0.021
Immigrant 1974-1989 (MC2) -0.180*** 0.044 -0.135** 0.062
Immigrant after 1989 (MC3) -0.157 0.227 -0.241*** 0.090
Duration effect
Natives (reference group)
Immigrant before 1974 (MC1 · T ) -0.001 0.003 -0.006* 0.003
Immigrant 1974-1989 (MC2 · T ) 0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.006
Immigrant after 1989 (MC3 · T ) -0.003 0.015 -0.015** 0.007
Age-at-arrival effect
Born before 1955; natives (reference groups)
Immigrants before 1974:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC1) 0.129*** 0.027 0.124* 0.064
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC1) 0.124*** 0.039 0.127*** 0.042
Immigrants 1974-1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC2) 0.129** 0.051 0.002 0.083
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC2) 0.234*** 0.051 0.090 0.082
Immigrants after 1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC3) -0.036 0.237 -0.088 0.104
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC3) 0.068 0.235 0.046 0.101
Duration effect of nested cohorts
Born before 1955; natives (reference groups)
Immigrants before 1974:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC1 · T ) -0.006* 0.004 -0.004 0.007
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC1 · T ) -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006
Immigrants 1974-1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC2 · T ) -0.013** 0.006 -0.005 0.007
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC2 · T ) -0.011* 0.006 0.001 0.007
Immigrants after 1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC3 · T ) 0.006 0.016 0.012 0.008
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC3 · T ) 0.007 0.016 0.023*** 0.008
Control variables
Education in years 0.062*** 0.001 0.063*** 0.001
Full-time employed 0.210*** 0.021 0.209*** 0.021
Married 0.137*** 0.007 0.138*** 0.007
Constant 1.451*** 0.042 1.425*** 0.042
R2 0.34 0.35
Observations 64340 60186
OLS. Year, county and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors (SE)
are clustered at the household level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5 reports cohort regressions of Equation (4) by country of origin
and educational group. Focusing on the estimated birth cohort effects, the
medium-aged birth cohort and especially the youngest birth cohort have on
average significantly lower earnings than the oldest birth cohort, again reflect-
ing that wages are increasing in age. The differentials are more pronounced
for higher education levels, suggesting a higher wage inequality in this group.
While the corresponding aging effects are positive in the regressions for higher
education levels, indicating wage growth over time, they are insignificant for
lower educated individuals born between 1955 and 1965 and even negative
for those born after 1965 in the lower education group, suggesting an average
earnings decline of 0.4% per year.
Focusing on immigration cohort effects for immigrants from OECD coun-
tries with a lower education level, there is a negative wage differential between
natives and immigrants between 1974 and 1989 as well as immigrants after
1989. In particular, the former are estimated to earn 9.2% less, while the
latter are measured to earn even 43.3% less than comparable natives. The cor-
responding duration effects and the duration effects of nested cohorts, which
are either insignificant or even slightly negative, do not indicate a narrowing
of these differentials over time.
For lower educated immigrants from countries not participating in the
OECD, no significant differentials compared to natives are measured. Addi-
tionally, all age-at-arrival effects are insignificant. Hence, although the wages
of immigrants before 1974 decline significantly over time and those of immi-
grants after 1989 from the youngest birth cohort rise, there are no overall
earnings disadvantages compared to natives.
Considering higher educated individuals, there are significant overall earn-
ings differentials for all immigration cohorts except for immigrants after 1989
from OECD countries. However, the positive age-at-arrival effects for immi-
grants before 1974 and younger immigrants between 1974 and 1989 potentially
offset the differentials for these groups. As for lower educated individuals, the
overall duration effects in combination with the duration effects of nested co-
horts do not point at any earnings assimilation process taking place. The
positive duration effect for immigrants before 1974 may be compensated by
the negative duration effects of nested cohorts for this immigration cohort.
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Table 3.5: Double Cohort Earnings Regressions, Effect Heterogeneity
Less than 11 years of education At least 11 years of education
OECD Other OECD Other
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Birth cohort
Born before 1955 (reference group
Born 1955-1965 (BC2) -0.051*** 0.017 -0.046*** 0.017 -0.193*** 0.018 -0.196*** 0.018
Born after 1965 (BC3) -0.134*** 0.020 -0.121*** 0.021 -0.341*** 0.021 -0.347*** 0.021
Aging effect
Born before 1955 (reference group)
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 · T ) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.007*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.001
Born after 1965 (BC3 · T ) -0.004** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.002
Immigration cohort
Natives (reference group)
Immigrant before 1974 (MC1) 0.017 0.022 0.011 0.031 -0.263*** 0.031 -0.168*** 0.031
Immigrant 1974-1989 (MC2) -0.092** 0.044 -0.065 0.125 -0.289*** 0.068 -0.206*** 0.067
Immigrant after 1989 (MC3) -0.434*** 0.147 -0.075 0.150 -0.100 0.320 -0.409*** 0.082
Duration effect
Natives (reference group)
Immigrant before 1974 (MC1 · T ) -0.005* 0.003 -0.009*** 0.003 0.019*** 0.005 0.004 0.006
Immigrant 1974-1989 (MC2 · T ) -0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.009 0.015* 0.008 0.001 0.006
Immigrant after 1989 (MC3 · T ) 0.016 0.015 -0.018 0.012 -0.005 0.023 -0.009 0.007
Age-at-arrival effect
Born before 1955; natives (reference groups)
Immigrants before 1974:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC1) 0.025 0.032 0.001 0.078 0.318*** 0.053 0.288*** 0.071
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC1) 0.003 0.045 -0.009 0.047 0.280*** 0.065 0.235** 0.101
Immigrants 1974-1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC2) 0.046 0.052 0.040 0.137 0.125 0.077 0.002 0.096
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC2) 0.083* 0.049 -0.125 0.147 0.256** 0.103 0.244** 0.100
Immigrants after 1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC3) 0.240 0.169 -0.255 0.168 -0.082 0.334 0.058 0.107
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC3) 0.286* 0.164 -0.126 0.156 0.063 0.337 0.177 0.111
Duration effect of nested cohorts
Born before 1955; natives (reference groups)
Immigrants before 1974:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC1 · T ) 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.008 -0.030*** 0.006 -0.009 0.009
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC1 · T ) 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.008 -0.020*** 0.008 -0.005 0.009
Immigrants 1974-1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC2 · T ) -0.000 0.005 -0.005 0.012 -0.016* 0.009 -0.005 0.008
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC2 · T ) 0.006 0.005 0.017 0.012 -0.020* 0.011 -0.008 0.009
Immigrants after 1989:
Born 1955-1965 (BC2 ·MC3 · T ) -0.008 0.016 0.019 0.014 0.002 0.025 0.005 0.009
Born after 1965 (BC3 ·MC3 · T ) -0.005 0.016 0.032** 0.013 -0.001 0.025 0.013 0.008
Control variables
Education in years 0.043*** 0.005 0.051*** 0.006 0.058*** 0.002 0.058*** 0.002
Full-time employed 0.256*** 0.044 0.262*** 0.046 0.192*** 0.023 0.190*** 0.024
Married 0.121*** 0.010 0.130*** 0.010 0.147*** 0.009 0.145*** 0.009
Constant 1.525*** 0.075 1.439*** 0.085 1.578*** 0.065 1.549*** 0.061
R2 0.19 0.20 0.34 0.35
Observations 25749 22211 38591 37975
OLS. Year, county and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors (SE)
are clustered at the household level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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The remaining duration effects are mostly insignificant.
In summary, there are considerable earnings differences between immi-
grants from OECD countries and immigrants with other countries of origin,
while the differences to Germans seem negligible for some immigrant groups
from OECD countries. Dividing the samples in lower and higher educated
individuals still reveals no convergence in earnings. Neither the cross-sectional
estimates nor the cohort model predictions yield evidence for a robust earnings
assimilation process.23 This confirms the pessimistic findings of most existing
studies on earnings assimilation processes of immigrants to Germany. Hence,
although the double cohort estimates suggest remarkable cohort differences,
these seem in general not to qualitatively distort predictions derived from
earlier cross-section studies on earnings assimilation processes for the case of
Germany.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper estimates earnings assimilation effects for immigrants to Germany
under exploration of the relevance of cohort effects for the validity of cross-
sectional estimates. In the empirical analysis, which is based on data for male
immigrants to Germany, a traditional cross-section regression model is esti-
mated, which does not control for birth or immigration cohort effects and
therefore yields potentially biased results. Consistent with the majority of ex-
isting empirical studies, this model predicts a huge initial earnings disadvan-
tage for immigrants from countries not participating in the OECD compared
to Germans, which remains persistent over time.
In order to measure earnings assimilation effects under consideration of
potential birth or immigration cohort effects, a double cohort model, which
circumvents the identification problem of age, cohort and period effects in a
more convincing way than traditional cross-section models do, is estimated
by both country of origin and educational level. The paper provides the first
application of a double cohort model to earnings assimilation processes. The
23To check for the robustness of the results, all regressions were also estimated including
interaction terms between the immigrant dummy and all control variables, except for the
variables of the basic model in Equation (4) but education. This as well did not yield
significant duration effects.
88
estimation results suggest that birth cohorts nested within immigration co-
horts affect earnings remarkably differently. However, in spite of controlling
for these differences, no evidence for a universal earnings assimilation process
can be found. This confirms the frequent finding of no appreciable earnings as-
similation process for immigrants to Germany. Hence, the results of this paper
do not indicate a qualitative distortion of cross-sectional estimates of earnings
assimilation processes for the case of Germany. In contrast, the result of no
significant earnings assimilation process appears to be robust for the case of
Germany.
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4 Inequality of Opportunity in Retirement
Age: The Role of Physical Job Demands
Abstract
We quantify differences in the retirement age between manual and non-manual
workers and evaluate these differences in the context of the literature on equal-
ity of opportunity. The focus is on the question how individual background
during childhood transmits through physical demands of occupations on re-
tirement ages. Individual retrospective data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel are used to analyze labor force dynamics over the years 1984 to 2011.
Discrete time duration models suggest that retirement ages differ substantially
between manual and non-manual workers. To elaborate how such differences
are explained by individual background characteristics on the one hand and ef-
fort and luck on the other hand, we make use of tests for stochastic dominance
and a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The result is that individual background
characteristics explain a share of about one third of inequality in retirement
ages as transmitted through physical demands of occupations.
4.1 Introduction
In 2007, the German Federal Parliament approved a law to gradually increase
the normal retirement age from 65 to 67. The decision was accompanied by
a public debate on the justness of a legal retirement age fixed at a high level
towards workers being exposed to different levels of physical job demands.
In particular, high physical demands of job duties may force a worker to re-
tire early because work-related health impairments accumulate over time and
human physical capacity declines naturally with increasing age. This may
disadvantage respective occupations since retirement previous to the normal
retirement age reduces benefit entitlements for two reasons. First, fewer years
of work imply fewer years of contribution and thus lower pension claims, since
their overall amount depends on the duration of preceding contributions. Sec-
ond, early retirement is subject to actuarial adjustments, which additionally
reduces pension claims by 3.6 per cent for each year by which an old age
pension is claimed early.24 In addition, occupations with high physical job de-
mands tend to be low-wage professions, which restricts the potential for private
pension provision.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify differences in the retirement age
between manual and non-manual workers and to evaluate these differences
with respect to equality of opportunity. The focus is on the question how
individual background during childhood transmits through physical demands
of occupations on retirement ages. Our study contributes to the existing liter-
ature in several respects. First, we provide a precise empirical description of
labor force dynamics of older manual and non-manual workers with a partic-
ular focus on retirement patterns. Second, we contribute to the literature on
equality of opportunity (EOP hereafter) as prominently discussed by Roemer
(1993, 1998), by distinguishing between individual background beyond indi-
vidual influence on the one hand and effort and luck on the other hand. This
framework is useful to structure thoughts in a debate, where early retirement
of manual workers is frequently declared as “unfair” because this usually im-
plies a reduction in social security wealth. To the best of our knowledge, this
24Actuarial adjustments have been introduced in the German public pension system be-
tween 1997 and 2004.
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is the first study on EOP in retirement age. Finally, we use data for Germany
which provides an eminent case study for analyses of an aging population.
Demographic change will continue to impose a fair amount of pressure on the
pay-as-you-go pension system. The baby boom cohorts born between 1955
and 1970 move towards retirement as of the year 2015, once they successively
become eligible for old age pensions. At the same time, younger birth cohorts
are much smaller (Federal Statistical Office, 2014b). Severe population aging
will either induce raising contributions, alleviate benefit entitlements or both.
Our analysis departs from a description of labor force dynamics of older
workers beginning at age 40 to elaborate differences in the retirement age for
manual workers compared to non-manual workers. In a first step, discrete
time duration models are used to estimate the hazard rate for transitions
out of full-time employment, part-time employment or unemployment into
retirement. To distinguish manual from non-manual occupations, we make
use of a well-defined measure for the degree of physical demands on respective
jobs (Kroll, 2011). In a second step, the question of EOP in retirement is
elaborated. We begin with a non-parametric test for stochastic dominance
at first order, which is applied to the EOP framework as in Lefranc et al.
(2009, 2008); Trannoy et al. (2010). This approach compares the cumulative
distribution of the outcome retirement age, conditional on specific individual
background characteristics or “circumstances” in the terminology of Roemer
(1998). We then proceed to a decomposition as established by Blinder (1973)
and Oaxaca (1973). This technique allows us to infer on how much of the
difference in retirement ages between manual and non-manual workers is due
to circumstances. Finding an answer to this question is crucial when evaluating
policy designs that may involve benefit reductions for early retirees.
Our results indicate that the estimated hazard profile of non-manual work-
ers is about 20% lower compared to individuals with physically demanding
occupations for the age group 55 to 65. Moreover, non-parametric tests for
stochastic dominance at first order indicate that the distribution of retirement
age differs significantly between individuals across circumstances. Most impor-
tantly, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition suggests that circumstances explain
at least one third of the observed differences in the retirement age between
workers of different degrees of physical job demands. This finding is impor-
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tant because it indicates that a considerable part of differences in retirement
age is predetermined and thus not subject to individual choice.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews
previous research on EOP, discusses the ambiguity in the evaluation of early re-
tirement as a “good” or a “bad” and provides an overview on the employment
behavior of older workers. Section 4.3 describes the data and sample con-
struction. Section 4.4 provides the empirical analysis, quantifies differences in
retirement age between manual and non-manual workers and attributes these
differences to circumstances and effort/luck in a corresponding decomposition.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Equality of Opportunity and Retirement
Modern egalitarian views such as expressed in Rawls (1971); Cohen (1989);
Fleurbaey (1995a,b) postulate that, instead of equality in outcomes, distribu-
tive justice only requires equality of opportunity in achieving those outcomes.
The recent economic literature usually follows the terminology as introduced
by Roemer (1998), according to which individual outcomes are generated by
two fundamental determinants: “circumstances” and “effort”, which are de-
fined to be orthogonal. While circumstances reflect background characteristics
for which an individual cannot be held responsible, differences in outcome due
to effort are considered a legitimate source of inequality. Consequently, given
equal circumstances, all remaining differences in outcomes are subject to per-
sonal responsibility. Lefranc et al. (2009) state that no consensus has been
reached so far on how opportunities are precisely defined. They provide an
extension of the EOP framework by introducing luck as an additional deter-
minant of individual outcome. Lefranc et al. (2009) conclude that luck is a
legitimate source of inequality in outcomes, as long as it is not correlated to
circumstances and is thus “even-handed”.
A large body of recent economic literature on EOP has emerged, with
numerous applications to income distributions (e.g. Devooght, 2008; Lefranc
et al., 2008, 2009; Aaberge et al., 2011) and health (e.g. Jusot et al., 2013;
Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009; Trannoy et al., 2010). In the present paper,
we provide the first application of the EOP framework to inequality in retire-
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ment age. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which circumstances are
mediated through physical demands of occupations to the age of retirement.
This question is often raised in the public debate, where early retirement of
manual workers is frequently considered to be “unfair” because this usually
implies a reduction in social security wealth.
Whether early retirement is a “good” or a “bad” is not unambiguous and
deserves some further discussion. In previous applications of EOP, a natural
ordering of the outcome of interest is straightforward, i.e. “more income is bet-
ter than less income” or “good health is better than poor health”. Our research
question differs from former applications in a sense that such an ordering is not
as straightforward for the retirement age; it is difficult to say whether early re-
tirement is good or bad. We take this puzzle as a motivation to briefly outline
the view which is taken in this paper. Traditionally, retirement decisions are
viewed to be determined by a combination of individual preferences for con-
sumption and leisure and incentives set by the social security system (see e.g.
Weiss, 1972; Sheshinski, 1978 for early contributions). Clear consequences of
early retirement are an increase in leisure time (less work time) and a reduction
in consumption (due to reduced income from labor and/or social security), and
thus retirement is an issue of labor supply (Hurd, 1990). Beyond individual
preferences for leisure and consumption, retirement may interact with subse-
quent phenomena that either support or prevent an individual to live longer.
Retirement may relieve individuals from work-related stress with a positive
impact on the remaining years to live, but empirical evidence suggests that a
cognitive decline sets in after retirement (see e.g. Rohwedder and Willis, 2010;
Bonsang et al., 2012). Moreover, according to Hernaes et al. (2013) no causal
link between retirement age and mortality can be established. Instead, recent
work by Giesecke and Schnabel (2014) indicates a strong selection into specific
retirement ages, where the type of individual to retire at a certain age differs
substantially by characteristics that are strongly correlated to mortality, such
as health related behaviors and wealth. Aside from labor supply, employer be-
havior may be responsible for the early termination of employment contracts
if demand is weak and layoffs are necessary (Hutchens, 1999). In this context,
demand-sided factors may induce early retirement even if employees wish to
retire later (Hakola and Uusitalo, 2005).
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The evaluation of early retirement is obviously an intricate task because
a complex mix of “goods” and “bads” needs to be taken into account. For
example, an individual with a strong preference for consumption may want
to work longer and retire later but may be forced to behave differently due to
plant closure or health issues. In the context of this paper, our interest in early
retirement refers to the case where individuals retire early for reasons that are
correlated to physical demands of occupations. Specifically, we calculate the
difference in mean retirement age between manual and non-manual workers to
assess the proportion of this difference which is due to individual background
characteristics. Therefore, our view on early retirement focuses on its adverse
effects, because it reduces retirement benefits and thus social security wealth
in a situation where postponed retirement would avoid a decline in retirement
income but is either difficult or impossible to realize.
Figure 4.1: Development of Average Retirement Age in Germany
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Source: German Federal Pension Insurance (2013). Retirement ages
previous to 1993 are for former West Germany only, while all subsequent
values are reported for reunified Germany.
Recent retirement patterns for Germany suggest that the average retire-
ment age increases. However, Figure 4.1 indicates that this trend is not quite
the same for old age pensions (OA-pensions) and reduced earnings capacity
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pensions (REC-pensions).25
Apparently, there is a large difference in the average retirement age between
OA-pensions and REC-pensions. Most notably, while the average retirement
age for OA-pensions exhibits an upward trend at least after the introduction of
actuarial adjustments in the late 1990s, the retirement age for REC-pensions
declined. These differences are substantial, which needs some explanation.
First, while REC-pensions do not necessarily coincide with physically demand-
ing occupations, eligibility for REC-pensions is usually due to poor health,
which itself is expected to be positively correlated to physically demanding
occupations. Thus, manual workers should be largely over-represented in the
group of individuals that receive REC-pensions. Second, selection into REC-
pensions may have changed in the course of a large decrease in the total num-
ber of entries into REC-pensions (German Federal Pension Insurance, 2013),
leaving a sample of the “worst cases” who retire earlier on average. Conse-
quently, the diverging pattern of average retirement ages for OA-pensions and
REC-pensions in Figure 4.1 has important implications for the present study
as it provides a first hint of differences in the retirement age between manual
and non-manual workers. Subsequently, these differences will be analyzed in
further detail.
4.3 Data and Sample Construction
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) for the waves 1984 to 2012. The SOEP is a repre-
sentative panel study for Germany which annually interviews households and
its individual members since 1984. The survey started with about 6,000 inter-
viewed households per year and comprises about 12,000 households per year
since 2000 (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005). As the focus of this study is
on transitions into retirement, we use individual retrospective calendar data
on employment spells as provided by the SOEP.26
25In contrast to old age pensions which are available after age 60 depending on the eligi-
bility type, reduced earnings capacity pensions are available at any age before 60, once the
corresponding medical indication has been assigned.
26Taking into account retrospective calendar records where individuals are asked to report
their labor force participation from the previous year, we effectively draw on information
until 2011.
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In order to analyze labor force transitions of older workers we restrict our
sample to individuals aged 40 and older. For those individuals, who meet this
restriction in the observation period from 1984 to 2011, we construct spells
with respect to four defined states of labor force participation. Specifically, we
distinguish spells of (i) full-time employment, (ii) part-time employment, (iii)
unemployment and (iv) retirement. Our primary sample provides 13,304 total
transitions from 17,594 individual spells as reported in Tables 4.A1 and 4.A2
in the Appendix.27 Central to our analysis is the number of total transitions
into retirement from all other states, which amounts to 3,036.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Retirement across Physical Job Demands: Evidence from Du-
ration Models
To classify individuals by the physical demands of their reported occupation,
we make use of the International Standard Classification of Occupations from
1988 (ISCO 88). This classification serves to categorize physical demands on
a 1-10 ordinal scale for physical job demands as constructed by Kroll (2011).28
Using this index, we categorize individuals into a group of low physical job
demands (index values 1-5, abbreviated as LD and also referred to as man-
ual workers), and a group of high physical job demands (index values 6-10,
abbreviated as HD and also referred to as non-manual workers). Figure 4.2
distinguishes between low physical demands (LD) and high physical demands
(HD) in occupations and shows how shares of individuals in defined labor force
states evolve over age separately for the two sexes.
According to Figure 4.2, manual workers both exit full-time employment
and enter retirement at lower ages compared to non-manual workers. Exits
from full-time employment increase substantially after age 55. Moreover, re-
tirement predominantly takes place between age 55 and 65, which is strongly
27Note that depending on the state of departure and the state of destination for specific
transitions, the number of observations varies considerably in subsequent empirical investi-
gations and is thus lower compared to the primary sample.
28The scale was developed using data from a large-scale representative survey for Ger-
many from 2006, which collected information on workplace characteristics such as job re-
quirements, main tasks, working conditions and job demands.
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driven by social security legislation. Aside from social security legislation,
retirement patterns as displayed in Figure 4.2 capture a rather broad situa-
tion where potentially unobserved factors such as mutual agreements or social
norms do play a role; such aspects are taken into account in the subsequent
duration model. Finally, the figure indicates that full-time employment is
more prevalent among male individuals while female individuals work more
frequently in part-time employment. As we are primarily interested in labor
force dynamics that document transitions into retirement, the observed pat-
terns in Figure 4.2 justify that we restrict our analysis to individuals aged 55
to 65 (equivalent to 11 years or 132 months) in subsequent regressions, while
capturing all relevant transition dynamics.
Further descriptive evidence for systematic differences in retirement across
physical demands is attained from discrete time duration models.
Table 4.1: Discrete Time Duration Models: Differences Estimation for
Transitions into Retirement by Physical Demands.
Compl. Log-Log Multinomial Logit
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Binary Case
Manual .247 (.041) – –
MNL (Coefficient w.r.t. Outcome):
Manual (Part-Time) – – –.417 (.098)
Manual (Unemployment) – – .765 (.075)
Manual (Retirement) – – .277 (.063)
+ Duration-Dummies Yes Yes
Predicted Transition Rate (%) 3.00 3.19
Obs.(Person-Month-Obs.) 5146(210770) 3630(134960)
Reported values are estimated coefficients. For the multinomial logit, coefficients are esti-
mated with respect to full-time employment as base category. Precise definition of labor
force states for all ages requires more information and thus the multinomial logit has more
missings, i.e. fewer observations.
Table 4.1 reports the results for two discrete time duration models, i.e. a
binary complementary log-log model assuming discrete time proportional haz-
ards and a multinomial logit assuming discrete time proportional odds. The
binary model describes transitions into retirement from any of the other labor
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force states, while the multinomial logit model allows for transitions into all
different states, i.e. full-time employment, part-time employment, unemploy-
ment and retirement. Duration time enters both models in its most flexible
form, where 132 dummies capture variation for each month (i.e. age) and
thus no functional form assumption on the baseline hazard is imposed. The
variable “Manual” discriminates between occupations with high physical de-
mands (Manual = 1) and low physical demands (Manual = 0). The estimated
coefficient on “Manual” is positive for the binary proportional hazards model,
which indicates that manual workers have a larger hazard to enter retirement
on average. In the multinomial logit model, the coefficient for “Manual” is as
well positive and of similar magnitude for transitions into retirement (i.e. the
respective outcome). This result is important to underline what we have found
in the binary case, because the multinomial model allows for transitions into
other states and is thus more general.
Figure 4.3: Predicted Hazard Profile for Retirement Entries by Physical
Demands
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Figure 4.3 reports hazard profiles for exits into retirement as predicted
from the complementary log-log model. Hazard profiles in Figure 4.3 show
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that retirement entries accumulate around age 60, 63 and 65, as suggested
by the respective peaks in predicted hazard rates. This pattern is a perfect
projection of the German social security legislation, where eligibility for spe-
cific types of old-age pensions are achieved at these specific ages.29 Similar
patterns for Germany with spikes at age 60, 63 and 65 have been recognized
in previous studies, such as Bo¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998); Bo¨rsch-Supan
(2000). Moreover, the hazard profile for non-manual workers (average haz-
ard to enter retirement is 2.5%) is systematically lower compared to manual
workers (average hazard to enter retirement is 3.2%) for the observed ages.
Thus, the hazard profile of non-manual workers is about 20% lower compared
to individuals with physically demanding occupations.
4.4.2 Retirement and Individual Background: Evidence from Non-
Parametric Tests
A simple test of equality of opportunity is to check whether the retirement
age distributions differ between individuals with different circumstances. If
so, this points at differences in the timing of retirement which are beyond
individual responsibility. Assume two retirement age distributions A and B
and their cumulative distribution functions (CDF) FA(r) and FB(r). Then,
A dominates B at first order if and only if FA(r) ≤ FB(r) for any retirement
age rj = {r1, r2, ..., rk}. We apply the first order stochastic dominance concept
using three different categories of circumstance variables to divide our sample,
namely, personal characteristics, socio-economic background, and urbanisation
of area of residence during childhood. We test for equality of distributions
conducting Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions.
4.4.2.1 Dominance According to Socio-Economic Background
We use parental educational attainment as a proxy for socio-economic back-
ground. Figure 4.4 plots the CDFs of retirement age for individuals whose
fathers achieved a secondary education degree (i.e. German “Abitur” or “Fa-
29Note that eligibility refers to both early and normal retirement ages. The normal retire-
ment age for a regular old-age pension was 65 until December 2011, where our observation
period ends. Besides regular old-age pensions, other types are available such as pensions for
unemployed, women, long-term insured and severely disabled individuals. These types of
old-age pensions are typically available “early”, i.e. at age 60 or 63.
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative Distribution Function of Retirement Age by
Circumstances
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choberstufe”) and individuals whose fathers did not achieve such a degree
(panel (a)). With an exception for the tails, the CDF of individuals born to
highly educated fathers lies below the CDF of individuals born to less educated
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fathers across the complete distribution of retirement age. The largest differ-
ence between highly and less educated fathers is 0.286, the largest difference
between less and highly educated fathers is zero. The distributions are tested
to be significantly different from each other. Hence, the CDF of individuals
born to highly educated fathers first order dominates the CDF of individuals
born to less educated fathers.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the analogous CDFs with respect to maternal educa-
tional attainment (panel (b)). The overall picture is similar to the one based on
paternal education. Again, the CDFs are significantly different with the CDF
of individuals born to mothers with a secondary degree lying below the CDF
of individuals born to mothers without such a degree. Both the findings based
on paternal and maternal education indicate that equality of opportunity is
violated.
4.4.2.2 Dominance According to Personal Characteristics
We consider sex and body height as personal characteristics, which are at-
tributes that individuals clearly cannot be held responsible for. Figure 4.4
illustrates CDFs of age at retirement by specific circumstances, where sex is
displayed in panel (c). While the overall shapes of the distributions appear
to be quite similar, the lines diverge between ages 60 and 65, implying that
females enter retirement earlier than males. Table 4.2 reports all results of
according stochastic dominance tests for equality of distribution by specific
circumstances. The largest difference between the distribution functions is
0.215. The maximum difference between females and males is negative (-
0.004), which indicates that the CDF of males lies below the CDF of females
at any possible retirement age. The small p-value for the combined test in-
dicates that the distributions of males and females are significantly different.
Hence, the CDF of males first order dominates the CDF of females. However,
differences in retirement age by sex cannot generally be considered as illegit-
imate inequalities since males and females are subject to different retirement
rules and social norms and are therefore of limited comparability.
In contrast, retirement rules are independent of body height. Height is a
proxy for childhood health as well as height-related differences in self-perception
and the perception by others which may both provoke differences in career
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Table 4.2: Tests for Stochastic Dominance at First Order: Differences in
Distribution of Retirement Age by Circumstances
Test Maximum Difference p-value Corrected p-value
By Father’s Schooling
No Secondary Education 0.286 0.000
Secondary Education 0.000 1.000
Combined 0.286 0.000 0.000
By Mother’s Schooling
No Secondary Education 0.273 0.000
Secondary Education -0.024 0.000
Combined 0.273 0.000 0.000
By Sex
Female 0.215 0.000
Male -0.004 0.185
Combined 0.215 0.000 0.000
By Body Height
Small 0.209 0.000
Tall -0.009 0.001
Combined 0.209 0.000 0.000
By Urbanisation
Rural 0.078 0.000
Urban -0.016 0.000
Combined 0.078 0.000 0.000
chances. In a comparison of CDFs by body height, first order stochastic dom-
inance would clearly imply the presence of inequality of opportunity in the
timing of retirement. Figure 4.4 (panel d) illustrates the distribution func-
tions for individuals who differ by body height, where the sample mean of
body height has served as a threshold to assign individuals to the two groups.
Again, the distributions appear very similar with a divergence between ages
60 and 65; the maximum difference amounts to 0.209. The largest difference
between small and tall individuals is negative (-0.009), which implies that the
CDF of tall individuals is below the CDF of small individuals at any retirement
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age. According to the combined test, the CDFs are significantly different from
each other. The conditions for first order stochastic dominance are fulfilled,
suggesting the presence of inequality of opportunity in favour of tall people.
4.4.2.3 Dominance According to Urbanization in Childhood
In contrast to personal characteristics and socio-economic background, visi-
ble differences in retirement age are not as distinctive when individuals who
grew up in areas of different degrees of urbanization are compared. Figure 4.4
suggests that the CDFs about coincide at most retirement ages (panel (e)).
There is a slight divergence between ages 60 and 63. The stochastic dominance
test reveals that at any retirement age the CDF of individuals who grew up in
urban areas lies below the CDF of individuals who grew up in rural areas. The
largest difference amounts to 0.078 and the CDFs are estimated to be signif-
icantly different. Hence, although the visible differences appear rather small
when comparing CDFs by urbanization, the urban-CDF dominates the rural-
CDF at first order, suggesting inequality of opportunity in age at retirement
as well for this characteristic.
4.4.3 Decomposition of the Difference in Retirement Age by Phys-
ical Demands: Circumstances versus Effort and Luck
Up to this point, we focused on retirement inequalities between different de-
grees of physical job demands (duration models) and inequality of opportunity
in retirement (tests for stochastic dominance) separately. The ultimate aim
of this study is, however, a combination of the two, i.e. an evaluation of the
proportion of differences in retirement age between manual and non-manual
workers that are attributed to circumstances as distinguished from effort and
luck. In order to estimate this proportion, we conduct the decomposition
method proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) based on the following
linear model:
RAg = Xg
′βg + εg , (5)
where g = (N,M) denotes the groups of non-manual workers N and manual
workers M , respectively, RA denotes individual retirement age expressed in
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years whereas varying by month, X contains a constant and a range of circum-
stance variables, and ε is an error term. The mean difference in retirement
age, which is given by
∆NM = E(RAN)− E(RAM) , (6)
= E(XN)
′βN − E(XM)′βM ,
where E(βg) = βg and E(εg) = 0 by assumption, can generally be decomposed
into
{E(XN)− E(XM)}′β∗ + {E(XN)′{βN − β∗}+ E(XM)′{β∗ − βM}} , (7)
such that the first summand refers to the “explained” part and the second
summand represents the “unexplained” part of the outcome difference between
the two groups. The literature proposes several variants of the decomposition
in Equation (7) by determining β∗ in different ways. Specifically, β∗ can be
defined as a weighted average of the group coefficient vectors:
β∗ = ΩβN + (I−Ω)βM , (8)
where Ω denotes a weighting matrix and I is an identity matrix. Ω = I
and Ω = 0 represent the special cases proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blin-
der (1973). These two decompositions provide the extreme cases of assigning
the complete interaction effect between endowments and coefficients either to
differences explained by endowments (“explained” part) or to differences ex-
plained by coefficients (“unexplained” part), respectively. Several authors have
suggested alternatives leading to decompositions in between. Neumark (1988)
suggests to estimate a pooled model over both groups to infer β∗. Cotton
(1988) proposes to choose Ω = sI, where s denotes the sample fraction of
group N .
In Section 4.4, we report estimates of all four described variants of Equa-
tion (7), while our preferred decompositions are those proposed by Neumark
(1988) and Cotton (1988) since they provide convincing strategies of achiev-
ing a result between the extreme cases. As the circumstances we include in
our model are only a subset of all relevant circumstances (we do not observe
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talent, for example), the estimate of the explained part of Equation (7) must
be interpreted as a lower bound of the contribution of circumstances to the
retirement differential between manual and non-manual workers. The unex-
plained part is to be interpreted as arising from differences in the coefficients
as well as differences in unobserved predictors, such as effort and luck (Jann,
2008).
4.4.4 Decomposition Results
Table 4.3 reports the results from the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. While
on average both considered occupation types retire in their early 60s, it is pre-
dicted that manual workers retire 1.1 years earlier than non-manual workers.
The decomposition results shown in the lower panel of Table 4.3 suggest that
endowments explain between 0.25 and 0.46 years of this differential, depending
on the choice of Ω, which is equivalent to a contribution of between 23.2% and
42.3%. When considering the results based on the pooled model over groups,
0.44 years of the differential (39.8%) are explained, while 0.66 years (60.2%)
remain unexplained. Finally, the results for the decomposition proposed by
Cotton (1988), suggest that 0.37 years of the difference (33.5%) are attributed
to differences in endowments.
Table 4.3: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Non-Manual Workers:
Average retirement age 61.42
Obs.(Person-Month-Obs.) 499(82185)
Manual Workers:
Average retirement age 60.33
Obs.(Person-Month-Obs.) 539(97363)
Difference 1.099
Decomposition:
Ω = I Ω = 0 Pooled Cotton
Explained 0.255 0.465 0.437 0.369
23.18% 42.30% 39.77% 33.55%
Unexplained 0.844 0.634 0.662 0.730
76.82% 57.70% 60.23% 66.45%
Decomposition of the difference in mean retirement age in years between non-manual and
manual workers.
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The findings from the latter two decompositions indicate that circum-
stances account for at least 33.5% to 39.8% of the differences in retirement
age between manual and non-manual workers, while at most 60.2% to 66.4%
can be attributed to effort and luck. The estimated contribution of circum-
stances can be considered as a lower bound since the range of circumstances
accounted for is unlikely to be complete (e.g., we do not observe innate talents)
and, in addition, circumstance effects are likely to be mediated partly through
characteristics not included in the model which are potentially influenced by
individual choices, such as educational attainment, occupational choice, or
health behaviors, which cannot be distinctively classified as circumstance or
effort variables. In sum, the decomposition results suggest that circumstances
explain at least one third of the observed differences in the retirement age
between workers of different degrees of physical job demands, which indicates
that a considerable part of differences in retirement ages are predetermined
and thus not subject to individual choice.
4.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to quantify differences in the retirement age
between manual and non-manual workers and to evaluate these differences with
respect to EOP. The focus is on the question how individual background during
childhood transmits through physical demands of occupations on retirement
ages.
Individual retrospective data from the SOEP are used to analyze labor
force dynamics over the years 1984 to 2011. Discrete time duration models are
estimated in the most flexible version, where age (i.e. duration time) enters
the model on a monthly level and thus accounts for variation in the relevant
range from age 55 to 65. The estimated hazard profile of non-manual workers
is about 20% lower compared to individuals with physically demanding occu-
pations. Non-parametric tests for stochastic dominance at first order indicate
that the distribution of retirement age differs significantly between individuals
across circumstances. However, the ultimate aim of this study is an evalu-
ation of the proportion of differences in retirement age between manual and
non-manual workers that are attributed to circumstances as distinguished from
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effort and luck. The result from a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition suggests that
circumstances explain at least one third of the observed differences in the re-
tirement age between workers with different degrees of physical job demands.
The result is a lower bound, as we do not observe the full set of individual cir-
cumstances. This finding is important because it indicates that a considerable
part of differences in retirement age is predetermined and thus not subject to
individual choice.
Retirement decisions are complex. Aside from general preferences for con-
sumption and leisure, several aspects such as health-related behaviors, wealth
and occupational sorting play a role in retirement choices, and most of these
factors are not exogenously determined. Beyond individual choice, employer
behavior and the availability of retirement benefits (i.e. social security legis-
lation) influence the observed outcomes for retirement ages. Thus, retirement
decisions are influenced by a number of factors which in sum do not clearly
indicate whether retiring early or working longer is more desirable from an
individual point of view. In the present paper, we apply an approach that car-
ries on the EOP literature and decomposes differences in the retirement age
into individual responsibility (i.e. effort and luck) and personal background
(i.e. circumstances). Thus, the relevant quantity is the share of individual
background characteristics that transmits through physical demands of occu-
pations to retirement ages. By nature, individual circumstances are predeter-
mined to any endogenous decision which individuals could be held responsible
for. Early retirement usually implies a reduction in social security wealth and
to this end, differences in retirement age between subgroups are of economic
relevance. When raising the normal retirement age, policy makers must be
aware of potential disadvantages in terms of reduced benefit entitlements for
manual workers. While the interpretation of our result is highly normative,
it helps to structure thoughts in a debate, where early retirement of manual
workers is often considered to be “unfair”.
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Appendix 4
Table 4.A1: Distribution of Individual Transitions across States
Origin Transition into State Total Net Total
Transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Full-time Employment 559,944 1,656 2,977 1,323 5,956 565,900
(98.95) (0.29) (0.53) (0.23) (1.05) (100.00)
(2) Part-time Employment 1,595 177,439 727 583 2,905 180,344
(0.88) (98.39) (0.40) (0.33) (1.61) (100.00)
(3) Unemployment 2,294 738 94,057 1,130 4,162 98,219
(2.34) (0.75) (95.76) (1.15) (4.24) (100.00)
(4) Retirement 142 122 116 762,117 380 762,497
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (99.94) (0.06) (100.00)
Total 13,403 1,606,960
Absolute transitions are reported; relative shares in parentheses. “Net transitions” refer to
all transitions into respective other states.
Table 4.A2: Number of Spells per Individual
Number of Spells Number of Individuals Per Cent
1 12,132 68.96
2 2,415 13.73
3 1,314 7.47
4 620 3.52
5 463 2.63
6 181 1.03
7 169 0.96
8 88 0.50
9 71 0.40
10 or more 141 0.80
Total 17,594 100.00
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5 Early Life Interventions: Evidence from
the Swedish Maternity and Infant Health
Care Program
Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of the universal introduction of free ante- and
neonatal health care in Sweden that started in 1938. Based on data from
official statistics we measure the short-run effects on fertility, infant mortality,
stillbirths and maternal mortality. Using the Swedish Death Index delivering
death data on a majority of the treated individuals who died until 2013, we
estimate mortality effects at the individual level. Finally, based on individual-
level data from the 1980s, we estimate long-run effects on schooling, wage and
a variety of self-assessed health variables. We find negative mortality effects
of both pre- and postnatal care. There is some evidence that these effects are
increasing in age. Prenatal care has beneficial effects on some health outcomes.
Further, our estimates suggest considerable wage gains from prenatal care. We
find some evidence for beneficial effects in maternal mortality, no effects on
fertility and stillbirths, and the effects on education are ambiguous.
5.1 Introduction
In this paper, we estimate effects of a universal ante- and neonatal health care
program in Sweden on health, mortality, fertility and socioeconomic status.
While a bunch of recent literature points at robust and lasting gains from
early health interventions,30 our knowledge of the effectiveness of public health
programs targeting infants is limited to date, particularly concerning long-term
effects. Recent contributions show that an availability of publicly provided
health services in early years can play a substantial role in child development
even in developed countries (e.g., Bharadwaj et al., 2013; Wu¨st, 2012; Almond
et al., 2010; Daysal et al., forthcoming; Almond and Currie, 2011; Jewell and
Triunfo, 2006; Rous et al., 2004). Such services include both safe and clean
birth delivery under the supervision of qualified medical staff, but positive
health effects may also relate to maternal advice and health surveillance during
pregnancy and after birth.
Our study makes important contributions over the existing literature. It
extends the scarce evidence on long-term effects of universal early-life health
interventions. The effects measured by existing studies are often confounded
since health care policies are in many cases targeted at disadvantaged sub-
groups. Our paper is among the first to study the causal effects of a universal
early-life health intervention on adult outcomes. One exception is Bu¨tikofer
et al. (2014) who find positive effects of the introduction of mother and child
health care centers in Norway on education and earnings. A second exception
is the study of Hjort et al. (2014) who find negative effects of a universal infant
health intervention on mortality, hospitalization and cardiovascular disease.
Furthermore, we add to the growing literature following Barker (1990)
which points at early-childhood conditions predetermining later-life health and
socioeconomic conditions (e.g., Almond, 2006; Black et al., 2007). This liter-
ature suggests a widening of the social gradient in health over the life cycle,
explained theoretically by health impairments accumulating over time (Cur-
rie and Stabile, 2003; Case et al., 2002). Supplementing this, our evidence
indicates that the benefit from early-life health interventions is increasing in
age. The topic is of ultimate political importance, as it suggests that the ori-
30Currie and Rossin-Slater (2015) survey the evidence.
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gins of existing social inequalities may consist in the health conditions during
pregnancy and early childhood.
Finally, we evaluate an early-life intervention in a context that is compara-
ble to the situation in many developing countries today. Historical Sweden in
the 1930s exhibited stillbirth rates, infant mortality rates and maternal mor-
tality rates of similar size as many developing countries today.31 The historical
intervention we evaluate was conducted many decades ago and therefore al-
lows us to measure long-term effects giving important implications to political
choices taken nowadays in poor countries.
The introduction of free ante- and neonatal care services provided to all ex-
pectant mothers and infants in Sweden started in 1938. By 1960, the prenatal
care utilization rate had reached about 85%, while in terms of postnatal care
universal coverage was achieved already during the 1950s. The intervention
included a combination of health checks for expectant mothers and infants
conducted by physicians and nurses at health care centers as well as educat-
ing parents about health, parenting skills, and nutrition through home visits,
executed by specially-trained nurses and midwives. Home-visiting initiatives
are among the most promising policies designed to improve early-life health
(Currie and Rossin-Slater, 2015).
We exploit the regional variation in the densities of health care centers
during the implementation process to identify effects of pre- and postnatal care
utilization. Intervention data for 24 counties and the City of Stockholm is used
for the years 1940 to 1950. We measure short-run effects on fertility, infant
mortality, stillbirths and maternal mortality using data from official Swedish
statistics. Based on the Swedish Death Index, we estimate mortality effects at
the individual level. The Death Index comprises the majority of deaths that
occurred in the treated birth cohorts until 2013. Finally, using individual-level
data from the 1980s, we estimate long-run effects on schooling, wage and a
variety of self-assessed health variables.
We find negative effects on mortality of both pre- and postnatal care. Using
aggregated data we find that an increase in the prenatal care utilization rate
31Current rates for developing countries can be found e.g. in Cousens et al. (2011, stillbirth
rates), World Bank (2015b, infant mortality rates) and WHO (2014, maternal mortality
rates). Compare Figures 5.A1, 5.A2, 5.A5 and 5.A6 in this chapter for historical descriptives
for Sweden.
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of 1 percentage point decreases the infant mortality rate by 0.9%. Reduced
form regressions based on the Swedish Death Index suggest significant negative
effects of different types of child care facilities that increase when the considered
time horizon is extended. For instance, increasing the density of child care
centers of type I32 by one standard deviation decreases the probability of dying
before age 1 by 0.1%, while it decreases the probability of dying before age
63 by 0.5%. A standard deviation increase in child care stations reduces the
probability of dying before age 63 by even 0.8%. A difference-in-difference
comparison of survival rates shows a rise in the intervention effects beyond
age 50 and suggests that postnatal care affects mortality only beyond age
50, which is in line with the findings of Bu¨tikofer et al. (2014). Reduced
form regressions for health and labor income indicate significant effects of
prenatal care. In particular, the densities of maternity centers of types I and
II have significant negative effects on the probabilities to be disabled and to
be diagnosed with a severe illness. The density of maternity centers of type
I further reduces the number of long-term illnesses. With regards to labor
income, a one standard deviation increase in the density of maternity centers
of type I is measured to increase labor income by 7.6%, while such an increase
in the density of maternity stations labor income by even 16.1%. In line with
our results, Bu¨tikofer et al. (2014) find that access to free postnatal health care
leads to an increase in lifetime earnings and has beneficial effects on health.
Finally, we find some evidence for beneficial effects from postnatal care on
maternal mortality from eclampsia and from childbed fever after childbirth.
Confirming Bu¨tikofer et al. (2014), there are no effects on fertility. Also,
there is no evidence for effects on stillbirths, and the effects on education
are ambiguous.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 outlines
the national rollout of free ante- and neonatal care in Sweden. Section 5.3
describes the data sources exploited in the empirical analysis and presents
descriptive statistics. Our estimation strategy is outlined in Section 5.4. In
Section 5.5 our empirical results are presented. Section 5.6 concludes.
32Health care facilities were either centers of type I, centers of type II or health care
stations. They differed by the quality of health care provided and the locations where they
were established, as described in detail in Section 5.2.
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5.2 The Rollout of Universal Ante- and Neonatal Health
Care
The history of the Swedish midwifery system dates back to the 18th century.
When in 1751 the first national statistics on maternal mortality revealed a rate
of almost 900 deaths per 100,000 live births, the Swedish authorities initiated
a system of thorough training and supervision of midwives for the first time
(Ho¨gberg, 2004). During the 19th century, midwives were deployed particu-
larly in areas with a shortage of midwives. Their overall number was restricted
by the fact that initially there was only one midwifery school. When a second
school was opened in 1856 and the health authorities started to subsidize some
students, the number of midwives increased. Until the 1930s, midwives were
in charge of nearly all obstetric care services since home births were the norm
and hospital deliveries constituted only a very small percentage of all births
(see Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014, for details).
Before the 1930s, a system called Mjo¨lkdroppen was in place which relied on
visits to physicians and had the purpose of distributing a nutritious cow milk
mixture to poor mothers who did not breastfeed their newborns. In addition,
there was a system called Barnav˚ardscentralsystemet with a focus on outreach
activities to increase awareness, home calls by nurses and center-based health
check-ups for children and mothers (Wallgren, 1935, 1936). Both institutions
were established only in the larger cities and exhibited no eligibility restrictions,
although the former aimed at low-income families. Still, none of the systems
covered the entire population, not even in the cities.
In the 1920s and early 1930s Sweden experienced stagnating infant and
maternal mortality rates. This trend was accompanied by a rapid decline in
birth numbers. While the protection of the mother and her child before and
after the birth had been legally consolidated long before, it was only when
confronted with this situation that Sweden realized a necessity for more in-
tense public support of the individual mother. The 1930s constituted a decade
of change for maternity support and early-life health care in several respects.
Maternity benefits were introduced in 1931 to compensate mothers enrolled in
a sickness fund or with a low family income for unpaid maternity leave and a
midwife’s assistance. A statute of 1937 expanded this policy to apply to nearly
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all mothers-to-be and raised the maternity allowance to cover an estimate of
three-fourths of the normal minimum costs connected with childbirth (Wang-
son, 1938). Additionally, a vast shift from home to institutional deliveries
occurred over the decade (Statistics Sweden, various issues).
Simultaneously, the Swedish health system moved towards the universal
provision of free maternity and infant health care. In a first step, a field trial
was conducted in seven Swedish medical districts from 1931 to 1933.33 The
decision for the national rollout of the program was taken on July 21, 1937, and
the reform was gradually implemented from 1938 onwards. The intervention
included the setup of maternity and child health care centers all over the
country where expectant mothers and infants were to undergo standardized
health examinations. This practice was supplemented by home visits executed
by nurses and midwives (Stro¨m, 1942).
A central organization of the new ante- and neonatal health care system was
complicated by the diversity of local conditions across the country. In cities,
towns, municipal communities with densely populated surrounding rural areas
or densely populated industrial areas, suitable facilities for the setup of health
care centers were already given and qualified staff was available. There were
places, however, where institutions exhibiting the preconditions to guarantee
the intended extent of health care provision did not exist, as was obviously the
case in the pure countryside (Population Commission, 1936).
To overcome these local differences and maximize the possible gains from
preventive care, the organization was decentralized to the counties and cities34
and the local agencies were instructed to implement health care institutions in
any of the following forms (Population Commission, 1936):
1. Maternal or child care centers of type I should be introduced in inpatient
or children’s hospitals, independent maternity and paediatric clinics or
in other places where specially trained women or pediatricians worked.
They were to be led by specially-trained, licensed physicians or pediatri-
cians, respectively, assisted by a nurse or midwife.
33Bhalotra et al. (2014) and Bhalotra et al. (2015) evaluate the field trial in terms of its
effects on mortality as well as on academic performance and sickness absence in primary
school, respectively.
34Several large cities organized the intervention independently of their counties.
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2. Maternal or child care centers of type II should be set up in common,
purpose-designed premises, under the direction of a licensed physician
and with the necessary assistance of a nurse or midwife.
3. Maternal and child health stations should be directed by a physician,
usually using his reception facilities, who is assisted by a district nurse
or midwife.
As intended, type I centers were introduced in the larger cities. Centers of type
II were built up in the cities where specially-trained staff was not available or
in very densely populated industrial areas. Maternal and child care stations
were opened in smaller communities and rural areas. For the latter no new
staff was necessary since the requirements could be met by the physicians in
service and the district nurses (Medicinalstyrelsens Fo¨rslag, 1935).
The reform was financed by state subsidies to the counties and cities to
cover the costs for equipment of the centers and their operating costs. In
comparison to the latter, the former were negligible. The operating expendi-
tures consisted of expenses for physicians’, nurses’ and midwives’ services as
well as travel expenses for home visits. In 1940, the total intervention costs
amounted to 713,885 SEK, Go¨teborg and Malmo¨ excluded, of which 77% where
attributed to the counties and 23% to the cities. At the same time, the annual
cost per supervised individual amounted to an average of 10.28 SEK in the
counties and 18.29 SEK in the cities35 (Stro¨m, 1942).
The health checks of the mothers consisted of medical tests complemented
with urine albumin tests. Infants were monitored by physicians through ex-
aminations at clinics as well as by nurses during their home calls or in special
clinics. In the latter case the service consisted mostly of weight control (Stro¨m,
1942).
35The difference is partly explained by the more expensive monitoring practice adopted
by the cities and the comparably low costs for health care stations in the countryside.
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5.3 Data36
5.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Restrictions
In the empirical analysis we make use of several aggregated and individual-
level data sources. Official medical, population and death statistics deliver
data on the numbers of health care facilities implemented, the shares of ex-
pectant mothers and infants treated as well as population numbers, numbers
of mothers, births, maternal and infant deaths and physicians over the period
of treatment implementation (Statistics Sweden, various issues). These data
are available for 24 counties and the City of Stockholm.The Swedish census of
1930 delivers data on occupation shares and average income at the parish and
the district level, respectively.
These aggregate data are combined with the Swedish Survey of Living
Conditions (ULF; Statistics Sweden, 2013). The ULF provides individual in-
formation for a random sample representative of the Swedish population. The
panel study combines information collected in annual face-to-face interviews
and register data. We use data from the waves 1980, 1981, 1988, 1989, 1996,
1997, 2004 and 2005. The ULF database delivers information on educational
attainment, wage level and a range of self-reported health variables for the
birth cohorts treated by the introduction of free ante- and neonatal health
care. This data is matched with the census 1930 via the parish name.37 Not
in all cases a match is found, e.g. due to different spelling of a parish name
or different regional divisions. We plan to raise the match rate from currently
88.4% to 100% of all ULF parishes for a future version of the analysis.
Finally, we combine the aggregate data available for 25 regions with the
Swedish Death Index, which is provided by the Swedish Genealogical Society
(2014). The dataset comprises universal information on all deaths that oc-
cured in Sweden from 1901 to 2013. Hence, it provides us with the mortality
36Detailed definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis are given in Ap-
pendix Table 5.A1.
37For the birth cohorts until 1946, the ULF reports the actual parish of birth (i.e. the
place of the hospital) instead of the parish of residence at birth. Because the numbers
of institutional deliveries rose sharply during the 1930s, this provides a potential source
of measurement error as described by (Fischer et al., 2013). However, as our regressor
of interest exhibits a highly aggregated regional level, we consider the measurement error
problem as negligible in the context of the present analysis.
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information on the great majority of individuals who were born during the in-
troduction of nationwide pre- and postnatal health care and have not survived
until the end of 2013. The information in this database stems from official
records such as church books.
While the pre- and postnatal care interventions began in 1938, our data
on numbers of health care centers and utilization rates starts only in 1940.
Because the period up to 1950 exhibited the largest variation in utilization
rates we focus on the birth cohorts from 1940 to 1950 in the regressions. Con-
sequently, our aggregated data sample for 25 regions comprises 275 observa-
tions. The individual samples are further restricted to persons born in Sweden
to guarantee a potential treatment by the interventions. In addition, the ULF
sample is restricted to observations without missings on the relevant outcome
variables. The final ULF data sample comprises 6,990 observations. The Death
Index delivers information on an individual’s birth date and place only if the
individual died until 2013. Since we intend to measure survival probabilities,
we simulate the observations of the survivors based on actual annual birth
numbers by county and sex and assign month and day of birth randomly. The
resulting sample consists of 228,270 dead and 1,064,151 survivors.
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The boxplots shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the utilization rates of
ante- and neonatal health care in the newly established centers and stations
over time. In terms of its median, the proportion of mothers utilizing care rose
sharply from about 20% in 1940 to 60% in 1946. Thereafter, it grew rather
moderately at a nearly constant rate to roughly 90% in 1960. In comparison,
the share of infants monitored grew at a much steeper rate during the early
1940s. While its median had exceeded 90% already in 1946, nearly universal
coverage was reached during the 1950s.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also reveal the regional variation in utilization rates
over time. With regards to maternal care, it remained fairly constant over the
observation period, exhibiting only a slight decrease. In contrast, infant super-
vision rates differed strongly during the early 1940s but shrinked considerably
while approaching universal coverage.
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Figure 5.1: Health Care Utilization Rate of Expectant Mothers
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Figure 5.2: Health Care Utilization Rate of Infants
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The differences in speed of implementation and variation levels resulted
possibly from the way how knowledge of the interventions was spreading. It
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is likely that at an early state of implementation many women who became
pregnant were unaware of the centers’ existence and their potential utility.
Slow diffusion of information might explain the only gradual uptake of prenatal
care under large regional variation. Frequently, mothers learned about the
newly available health care only at the time of childbirth at the hospital (Stro¨m,
1942). Under the assumption that a mother follows the professional advise
given her by the hospital staff, most mothers will have initiated the receipt
of postnatal care for their newborns after delivery, even when they have not
utilized prenatal care during their pregnancies. This reasoning would fuel the
expectation that the proportion of infants in postnatal care grew closely as
rapidly as geographic coverage by health care centers and stations did.
Table 5.1: Treatment Correlations with Population, Fertility and Stillbirths
Year 1942 1937 1942
Prenatal Postnatal Popu- Birth Stillbirth Popu- Birth Stillbirth
County care (%) care (%) lation rate rate lation rate rate
Kronobergs 8 17 152941 14.2 238.6 152133 16.8 250.8
O¨rebro 7 25 219800 12.4 347.6 230868 17.9 249.2
Skaraborgs 34 32 238540 14.4 270.9 241466 17.5 184.6
Malmo¨hus 21 34 523407 14.7 263.2 535237 17.7 196.2
Kristianstads 33 39 247963 16.0 242.1 249487 17.7 199.8
Jo¨nko¨pings 35 49 238082 14.7 300.2 245458 17.7 237.4
Ja¨mtlands 37 51 136763 16.2 319.8 141956 20.3 250.1
Hallands 43 54 152106 15.0 336.4 152355 17.3 194.0
So¨dermanlands 74 56 190128 13.6 310.3 194227 17.2 203.1
O¨stergo¨tlands 43 56 312181 14.4 299.9 323022 18.0 225.7
Blekinge 39 60 145067 16.7 288.9 146329 18.6 202.4
Ga¨vleborgs 41 60 278772 14.8 258.8 273863 16.6 231.2
Kalmar 47 61 230230 15.7 346.1 228411 18.0 290.0
Va¨rmlands 41 61 270967 13.7 353.3 268895 16.0 211.9
Gotlands 24 67 58066 17.2 189.8 59275 20.3 257.3
Go¨teborgs/Bohus 41 72 476800 13.9 267.8 489855 17.0 208.4
A¨lvsborgs 47 72 324545 14.6 285.8 331570 16.8 232.0
Stockholm city 74 76 556954 11.6 250.0 613754 18.5 234.4
Kopparbergs 67 80 247407 13.7 342.5 251132 17.3 228.4
Uppsala 43 81 138726 13.7 247.2 139255 17.6 191.6
Norrbottens 62 81 209974 23.0 292.6 223117 24.6 293.4
Stockholm county 41 82 273702 13.3 297.7 295137 17.7 166.2
Va¨stmanlands 63 84 164452 14.7 228.2 171967 17.8 167.0
Va¨sterbottens 78 92 217156 20.5 323.4 223872 22.1 263.1
Va¨sternorrlands 65 98 279993 16.6 277.5 275559 18.7 229.2
Prenatal (postnatal) care (%): health care utilization rate of expectant mothers (infants). Counties are
sorted by postnatal care (%). The correlation coefficient between pre- and postnatal care equals 0.82
(significant at 1%). Birth rate: number of births per 1,000 inhabitants. Stillbirth rate: number of stillbirths
per 10,000 births.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the relationships before and during treatment im-
plementation between pre- and postnatal health care utilization and several
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Table 5.2: Treatment Correlations with Infant Mortality, Maternal Mortality
and the Physician Rate
Year 1942 1937 1942
Prenatal Postnatal Infant Maternal Physician Infant Maternal Physician
County care (%) care (%) mortality mortality rate mortality mortality rate
Kronobergs 8 17 417.6 32.7 0.5 293.9 19.9 0.7
O¨rebro 7 25 395.2 11.2 0.6 292.8 24.5 0.7
Skaraborgs 34 32 471.9 41.4 0.7 279.2 16.8 0.6
Malmo¨hus 21 34 392.2 27.7 1.1 306.0 18.2 1.2
Kristianstads 33 39 451.5 25.7 0.4 304.3 6.9 0.7
Jo¨nko¨pings 35 49 385.9 34.7 0.7 248.9 14.0 0.8
Ja¨mtlands 37 51 427.9 22.9 0.5 357.8 7.0 0.8
Hallands 43 54 454.3 31.0 0.7 235.8 7.7 0.7
So¨dermanlands 74 56 399.5 15.7 0.7 289.7 15.2 0.8
O¨stergo¨tlands 43 56 324.3 22.5 0.7 258.5 12.2 0.8
Blekinge 39 60 404.5 16.8 0.7 220.8 7.5 0.6
Ga¨vleborgs 41 60 476.5 44.2 0.5 301.6 15.6 0.6
Kalmar 47 61 487.3 30.9 0.5 355.8 7.4 0.6
Va¨rmlands 41 61 415.3 35.5 0.6 314.4 14.2 0.7
Gotlands 24 67 519.5 10.1 0.5 249.0 16.8 0.7
Go¨teborgs/Bohus 41 72 320.4 24.4 1.0 216.8 15.8 1.1
A¨lvsborgs 47 72 336.6 23.6 0.7 233.8 10.9 0.8
Stockholm city 74 76 375.0 35.9 1.6 221.2 22.3 1.6
Kopparbergs 67 80 490.1 23.9 0.6 281.5 7.0 0.7
Uppsala 43 81 336.7 37.0 1.2 248.7 16.5 1.5
Norrbottens 62 81 738.7 37.9 0.5 473.8 18.4 0.6
Stockholm
county
41 82 405.2 36.4 0.9 267.4 17.4 1.0
Va¨stmanlands 63 84 332.0 25.2 0.7 225.9 19.8 0.7
Va¨sterbottens 78 92 649.0 45.7 0.6 315.7 22.6 0.6
Va¨sternorrlands 65 98 568.0 39.2 0.6 390.4 13.7 0.7
Prenatal (postnatal) care (%): health care utilization rate of expectant mothers (infants). Counties are
sorted by postnatal care (%). The correlation coefficient between pre- and postnatal care equals 0.82
(significant at 1%). Infant (maternal) mortality: number of infant (maternal) deaths per 10,000 births
(mothers). Physician rate: number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants.
of the aggregated outcome variables we will discuss in the empirical analysis
of Section 5.5.1. Solely the infant mortality of 1937 seems to be slightly pos-
itively correlated with the maternal and infant care rates measured in 1942,
but this correlation is not significant. There is no evidence for a systematic
connection between the pre-treatment characteristics of the counties and the
implementation process that could induce a reverse causality concern.
Figures 5.A1 to 5.A6 in the Appendix illustrate the evolvements of the
dependent variables in the aggregated analysis of Section 5.5.1. After the
interventions had started in 1938, both infant mortality and stillbirths seem
to have experienced a sudden drop in the early 1940s (Figures 5.A1 and 5.A2).
However, the infant mortality rate, at least, had followed a falling trend already
before. With regards to fertility, Sweden experienced a phase of very low
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birth numbers during the 1930s followed by a strong boom starting in the
late 1930s and early 1940s, which was particularly driven by the urban areas
(Figures 5.A3 and 5.A4). Maternal mortality, finally, was stagnating at a high
level during the 1920s and 1930s before it experienced an unparalleled drop
that began in the late 1930s (Figures 5.A5 and 5.A6). During this phase,
maternal mortality from all causes decreased with mortality from childbed
fever sinking fastest.
Appendix Table 5.A2 reports descriptive statistics for the individual-level
data samples. In the sample based on the Death Index, 2% of all individuals
have died before reaching their first birthday, while only 5% did not survive
until age 40. This difference of only three percentage points reflects the still
high infant mortality during the 1940s. 13% of the individuals have died
before reaching age 63. In the ULF sample, a good general health condition is
reported for 83% of the observations, 23% receive regular medical treatment
and 74% hold at least a secondary schooling degree.
5.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to identify the effects of ante- and neonatal health care on various out-
comes, we exploit the regional variation in the treatments during their gradual
implementation by comparing the proportions of mothers and infants treated
across regions and over time. Since visiting the health care facilities was volun-
tary, participation in the treatment was subject to individual decisions which
were possibly related to individual characteristics such as level of education.
In order to identify the causal effect of the treatment, we conduct a standard
2SLS approach in which we exploit the regional variation in the densities of
different health care centers as instruments for actual health care utilization.38
Because the establishment of new centers was subject to institutional deci-
sions, we consider our instruments as unrelated to individual preferences and
therefore exogenous.
Our baseline second-stage regression equation reads as follows:
yitr = β0 + β1TˆMtr + β2TˆItr + µt + vr + εitr (9)
38In the empirical analysis, regressions are estimated applying the Stata command ivreg2
(Baum et al., 2010).
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where yitr is an outcome of individual i born in year t in parish r, TMtr is the
proportion of mothers treated, TItr is the proportion of infants treated, and µt
and vr are birth year and region fixed effects, respectively.
TˆMtr and TˆItr are estimated from the following first-stage regressions:
TCtr = α0 + Xα1 + ηt + wr + utr (10)
where C = M, I. X is a vector of center densities of different types, and ηt and
wr are birth year and region fixed effects, respectively. Our first- and second-
stage regression equations for the aggregated outcome variables are formulated
accordingly at the regional level (omitting the individual index i).
β1 and β2 reflect the effects of pre- and postnatal care utilization on the
outcome which we are interested in. We measure them by estimating various
specifications of Equations (9) and (10) based on the datasets described in
Section 5.3.
We define different estimation specifications by applying the following mod-
ifications to Equations (9) and (10). First, by replacing county fixed effects by
the average income level and the occupation shares in 1930, we test whether the
county fixed effects capture more than only regional differences in economic
measures. Second, we add county-specific linear time trends to the regres-
sors to account for region-specific developments over time. Third, we add the
physician rate as a control variable to account for regional quality differences
in the medical system. Fourth, we add socio-economic background variables to
capture initial individual differences possibly affecting our outcome variables.
Finally, we take into account the timing of health care utilization. The
year of pre- and postnatal care utilization is in most cases not entirely identical
with the year of birth because the former takes place during the pregnancy
and the latter takes place during the first year of life. To take these temporal
deviations into account, we also estimate the above equations a), by replacing
TMtr by the share of mothers supervised in the previous year TM(t−1)r, and
b), by replacing TItr by the share of infants supervised in the subsequent year
TI(t+1)r. The analysis of mortality conducted in Section 5.5.2.1 allows a more
accurate procedure to account for the timing of health care utilization because
the Death Index reports an individual’s exact date of birth. By exploiting the
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date of birth we are able to calculate utilization probabilities which cover the
individual gestational period or the first birth year, respectively. In particular,
we calculate individual-specific averages over the prenatal care utilization rates
in the previous year and the current year, weighting accordingly to cover the
period of gestation. Analogously, we average over the postnatal care utilization
rates in the current year and the subsequent year, weighting to cover the first
year of birth. We apply temporal shifts to the center densities contained in
vector X in an identical way.
5.5 Results
In this section we present estimates of the impact of the interventions on
various outcomes. We begin with a discussion of the short-run effects on
several aggregated outcomes, followed by an analysis of the effects on individual
mortality, long-run health and socioeconomic status.
5.5.1 Aggregated Analysis
5.5.1.1 First-Stage Results
Our aggregated analysis focuses on estimates from 2SLS regressions of fertility,
infant mortality and stillbirths as well as maternal mortality. All aggregated
outcomes in this section have been logarithmized (ln) and are to be interpreted
accordingly. Our first stage is based on the assumption that the densities
of maternity and child care centers and stations, respectively, are important
predictors of the utilization rates of ante- and neonatal health care during
the implementation process. Since a utilization of the newly available health
care became possible only after having gained access to a suitable health care
center, we are confident that the plausibility of this relationship is sufficiently
established.
Appendix Tables 5.A3 and 5.A4 report the results from the first-stage re-
gressions of pre- and postnatal care utilization.39 Our main focus is on the
third and fourth columns since they control for regional time trends. In most
39For the regressions of fertility, center densities have been based on population numbers
instead of birth numbers. Since this does not lead to qualitative changes in the results, the
first-stage regressions using center densities based on population numbers are not reported
here.
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of the specifications for prenatal care, the density of maternity centers of type
II has a significant positive effect, particularly after including linear time trends
in the regressions. In the lower panel of Table 5.A3, the density of maternity
stations offers an additional effect on prenatal care utilization. Considering
the results for postnatal care in Table 5.A4, the densities of child care centers
of type I and child care stations have positive effects in the upper panel, but
their significance levels reduce to only 10% in the medium panel. In the low-
est panel, at least for child care stations the positive sign returns. For both
pre- and postnatal care utilization there are some significant effects for centers
offering the respective other type of health care, possibly because a number of
centers offers both types of health care.
Since our estimation specification comprises more than one endogenous
regressor, we report the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test of excluded in-
struments for each first-stage regression. For neither of the regressions the
threshold of an F-statistic of 10 is reached, implying that we cannot reject the
hypothesis of under- or weak identification of one of the endogenous regressors.
However, the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics reported in the last two columns of
the medium and lower panels of Tables 5.A3 and 5.A4 range between 7.8 and
8.7, which is close to the threshold of 10. Our following interpretation of the
second-stage results will therefore focus on these specifications.
5.5.1.2 Fertility
We hypothesize that the increasing utilization of free pre- and postnatal health
care has incentivized couples to increase their own fertility. Such an effect
would contribute to explaining the strong baby boom of the 1940s. Table 5.3
reports the second-stage estimates from regressions of the fertility rate in the
subsequent year on utilization rates. As described above in Section 5.5.1.1,
our focus is on the third and fourth columns of the medium and lower pan-
els. Because the estimation coefficients in these specifications are insignificant,
the results to not support our expectation of positive intervention effects on
fertility.
Appendix Tables 5.A5 to 5.A7 report results focusing on the fertility of
different groups of mothers as defined by marital status. As for overall fertility,
the coefficients of interest are insignificant for married, unmarried as well as
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Table 5.3: Second Stage, Fertility
Prenatal care -0.006 -0.005* -0.012** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Postnatal care 0.005* 0.004* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Prenatal care(−1) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Postnatal care 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 250 250 250 250
Prenatal care -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
engaged women, not supporting our expectation.
Appendix Tables 5.A10 to 5.A13 report the reduced-form regressions. The
results imply insignificant coefficients or unexpected effect signs. Overall, we
cannot conclude that the interventions contributed to the baby boom of the
1940s.
5.5.1.3 Infant Mortality and Stillbirths
The introduction of free ante- and neonatal health care aimed at improving
the health of infants and mothers. We therefore expect the interventions to
have reduced infant mortality and the number of stillbirths. Table 5.4 presents
the second-stage results for effects on infant mortality. The third and fourth
columns of the medium panel reveal a negative effect of prenatal care uti-
lization in the previous year. Specifically, an increase in the prenatal care
utilization rate of 1 percentage point decreases the infant mortality rate by
0.9%. Table 5.5 reports the second-stage results for stillbirths. In the lower
panel, prenatal care utilization exhibits a positive sign, which is significant,
however, only at the 10% level.
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Table 5.4: Second Stage, Infant Mortality
Prenatal care 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
Postnatal care -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Prenatal care(−1) 0.002 -0.007* -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 250 250 250 250
Prenatal care 0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Postnatal care(+1) -0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Appendix Tables 5.A8 and 5.A9 present the corresponding reduced-form
regressions. Again considering the medium and lower panels only, the density
of maternity centers of type I has a negative effect on infant mortality, while
there is no evidence that stillbirths are affected by any of the center densities.
Unexpectedly, the current density of child care centers of type II positively
affects infant mortality, as reported in the medium panel of Table 5.A8.
5.5.1.4 Maternal Mortality
As for infant mortality and stillbirths, we expect negative intervention effects
on maternal mortality. The second-stage results for maternal mortality are
presented in Table 5.6. None of the specifications confirms our expectation,
while maternity care utilization in the previous year even implies a positive
effect, which is, however, only significant at the 10% level. Table 5.A14 delivers
the reduced-form results. After controlling for regional time trends, there are
no significant effects at all.
We also estimated the effects on maternal mortality from different causes
such as childbed fever after childbirth or miscarriage and eclampsia. Because
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Table 5.5: Second Stage, Stillbirths
Prenatal care 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.011
(0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011)
Postnatal care -0.006 -0.004 -0.010 -0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Prenatal care(−1) 0.002 0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Postnatal care -0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 250 250 250 250
Prenatal care 0.010* 0.009** 0.006* 0.005*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care(+1) -0.006 -0.008* -0.005 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
all coefficients from these regressions are insignificant or, in one case, unexpect-
edly positive, we refrain from reporting all the regression tables here. However,
with regards to the reduced-form regressions, two exceptions deserve mention.
First, the density of child care centers of type I has a significant negative effect
on maternal mortality from childbed fever after childbirth. Second, a higher
density of child care stations significantly reduces maternal mortality from
eclampsia. Although child care centers and stations were primarily designed
to supervise infants, probably also mothers received advice and supervision
in these localities after childbirth, which could explain these findings. The
regression results are available upon request.
5.5.2 Individual Analysis
This subsection is devoted to the measurement of longer-term intervention
effects on individual outcomes. As outlined above, the existing literature in-
dicates that prenatal and early-childhood conditions predetermine later-life
health and socioeconomic outcomes with initial differences reinforcing over
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Table 5.6: Second Stage, Maternal Mortality
Prenatal care 0.015 0.023 -0.013 -0.009
(0.019) (0.016) (0.049) (0.046)
Postnatal care -0.007 -0.013 0.001 -0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.035) (0.034)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Prenatal care(−1) 0.026 0.029 0.029* 0.028*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
Postnatal care -0.015 -0.018 -0.012 -0.012
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 250 250 250 250
Prenatal care -0.009 0.006 -0.011 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.006
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
the life cycle. Against this background, we expect to find positive intervention
effects on individual mortality, health and socioeconomic status, potentially
increasing in age.
5.5.2.1 Mortality
Our analysis of intervention effects on individual mortality is based on the
Death Index sample. In a first step, we compare mortality of children born
during the implementation phase to mortality of pre-intervention children.
Additionally, we compare the children with regards to the utilization levels
of pre- and postnatal care in their birth regions during the implementation
process. The double difference then captures the effect of being born in a
region with a high utilization as compared to being born in a region with a
low utilization of pre- and postnatal health care, respectively.
Figure 5.3 plots the survival curves for children born in 1937, the year
before the intervention started, and children born in 1942, one of the years
with the largest variation in utilization rates (compare Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
We divide the two birth cohorts at the median of prenatal care utilization in
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Figure 5.3: Survival Curves for Birth Cohorts 1937 and 1942 Splitted at
Median of Predicted Prenatal Care Utilization 1942
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1942 as predicted from regressions on center densities. Black curves refer to
children born in 1942 and gray curves refer to children born in 1937. While
in 1937 the survival rate of children born in high-utilization regions was below
the survival rate of children born in low-utilization regions, there is nearly no
visible difference between high- and low-utilization regions for children born
in 1942. This is reflected in the double difference, the difference-in-difference
(DiD), which we plot against the right y-axis. It implies that the effect on the
survival rate of being born in a high-utilization county as compared to being
born in a low-utilization county is slightly positive at all ages and starts to
increase after about age 53.
Figure 5.4 plots the analogous surival rates with regards to postnatal care
utilization as predicted from center densities. Within the birth cohorts, the
survival curves differ barely by level of utilization, which indicates an effect of
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Figure 5.4: Survival Curves for Birth Cohorts 1937 and 1942 Splitted at
Median of Predicted Postnatal Care Utilization 1942
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the intervention that is close to zero. This is reflected by the double difference,
which, however, becomes positive and increases after age 50.
In summary, our comparison of pre- and during-intervention children in-
dicates a positive effect of prenatal health care on survival at all ages which
increases from the mid 50s onwards. Similarly, the effect of postnatal health
care, while being close to zero before age 50, becomes positive and increases
above age 50. These results are in line with our expectation of positive inter-
vention effects that increase over the life cycle.
In a second step, we present 2SLS estimates of intervention effects on in-
dividual mortality focusing on different time horizons. The utilization rates
of pre- and postnatal care have been calculated based on the birth year, as
described above in Section 5.4. In addition, they have been divided by the
factor 1,000 because in many cases the estimation coefficients are quite small,
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which has to be taken into account when interpreting the following results.
Table 5.7: Second Stage, Individual Mortality
Died before reaching age 1
Prenatal carew -0.8742** -1.7948*** -1.7859***
(0.3917) (0.5731) (0.5751)
Postnatal carew 0.6490* 1.0565** 1.0458**
(0.3664) (0.4946) (0.4978)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
Died before reaching age 5
Prenatal carew -0.9239** -2.1445*** -2.1365***
(0.3925) (0.6879) (0.6891)
Postnatal carew 0.7212* 1.3303** 1.3198**
(0.3771) (0.5789) (0.5810)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
Died before reaching age 35
Prenatal carew -1.0750** -2.5903*** -2.5849***
(0.4319) (0.8439) (0.8376)
Postnatal carew 0.8063** 1.4526** 1.4418**
(0.4102) (0.6588) (0.6568)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
Died before reaching age 63
Prenatal carew -2.2687** -6.6852*** -6.6919***
(1.0434) (2.0112) (1.9923)
Postnatal carew 1.7217* 3.3928** 3.3781**
(0.9663) (1.7183) (1.7079)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 5.A15 in the Appendix reports the first-stage regressions. While
several densities have significant effects on utilization rates, particularly centers
of type II and health care stations, the Angrist-Pischke F-statistics are quite
low for all specifications and not even exceeding a value of 4. Therefore, the
second stage results need to be interpreted with caution.
In Table 5.7 we report intervention effects on the probabilities of dying
before reaching ages 1, 5, 35 and 63.40 Robustly, prenatal care utilization has
a significant negative effect in all specifications. In most of the specifications,
40As the Death Index ends in 2013, deaths occurring in the youngest birth cohort in our
sample that was born in 1950 can be observed maximally up to age 63.
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postnatal care has significant positive effects on mortality, but this effect may
be to small in comparison to fully compensate the negative effects measured
for prenatal care.
Tables 5.A16 and 5.A17 report the reduced form regressions. The density
of child care centers of type I has a significantly negative effect on mortality
in the context of all considered time horizons. Furthermore, its effect seems to
increase with age. While an increase of one standard deviation in the density
of child care centers of type I decreases the probability of dying before age
1 by only 0.1%, it decreases the probability of dying before age 63 by 0.5%.
Also the density of child care stations affects mortality in middle ages. An
increase of one standard deviation in this density reduces the probability of
dying before reaching age 35 by 0.2% and the probability of dying before age
63 by even 0.8%.
Overall, the 2SLS regression results are to be interpreted with severe cau-
tion. However, the reduced form regressions provide evidence for negative
effects of postnatal health care on mortality which are robust across specifica-
tions and increase with age.
5.5.2.2 Health
In this subsection we present estimates of the intervention effects on various
health outcomes from the ULF data sample. Appendix Tables 5.A18 and 5.A19
report the first stage regressions. Several specifications suggest significant
effects of the densities of maternity centers of type II and maternity stations
on prenatal care utilization and, likewise, of the densities of child care centers of
both types and of child care stations on postnatal care utilization. The Angrist-
Pischke test of excluded instruments indicates an F-statistic close to 10 only
for the third, fourth and fifth columns of the lower panel (F-values between 7.9
and 9.5). In addition to these specifications we will cautiously interpret the
third, fourth and fifth columns of the medium panel in the following discussion,
where the F-statistic is at least close to 6.
Because we estimated utilization effects on a large range of health outcomes,
we shift the second stage regression tables to the Appendix (Tables 5.A20
to 5.A26) and only summarize the results here. Focusing only on specifications
with F-statistics larger than 5, none of the regressions of any health outcome
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reveals robust and significant intervention effects. At least, the coefficients of
prenatal care utilization exhibit the expected signs for most of the considered
outcomes and are sometimes significant at the 10% level.
While our second stage regressions provide only little evidence that the in-
terventions have mattered for long-term health, the reduced form regressions
shown in Tables 5.A27 to 5.A33 deliver some support for this hypothesis. In
particular, an increase of one standard deviation in the density of type I mater-
nity centers in the previous year reduces the probability to have been diagnosed
with a severe illness by 2.4% (Table 5.A28, medium panel). Similarly, a de-
crease in the same outcome of 1.7% is measured for an increase in the density
of maternity centers of type II by one standard deviation (Table 5.A28, lower
panel). Also, increasing the density of type I maternity centers in the previous
year by one standard deviation reduces the number of long-term illnesses by
0.1 (Table 5.A32, medium panel) as well as the probability of having a disabil-
ity by 0.8% (Table 5.A33, medium panel). The probability of being disabled
is also reduced by 1.4%, when the density of maternity centers of type II in-
creases by one standard deviation (Table 5.A33, lower panel). Finally, there
is also an unexpected effect. The medium panel of Table 5.A31 suggests that
an increase in the density of maternity centers of type I in the previous year
reduces the probability to be able to run 100 meters.
Overall, while there is nearly no evidence for effects of pre- and postnatal
health care utilization on health outcomes in the second stage, the reduced
form regressions reveal some significant coefficients. Particularly the finding
that maternity centers of type I are beneficial for health exhibits some degree
of robustness.
5.5.2.3 Socioeconomic Status
This subsection discusses intervention effects on socioeconomic status as mea-
sured by education and wage. Again, we will focus on the specifications re-
ported in the third, fourth and fifth columns of the medium and lowest panels
of each table (the relevant first-stage regressions, delivered in Appendix Ta-
bles 5.A18 and 5.A19, are identical to those presented in the previous section).
Table 5.8 presents the second stage results for effects on education. The
coefficients in the medium panel indicate that an increase in prenatal care
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Table 5.8: Second Stage, Secondary Education or Higher
Prenatal care 0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Postnatal care 0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) 0.003 0.002 0.007** 0.007** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care -0.000 -0.000 -0.007** -0.006** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
utilization by one percentage point increases the probability to hold at least
a secondary schooling degree by 0.8%. However, the effect of postnatal care
utilization points in the opposite direction, which is difficult to interpret. The
lower panel does not show significant coefficients. The corresponding reduced
form regressions are reported in Appendix Table 5.A35. The coefficients shown
here are mostly insignicant, while an increase in the density of child care cen-
ters of type II of one standard deviation unexpectedly decreases the probabil-
ity of receiving a secondary schooling degree, even after controlling for social
background.
Table 5.9 reports the results from wage regressions. After controlling for
social background, only the medium panel shows a positive wage effect of pre-
natal care in the previous year, signficant at 10%. The reduced form regressions
delivered in Table 5.A34 provide more support for positive intervention effects
on labor income. An increase of one standard deviation in the density of ma-
ternity centers of type I in the previous year increases the labor income by
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7.6% (medium panel). Increasing the density of maternity care stations by
one standard deviation increases labor income by even 16.1% (lower panel).
Table 5.9: Second Stage, ln of Gross Labor Income
Prenatal care 0.009* 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Postnatal care -0.006 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) -0.002 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.012*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Postnatal care 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care 0.014** 0.011* 0.011 0.010 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Postnatal care(+1) -0.011* -0.014* -0.012** -0.011* -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Overall, the results for education effects are ambiguous. With regards
to labor income, positive intervention effects are visible in the reduced form,
where considerable gains are suggested.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we measure the short-run effects of the universal introduction of
free ante- and neonatal health care on fertility, infant mortality, stillbirths and
maternal mortality using data from official Swedish statistics. Based on the
Swedish Death Index which comprises a majority of the deaths of members of
the treated birth cohorts that occurred until 2013, we estimate mortality effects
at the individual level. Finally, using individual-level data from the 1980s, we
identify long-run effects on schooling, wage and a variety of self-assessed health
variables under control for social background.
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We find negative effects on mortality of both pre- and postnatal care. Using
aggregated data we find that an increase in the prenatal care utilization rate
of 1 percentage point decreases the infant mortality rate by 0.9%. Reduced
form regressions based on the Swedish Death Index suggest significant negative
effects of different types of child care facilities that increase when the considered
time horizon is extended. For instance, increasing the density of child care
centers of type I by one standard deviation decreases the probability of dying
before age 1 by 0.1%, while it decreases the probability of dying before age
63 by 0.5%. A standard deviation increase in child care stations reduces the
probability of dying before age 63 by even 0.8%. A difference-in-difference
comparison of survival rates shows a rise in the intervention effects beyond
age 50 and suggests that postnatal care affects mortality only beyond age
50. Reduced form regressions for health and labor income indicate significant
effects of prenatal care. In particular, the densities of maternity centers of types
I and II have significant negative effects on the probabilities to be disabled and
to be diagnosed with a severe illness. The density of maternity centers of type
I further reduces the number of long-term illnesses. With regards to labor
income, a one standard deviation increase in the density of maternity centers
of type I is measured to increase labor income by 7.6%, while such an increase in
the density of maternity stations labor income by even 16.1%. Finally, we find
some evidence for beneficial effects from postnatal care on maternal mortality
from eclampsia and from childbed fever after childbirth. There are no effects
on fertility and stillbirths, and the effects on education are ambiguous.
Overall, beneficial effects from prenatal care are measured more frequently
and more robustly across specifications compared to gains from postnatal care.
This may suggest that prenatal care is the more effective type of intervention.
Another lesson from our analysis is that different qualities of health checks
seem to matter. As Currie and Rossin-Slater (2015) point out, there is little
support for the quantity of prenatal care being a critical dimension, possibly
because the quality is the more important variable. Yet, there is almost no
evidence existent on the impacts of prenatal care quality.
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Appendix 5
Table 5.A1: Variable Definitions
Outcome variables
Aggregated data:
Infant mortality number of infant deaths per 10,000 births
Live births number of live births per 1,000 births
Stillbirths number of stillbirths per 10,000 births
Fertility number of births per 1,000 inhabitants in sub-
sequent year
Fertility, married women number of births to married women per 1,000
inhabitants in subsequent year
Fertility, unmarried women number of births to unmarried women (incl. en-
gaged) per 1,000 inhabitants in subsequent year
Fertility, engaged women number of births to engaged women per 1,000
inhabitants in subsequent year
Maternal mortality number of maternal deaths per 10,000 mothers
Maternal mortality from
childbed fever
number of maternal deaths from childbed fever
(after childbirth or miscarriage) per 10,000
mothers
Maternal mortality from
childbed fever after child-
birth
number of maternal deaths from childbed fever
after childbirth per 10,000 mothers
Maternal mortality from
childbed fever after miscar-
riage
number of maternal deaths from childbed fever
after miscarriage per 10,000 mothers
Maternal mortality from
eclampsia
number of maternal deaths from eclampsia per
10,000 mothers
Maternal mortality from
other cause of death
number of maternal deaths from other cause of
death per 10,000 mothers
ULF data:
Gross labor income real gross labor income
ln of gross labor income ln of real gross labor income
Secondary education or
higher
dummy variable indicating if the individual
holds a secondary schooling degree or higher
Good general health condi-
tion
dummy variable indicating if the individual re-
ports a good general health condition (instead
of average or bad)
Had a severe diagnosis dummy variable indicating if the individual was
diagnosed with a severe illness
Regular medical treatment dummy variable indicating if the individual re-
ceives regular medical treatment
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Normal weight dummy variable indicating if the individual’s
body mass index is between 18.50 and 24.99
Only able to run less than
100 meters
dummy variable indicating if the individual is
not able to run 100 meters
Number of long-term ill-
nesses
number of long-term illnesses the individual was
diagnosed with
Disabled dummy variable indicating if the individual is
disabled
Death Index:
Probability of dying before
reaching age 1
dummy variable indicating if the individual died
before reaching age 1
Probability of dying before
reaching age 5
dummy variable indicating if the individual died
before reaching age 5
Probability of dying before
reaching age 40
dummy variable indicating if the individual died
before reaching age 40
Probability of dying before
reaching age 63
dummy variable indicating if the individual died
before reaching age 63
Independent variables
Endogenous regressors:
Prenatal care proportion of expectant mothers who utilize
health care in %
Postnatal care proportion of infants who receive health care in
%
Instruments:
MtypI density of type I maternity centers, defined as
current number of maternity centers of type I
divided by birth number in subsequent year,†
normalized by one standard deviation
MtypII density of type II maternity centers, defined as
current number of maternity centers of type II
divided by birth number in subsequent year,†
normalized by one standard deviation
Mstat density of maternity stations, defined as current
number of maternity stations divided by birth
number in subsequent year,† normalized by one
standard deviation
CtypI density of type I child care centers, defined as
number of child care centers of type I divided by
number of births†, normalized by one standard
deviation
CtypII density of type II child care centers, defined as
number of child care centers of type II divided by
number of births†, normalized by one standard
deviation
Cstat density of child care stations, defined as num-
ber of child care stations divided by number of
births†, normalized by one standard deviation
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Control variables:
Avg. income 1930 average hourly income in 1930, measured at dis-
trict level (census 1930)
Ind. shares 1930 industry shares in 1930, measured at parish level
(census 1930)
County fixed effects dummy variables for 24 counties and Stockholm
Regional time trends county-specific linear time trends
Physician rate number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants
Social background dummy variables for occupation of father, for-
eign parental background and number of siblings
(ULF)
Indices:
variable(−1) variable in previous year
variable(+1) variable in subsequent year
variablew (Prenatal care, MtypI, MtypII, Mstat:) variable
during the individual gestational period, calcu-
lated as weighted average of variable in previous
and current year with weights being defined ac-
cording to date of birth
variablew (Postnatal care, CtypI, CtypII, Cstat:) variable
during the individual’s first year of life, calcu-
lated as weighted average of variable in current
and subsequent year with weights being defined
according to date of birth
† For the regressions of fertility, numbers of centers are divided by current population num-
bers.
Figure 5.A1: Infant Mortality Rate, 1900-1960
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Figure 5.A2: Stillbirth Rate, 1930-1960
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Figure 5.A3: Fertility Rate, 1900-1960
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Figure 5.A4: Fertility Rate by Level of Urbanization, 1930-1960
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Figure 5.A5: Maternal Mortality by Cause of Death, 1900-1960
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Figure 5.A6: Maternal Mortality by Cause of Death, 1931-1960
0
50
10
0
15
0
M
at
er
na
l d
ea
th
s 
pe
r 1
00
,0
00
 m
ot
he
rs
1930 1940 1950 1960
Year
Childbed fever after childbirth Eclampsia
Childbed fever after miscarriage Other cause of death
144
Table 5.A2: Descriptive Statistics, Individual Samples
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Death Index
Year of birth 1945.43 2.87 1940.00 1950.00 1292421
Year of death 1990.05 23.75 1940.00 2013.00 228270
Died before reaching age 1 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00 1292421
Died before reaching age 5 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 1292421
Died before reaching age 35 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 1292421
Died before reaching age 63 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 1292421
ULF
Year of birth 1945.26 2.99 1940.00 1950.00 6990
Female 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 6990
Both parents born in Sweden 0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 6990
At least two siblings 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 6990
Good general health condition 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 6990
Had a severe diagnosis 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 6990
Regular medical treatment 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 6990
Normal weight 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 6990
Only able to run less than 100m 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 6990
Number of long-term illnesses 0.58 0.90 0.00 6.00 6990
Disabled 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 6990
Gross labor income 2037.83 20718.87 1.00 999999.00 6990
Secondary education or higher 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 6990
SD: standard deviation. N: number of observations.
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Table 5.A3: First Stage for Prenatal Care, Aggregated Outcomes
MtypI 4.240 1.089 1.379 1.154
(3.362) (1.709) (1.353) (1.252)
MtypII -0.182 1.914 4.324*** 4.311***
(3.424) (2.327) (1.441) (1.320)
Mstat 1.303 -3.884 1.810 3.598
(13.774) (15.025) (9.669) (9.196)
CtypI -0.511 0.684 8.941** 8.970***
(3.086) (1.839) (3.214) (2.972)
CtypII 3.806 5.108 2.540* 2.587*
(3.048) (3.266) (1.464) (1.420)
Cstat 5.916 16.086 7.219 5.643
(13.329) (16.402) (12.013) (11.708)
Observations 275 275 275 275
APF 0.45 1.07 0.45 0.54
MtypI(−1) 4.238 1.433 1.437 1.401
(3.343) (1.644) (1.026) (1.009)
MtypII(−1) 4.644** 5.974*** 6.188*** 6.147***
(2.196) (1.581) (1.389) (1.330)
Mstat(−1) 9.897*** 10.903*** 9.126* 9.207*
(3.152) (2.817) (4.633) (4.650)
CtypI -2.326 -0.315 2.338 2.298
(2.642) (1.885) (3.067) (3.076)
CtypII -1.062 1.390 -1.122 -1.116
(2.423) (2.368) (1.415) (1.426)
Cstat -2.230 2.066 1.119 1.207
(3.691) (3.150) (2.485) (2.492)
Observations 250 250 250 250
APF 1.93 3.63 8.07 7.80
MtypI 4.463 1.713 2.211 1.989
(3.346) (1.820) (1.451) (1.362)
MtypII 3.149 5.179*** 6.338*** 6.349***
(2.344) (1.745) (1.226) (1.120)
Mstat 9.277*** 10.319*** 10.190** 10.473**
(3.112) (2.618) (4.015) (4.067)
CtypI(+1) -1.467 0.259 1.834 1.634
(2.721) (1.981) (3.465) (3.296)
CtypII(+1) 0.054 1.546 -1.178 -1.298
(2.209) (2.038) (1.019) (1.048)
Cstat(+1) -2.050 1.425 2.197 2.001
(3.594) (3.170) (2.486) (2.469)
Observations 275 275 275 275
APF 1.85 3.97 8.71 8.20
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. APF: Angrist-
Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments.
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Table 5.A4: First Stage for Postnatal Care, Aggregated Outcomes
MtypI 8.180** 3.178 2.493 2.306
(3.069) (2.035) (1.728) (1.643)
MtypII 3.962* 7.422*** 4.573** 4.562***
(2.092) (2.449) (1.637) (1.532)
Mstat -23.472 -38.954*** -13.648 -12.163
(15.013) (12.122) (8.747) (8.525)
CtypI -4.946** -3.455* 7.591*** 7.615***
(1.925) (1.912) (2.270) (2.132)
CtypII 0.548 2.378 2.956 2.995
(2.617) (2.428) (2.168) (2.157)
Cstat 34.768** 53.147*** 27.187*** 25.878**
(15.318) (12.592) (9.521) (9.353)
Observations 275 275 275 275
APF 0.45 1.07 0.45 0.54
MtypI(−1) 6.269** 1.297 1.413 1.353
(2.992) (1.372) (0.999) (0.943)
MtypII(−1) 5.774*** 7.613*** 4.066*** 3.997***
(1.600) (2.271) (1.382) (1.376)
Mstat(−1) 1.757 1.728 6.423* 6.558*
(2.860) (3.077) (3.159) (3.185)
CtypI -2.853* -0.405 4.533* 4.467*
(1.594) (2.260) (2.284) (2.315)
CtypII -1.551 3.654* 4.093* 4.103*
(1.901) (1.959) (2.176) (2.185)
Cstat 9.099*** 10.484** 11.919* 12.067*
(3.240) (4.541) (6.123) (6.088)
Observations 250 250 250 250
APF 1.93 3.63 8.07 7.80
MtypI 6.273** 2.394 1.906 1.936
(2.759) (1.655) (1.288) (1.319)
MtypII 4.758*** 7.247*** 4.520*** 4.519***
(1.344) (2.137) (1.408) (1.413)
Mstat 1.172 0.504 6.383** 6.345**
(2.827) (3.164) (2.946) (2.978)
CtypI(+1) -2.855* -0.483 2.735 2.761
(1.408) (2.288) (2.392) (2.393)
CtypII(+1) -0.870 3.032 3.527* 3.543*
(1.819) (1.801) (1.897) (1.909)
Cstat(+1) 8.416** 9.324* 12.536** 12.562**
(3.176) (4.562) (5.780) (5.811)
Observations 275 275 275 275
APF 1.85 3.97 8.71 8.20
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. APF: Angrist-
Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments.
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Table 5.A5: Second Stage, Fertility of Married Women
Prenatal care -0.006 -0.005* -0.012** -0.012**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Postnatal care 0.005* 0.004* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Prenatal care(−1) 0.004* 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Postnatal care -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 250 250 250 250
Prenatal care 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 5.A6: Second Stage, Fertility of Unmarried Women
Prenatal care -0.008 -0.004 -0.014* -0.014*
(0.013) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Postnatal care 0.006 0.003 0.011* 0.011*
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Prenatal care(−1) -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 250 250 250 250
Prenatal care -0.007* -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.009* -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A7: Second Stage, Fertility of Engaged Women
Prenatal care -0.053 -0.007 0.002 0.001
(0.051) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Postnatal care 0.031 0.008 0.000 0.001
(0.029) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 225 225 225 225
Prenatal care(−1) -0.008 0.004 -0.000 -0.000
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Postnatal care 0.005 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 200 200 200 200
Prenatal care -0.010 0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 225 225 225 225
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A8: Reduced Form, Infant Mortality
MtypI -0.021 -0.017 -0.024 -0.027
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
MtypII -0.021 -0.001 -0.011 -0.011
(0.037) (0.025) (0.034) (0.037)
Mstat -0.069 0.037 -0.005 0.019
(0.175) (0.130) (0.151) (0.148)
CtypI -0.010 0.025 -0.030 -0.029
(0.031) (0.020) (0.081) (0.080)
CtypII 0.079* 0.046 0.064* 0.065*
(0.041) (0.028) (0.036) (0.037)
Cstat 0.008 -0.080 -0.014 -0.035
(0.183) (0.123) (0.136) (0.135)
Observations 275 275 275 275
MtypI(−1) -0.028 -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.042***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
MtypII(−1) -0.034 -0.021 -0.023 -0.024
(0.028) (0.014) (0.032) (0.030)
Mstat(−1) -0.060** -0.019 -0.042 -0.040
(0.027) (0.031) (0.040) (0.041)
CtypI -0.008 0.021 -0.026 -0.028
(0.030) (0.021) (0.074) (0.072)
CtypII 0.091*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.031) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Cstat -0.005 -0.038 0.002 0.005
(0.037) (0.044) (0.034) (0.034)
Observations 250 250 250 250
MtypI -0.015 -0.016 -0.019 -0.022
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
MtypII 0.005 0.014 0.022 0.022
(0.024) (0.018) (0.026) (0.027)
Mstat -0.013 0.032 -0.006 -0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.037)
CtypI(+1) -0.018 0.008 -0.093* -0.096*
(0.030) (0.020) (0.050) (0.051)
CtypII(+1) 0.054* 0.030 0.030 0.028
(0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
Cstat(+1) -0.048 -0.113*** -0.082 -0.085
(0.048) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A9: Reduced Form, Stillbirths
MtypI -0.032 0.008 0.003 0.007
(0.024) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
MtypII 0.005 -0.003 0.032 0.032
(0.041) (0.060) (0.069) (0.066)
Mstat 0.391*** 0.303** 0.317** 0.284**
(0.126) (0.118) (0.124) (0.125)
CtypI 0.001 -0.005 -0.026 -0.027
(0.015) (0.013) (0.034) (0.038)
CtypII 0.023 -0.010 -0.021 -0.022
(0.047) (0.053) (0.068) (0.066)
Cstat -0.386*** -0.269** -0.293** -0.264*
(0.125) (0.127) (0.142) (0.147)
Observations 275 275 275 275
MtypI(−1) -0.028 0.013 0.008 0.010
(0.027) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
MtypII(−1) -0.033 -0.037 -0.035 -0.033
(0.028) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026)
Mstat(−1) -0.004 0.008 -0.045 -0.048
(0.049) (0.043) (0.076) (0.076)
CtypI -0.011 -0.018 -0.038 -0.036
(0.014) (0.013) (0.047) (0.051)
CtypII 0.052 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.033) (0.028) (0.037) (0.036)
Cstat 0.002 0.040 0.040 0.037
(0.035) (0.046) (0.066) (0.064)
Observations 250 250 250 250
MtypI -0.030 0.003 -0.001 0.003
(0.024) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
MtypII -0.005 -0.009 0.015 0.015
(0.024) (0.028) (0.039) (0.037)
Mstat 0.070** 0.080** 0.032 0.026
(0.028) (0.029) (0.080) (0.078)
CtypI(+1) -0.003 -0.014 0.021 0.024
(0.013) (0.012) (0.026) (0.029)
CtypII(+1) 0.029 -0.018 -0.015 -0.012
(0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
Cstat(+1) -0.066** -0.055 -0.063 -0.059
(0.032) (0.033) (0.060) (0.061)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A10: Reduced Form, Fertility
MtypI 0.016 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
MtypII 0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011
(0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Mstat -0.180* -0.165*** -0.156*** -0.163***
(0.096) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036)
CtypI -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.045***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
CtypII 0.004 0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(0.018) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Cstat 0.169 0.146*** 0.156*** 0.162***
(0.099) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037)
Observations 275 275 275 275
MtypI(−1) 0.018 0.002 0.005 0.005
(0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
MtypII(−1) 0.014 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Mstat(−1) -0.015 -0.002 0.016 0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
CtypI -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.022** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
CtypII 0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
(0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Cstat 0.008 -0.018 0.004 0.004
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 250 250 250 250
MtypI 0.014 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
(0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
MtypII 0.012 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009
(0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Mstat -0.021* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
CtypI(+1) -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
CtypII(+1) 0.009 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Cstat(+1) 0.012 -0.027* -0.011 -0.011
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A11: Reduced Form, Fertility of Married Women
MtypI 0.021 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
MtypII 0.003 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012
(0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Mstat -0.232** -0.176*** -0.140*** -0.148***
(0.108) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
CtypI -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.047***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
CtypII 0.016 0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(0.018) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Cstat 0.210* 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.151***
(0.110) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Observations 275 275 275 275
MtypI(−1) 0.023 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MtypII(−1) 0.009 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Mstat(−1) -0.014 -0.002 0.021 0.021
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
CtypI -0.050*** -0.041*** -0.021** -0.020*
(0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
CtypII 0.013 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009
(0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Cstat -0.005 -0.016 0.006 0.006
(0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 250 250 250 250
MtypI 0.019 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.016) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
MtypII 0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.011*
(0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Mstat -0.021* -0.007 -0.002 -0.003
(0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
CtypI(+1) -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
CtypII(+1) 0.018 0.003 -0.001 -0.000
(0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Cstat(+1) 0.001 -0.027* -0.010 -0.009
(0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A12: Reduced Form, Fertility of Unmarried Women
MtypI -0.014 -0.012 -0.006 -0.007
(0.029) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
MtypII 0.092* 0.008 -0.002 -0.002
(0.045) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Mstat 0.098 -0.103 -0.308** -0.301**
(0.231) (0.148) (0.122) (0.127)
CtypI 0.018 -0.019* -0.026 -0.026
(0.039) (0.009) (0.028) (0.030)
CtypII -0.101* -0.008 0.010 0.010
(0.059) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Cstat -0.023 0.088 0.300** 0.294**
(0.244) (0.154) (0.114) (0.118)
Observations 275 275 275 275
MtypI(−1) -0.018 -0.014 -0.007 -0.008
(0.030) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
MtypII(−1) 0.052 0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.034) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
Mstat(−1) -0.027 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004
(0.034) (0.023) (0.032) (0.033)
CtypI 0.012 -0.021 -0.026 -0.026
(0.042) (0.012) (0.036) (0.039)
CtypII -0.064 0.002 0.015 0.015
(0.047) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Cstat 0.097 -0.025 0.012 0.013
(0.069) (0.027) (0.036) (0.037)
Observations 250 250 250 250
MtypI -0.019 -0.015 -0.006 -0.008
(0.032) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
MtypII 0.055* 0.006 0.013 0.013
(0.032) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
Mstat -0.011 0.007 -0.008 -0.006
(0.034) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032)
CtypI(+1) 0.012 -0.015 -0.021 -0.022
(0.039) (0.013) (0.029) (0.028)
CtypII(+1) -0.067 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.042) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Cstat(+1) 0.079 -0.038 -0.021 -0.022
(0.072) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A13: Reduced Form, Fertility of Engaged Women
MtypI 0.066 0.015 -0.027 -0.026
(0.043) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016)
MtypII 0.167** 0.071* 0.010 0.010
(0.066) (0.038) (0.030) (0.031)
Mstat 0.046 -0.042 -0.277 -0.279
(0.399) (0.278) (0.334) (0.351)
CtypI -0.032 -0.087** 0.094 0.094
(0.087) (0.034) (0.105) (0.104)
CtypII -0.244*** -0.041 0.027 0.026
(0.080) (0.048) (0.039) (0.039)
Cstat -0.001 0.051 0.211 0.213
(0.401) (0.277) (0.300) (0.320)
Observations 225 225 225 225
MtypI(−1) 0.064 0.026* 0.008 0.008
(0.043) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MtypII(−1) 0.071 0.034 -0.011 -0.011
(0.046) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Mstat(−1) -0.040 0.016 0.015 0.015
(0.071) (0.045) (0.073) (0.073)
CtypI -0.013 -0.067** 0.043 0.043
(0.092) (0.030) (0.150) (0.149)
CtypII -0.162** -0.004 0.034 0.034
(0.067) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
Cstat 0.061 -0.035 -0.027 -0.027
(0.097) (0.055) (0.088) (0.088)
Observations 200 200 200 200
MtypI 0.054 0.010 -0.021 -0.021
(0.045) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)
MtypII 0.095* 0.063* 0.032 0.032
(0.048) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
Mstat -0.068 -0.006 -0.042 -0.042
(0.062) (0.050) (0.079) (0.079)
CtypI(+1) -0.064 -0.108*** -0.042 -0.042
(0.076) (0.019) (0.069) (0.069)
CtypII(+1) -0.188** -0.044 -0.012 -0.012
(0.069) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
Cstat(+1) 0.085 -0.013 -0.016 -0.017
(0.113) (0.056) (0.069) (0.070)
Observations 225 225 225 225
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A14: Reduced Form, Maternal Mortality
MtypI -0.018 -0.027 0.002 -0.004
(0.048) (0.071) (0.091) (0.089)
MtypII -0.148 -0.183 -0.049 -0.050
(0.146) (0.184) (0.200) (0.203)
Mstat 0.829* 0.932** 0.413 0.465
(0.404) (0.451) (0.834) (0.879)
CtypI -0.172** -0.174* -0.367 -0.366
(0.070) (0.090) (0.362) (0.353)
CtypII 0.112 0.252 0.140 0.141
(0.147) (0.182) (0.302) (0.306)
Cstat -0.857* -0.980* -0.511 -0.556
(0.437) (0.501) (0.781) (0.828)
Observations 275 275 275 275
MtypI(−1) 0.042 0.045 0.088 0.086
(0.050) (0.054) (0.065) (0.064)
MtypII(−1) -0.070 0.026 0.189 0.186
(0.117) (0.112) (0.123) (0.121)
Mstat(−1) 0.148 0.234 0.156 0.161
(0.194) (0.206) (0.255) (0.259)
CtypI -0.195** -0.189 -0.655 -0.657
(0.091) (0.117) (0.401) (0.391)
CtypII 0.030 -0.000 0.024 0.024
(0.116) (0.126) (0.159) (0.160)
Cstat -0.179 -0.283 -0.150 -0.145
(0.165) (0.186) (0.268) (0.267)
Observations 250 250 250 250
MtypI -0.013 -0.019 -0.014 -0.019
(0.053) (0.071) (0.098) (0.097)
MtypII -0.099 -0.060 0.014 0.014
(0.088) (0.067) (0.070) (0.071)
Mstat -0.113 -0.030 -0.128 -0.122
(0.106) (0.114) (0.246) (0.247)
CtypI(+1) -0.181*** -0.180*** -0.121 -0.125
(0.046) (0.064) (0.311) (0.307)
CtypII(+1) 0.040 0.048 0.006 0.004
(0.085) (0.125) (0.150) (0.150)
Cstat(+1) 0.102 0.049 0.110 0.106
(0.110) (0.178) (0.168) (0.165)
Observations 275 275 275 275
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects and are weighted by birth numbers. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A15: First Stage, Individual Mortality
Prenatal care
MtypIw -0.0007 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0004)
MtypIIw 0.0027** 0.0012** 0.0011**
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Mstatw 0.0055** 0.0021 0.0022
(0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0014)
CtypIw -0.0003 0.0010 0.0009
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008)
CtypIIw 0.0032*** 0.0015** 0.0015**
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Cstatw 0.0069** 0.0033** 0.0033**
(0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
APF 1.21 3.31 3.57
Postnatal care
MtypIw -0.0007 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0003)
MtypIIw 0.0048*** 0.0018** 0.0018**
(0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Mstatw 0.0041 0.0037** 0.0037**
(0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0015)
CtypIw -0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0005)
CtypIIw 0.0051*** 0.0026** 0.0026**
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Cstatw 0.0056* 0.0046** 0.0046**
(0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
APF 1.21 3.31 3.57
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A16: Reduced Form, Died Before Reaching Age 1/5
Died before reaching age 1
MtypIw -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
MtypIIw 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Mstatw -0.0012* 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)
CtypIw -0.0009* -0.0013** -0.0013**
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
CtypIIw 0.0009 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Cstatw -0.0030*** -0.0012* -0.0012*
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
Died before reaching age 5
MtypIw -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
MtypIIw 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Mstatw -0.0010* 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)
CtypIw -0.0013** -0.0015** -0.0015**
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
CtypIIw 0.0011 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Cstatw -0.0029*** -0.0011 -0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A17: Reduced Form, Died Before Reaching Age 35/63
Died before reaching age 35
MtypIw -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
MtypIIw 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Mstatw -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010)
CtypIw -0.0015*** -0.0018*** -0.0018***
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
CtypIIw 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Cstatw -0.0033*** -0.0021** -0.0021**
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
Died before reaching age 63
MtypIw -0.0019* -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0007)
MtypIIw 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Mstatw -0.0016** -0.0034* -0.0034*
(0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0019)
CtypIw -0.0060*** -0.0047*** -0.0047***
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005)
CtypIIw 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Cstatw -0.0068*** -0.0082** -0.0082**
(0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Observations 1292421 1292421 1292421
County fixed effects
√ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √
Physician rate
√
Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county
level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A18: First Stage for Prenatal Care, Health and Socioeconomic Status
MtypI 1.895 1.260 0.763 0.520 0.527
(3.365) (1.733) (1.676) (1.370) (1.373)
MtypII -2.251 2.161 3.695** 4.006*** 4.005***
(3.658) (1.995) (1.683) (1.294) (1.294)
Mstat 11.588 -3.693 3.676 9.436 9.416
(12.968) (13.904) (10.607) (10.421) (10.349)
CtypI 3.743 0.547 12.113*** 10.977*** 10.993***
(3.004) (2.151) (4.279) (3.358) (3.342)
CtypII 4.332 4.829* 2.876* 3.050* 3.096*
(3.308) (2.796) (1.613) (1.521) (1.511)
Cstat -2.012 15.478 5.918 0.829 0.758
(13.695) (15.351) (11.377) (11.338) (11.272)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
APF 1.42 1.24 0.89 0.89 0.89
MtypI(−1) 1.591 1.146 0.821 0.938 0.959
(2.851) (1.444) (1.125) (1.054) (1.046)
MtypII(−1) 2.876 5.948*** 6.659*** 6.750*** 6.726***
(2.524) (1.465) (1.084) (0.966) (0.957)
Mstat(−1) 15.458*** 10.823*** 10.752*** 11.215*** 11.186***
(4.454) (2.862) (3.488) (3.504) (3.475)
CtypI 3.391 0.348 6.929* 5.899* 5.889*
(3.302) (2.106) (3.826) (3.354) (3.340)
CtypII -0.547 1.597 0.509 0.533 0.551
(2.973) (2.199) (1.047) (1.087) (1.073)
Cstat -4.552 2.273 0.919 1.109 1.052
(4.810) (3.183) (2.734) (2.698) (2.711)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
APF 1.54 2.86 5.89 5.80 5.92
MtypI 2.285 1.892 1.492 1.261 1.269
(3.254) (1.797) (1.571) (1.332) (1.343)
MtypII 1.203 5.381*** 6.002*** 6.391*** 6.418***
(2.506) (1.516) (1.300) (0.949) (0.960)
Mstat 14.964*** 10.475*** 9.380*** 10.160*** 10.072***
(4.551) (2.653) (2.885) (3.009) (2.972)
CtypI(+1) 2.945 0.111 8.534* 6.516* 6.511*
(2.825) (2.290) (4.902) (3.713) (3.722)
CtypII(+1) 0.467 1.413 0.284 0.169 0.178
(2.612) (1.452) (0.773) (0.749) (0.756)
Cstat(+1) -5.005 0.656 0.941 0.796 0.780
(4.126) (3.160) (2.819) (2.769) (2.770)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
APF 1.71 4.03 7.91 9.36 9.49
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at
the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A19: First Stage for Postnatal Care, Health and Socioeconomic
Status
MtypI 8.161*** 3.234 1.757 1.699 1.728
(2.487) (1.917) (1.503) (1.432) (1.420)
MtypII 0.875 6.559*** 4.334** 4.408** 4.358**
(2.471) (2.017) (1.777) (1.754) (1.741)
Mstat -9.583 -38.856*** -10.666 -9.300 -9.375
(13.251) (12.093) (9.949) (10.137) (10.029)
CtypI 0.868 -4.603** 9.348*** 9.078*** 9.118***
(2.811) (2.014) (2.947) (2.818) (2.815)
CtypII 3.325 3.038 6.098** 6.139*** 6.181***
(3.395) (2.005) (2.185) (2.170) (2.141)
Cstat 22.198 51.713*** 21.425** 20.218** 20.201**
(13.336) (12.430) (8.918) (8.841) (8.751)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
APF 1.42 1.24 0.89 0.89 0.89
MtypI(−1) 6.214*** 1.519 0.636 0.720 0.686
(1.941) (1.198) (0.755) (0.775) (0.767)
MtypII(−1) 3.393* 7.006*** 4.286*** 4.351*** 4.340***
(1.867) (1.883) (1.227) (1.202) (1.185)
Mstat(−1) 6.601** 2.145 3.355 3.686 3.704
(2.438) (2.745) (2.888) (2.904) (2.879)
CtypI 1.387 -1.007 7.824** 7.085** 7.108**
(2.418) (2.267) (3.120) (2.748) (2.739)
CtypII 0.734 3.853** 6.607*** 6.624*** 6.631***
(2.500) (1.761) (1.815) (1.787) (1.771)
Cstat 5.923* 9.088** 7.573* 7.710* 7.665*
(2.895) (4.201) (4.412) (4.392) (4.329)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
APF 1.54 2.86 5.89 5.80 5.92
MtypI 6.572*** 2.849* 1.632** 1.626** 1.637**
(1.773) (1.397) (0.790) (0.767) (0.757)
MtypII 2.807* 6.731*** 4.452*** 4.461*** 4.434***
(1.508) (1.797) (1.409) (1.407) (1.406)
Mstat 4.935* -0.005 1.466 1.484 1.412
(2.613) (3.161) (3.040) (3.149) (3.141)
CtypI(+1) 0.479 -1.757 5.950* 5.904* 5.933*
(2.043) (2.296) (3.368) (3.129) (3.134)
CtypII(+1) 0.977 3.083* 5.288*** 5.285*** 5.304***
(2.299) (1.528) (1.390) (1.395) (1.382)
Cstat(+1) 5.617** 7.730* 5.824 5.821 5.825
(2.389) (4.276) (4.732) (4.721) (4.704)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
APF 1.71 4.03 7.91 9.36 9.49
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors (SE) are clustered at
the county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
161
Table 5.A20: Second Stage, Good General Health Condition
Prenatal care -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Postnatal care -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care(+1) -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A21: Second Stage, Had a Severe Diagnosis
Prenatal care -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Postnatal care 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A22: Second Stage, Regular Medical Treatment
Prenatal care -0.006 -0.009** -0.012 -0.013 -0.013
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Postnatal care 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A23: Second Stage, Normal Weight
Prenatal care 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Postnatal care 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Postnatal care(+1) -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A24: Second Stage, Only Able to Run Less than 100 Meters
Prenatal care 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Postnatal care -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care 0.001 -0.002 -0.003* -0.003* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A25: Second Stage, Number of Long-term Illnesses
Prenatal care -0.007 -0.016 -0.019 -0.022 -0.023
(0.005) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Postnatal care 0.005 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.015
(0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Postnatal care 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A26: Second Stage, Disabled
Prenatal care -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Prenatal care(−1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Postnatal care -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
Prenatal care -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Postnatal care(+1) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A27: Reduced Form, Good General Health Condition
MtypI -0.010 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.014) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
MtypII -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Mstat -0.032 -0.008 0.007 -0.020 0.005
(0.067) (0.106) (0.114) (0.122) (0.119)
CtypI 0.007 0.007 0.030 0.036 0.040
(0.007) (0.011) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031)
CtypII 0.013 0.027 0.032 0.032 0.031
(0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Cstat 0.020 0.009 -0.009 0.015 -0.003
(0.064) (0.103) (0.114) (0.120) (0.116)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) -0.018** -0.015** -0.016** -0.017** -0.014*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
MtypII(−1) 0.005 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.026
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Mstat(−1) -0.016 -0.015 -0.030 -0.034 -0.027
(0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
CtypI 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.015 0.019
(0.005) (0.009) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
CtypII 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Cstat -0.002 -0.012 0.002 -0.000 0.000
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI -0.007 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
MtypII -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.008
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Mstat 0.021 0.021 0.014 0.011 0.016
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
CtypI(+1) 0.002 -0.003 -0.023 -0.016 -0.016
(0.007) (0.008) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035)
CtypII(+1) 0.011 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Cstat(+1) -0.035 -0.035 -0.025 -0.025 -0.022
(0.031) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A28: Reduced Form, Had a Severe Diagnosis
MtypI 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
MtypII -0.006 -0.034 -0.023 -0.022 -0.025
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Mstat -0.134** -0.121 -0.161* -0.150 -0.166*
(0.062) (0.084) (0.085) (0.089) (0.088)
CtypI -0.001 0.009 0.014 0.012 0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
CtypII 0.001 0.017 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Cstat 0.138** 0.120 0.152* 0.143 0.155*
(0.062) (0.086) (0.087) (0.091) (0.088)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) -0.012* -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MtypII(−1) 0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Mstat(−1) -0.001 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.004
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
CtypI 0.007 0.020** 0.011 0.004 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
CtypII -0.007 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Cstat 0.002 -0.013 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
MtypII 0.002 -0.023** -0.017** -0.016** -0.017**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Mstat -0.026 -0.025 -0.025* -0.023* -0.027*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
CtypI(+1) -0.001 0.010 0.023 0.018 0.017
(0.006) (0.008) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
CtypII(+1) -0.005 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Cstat(+1) 0.028* 0.027* 0.022* 0.022* 0.022
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A29: Reduced Form, Regular Medical Treatment
MtypI 0.004 -0.026* -0.017 -0.017 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
MtypII -0.001 -0.000 0.014 0.015 0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Mstat -0.290*** -0.281** -0.364** -0.360** -0.350**
(0.080) (0.105) (0.149) (0.149) (0.152)
CtypI -0.019 -0.019 -0.061* -0.062* -0.058*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033)
CtypII -0.014 -0.015 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023
(0.014) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Cstat 0.270*** 0.238** 0.323** 0.319** 0.307**
(0.081) (0.103) (0.143) (0.143) (0.146)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) 0.005 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
MtypII(−1) -0.007 -0.015 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Mstat(−1) -0.045 -0.031 -0.030 -0.027 -0.027
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
CtypI -0.019* -0.005 -0.049* -0.056* -0.048
(0.009) (0.011) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030)
CtypII -0.004 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.018
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Cstat 0.024 -0.019 -0.021 -0.020 -0.024
(0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI 0.003 -0.027* -0.024 -0.024 -0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
MtypII 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.016
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Mstat -0.065* -0.057 -0.055 -0.054 -0.054
(0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)
CtypI(+1) -0.014 -0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035)
CtypII(+1) -0.018* -0.019* -0.020 -0.020 -0.021
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Cstat(+1) 0.044 0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A30: Reduced Form, Normal Weight
MtypI 0.020 0.034 0.036 0.038* 0.039*
(0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019)
MtypII -0.016 0.022 0.011 0.009 0.009
(0.026) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Mstat 0.075 0.016 0.073 0.039 0.099
(0.092) (0.122) (0.147) (0.150) (0.147)
CtypI 0.011 -0.000 -0.011 -0.004 0.003
(0.010) (0.013) (0.033) (0.040) (0.038)
CtypII 0.026 -0.025 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014
(0.020) (0.024) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Cstat -0.068 0.009 -0.046 -0.017 -0.061
(0.092) (0.132) (0.152) (0.155) (0.155)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) -0.001 -0.023** -0.025** -0.026** -0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
MtypII(−1) -0.020* 0.011 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Mstat(−1) 0.019 0.007 0.007 0.002 -0.003
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
CtypI 0.023* 0.011 0.031 0.041 0.042
(0.012) (0.017) (0.037) (0.050) (0.047)
CtypII 0.027** 0.008 0.023 0.023 0.015
(0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Cstat -0.010 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.043
(0.027) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI 0.023 0.031 0.035 0.036* 0.037*
(0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019)
MtypII -0.004 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.009
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
Mstat 0.064* 0.047 0.049 0.045 0.065*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037)
CtypI(+1) 0.005 -0.011 -0.054* -0.045 -0.044
(0.008) (0.012) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
CtypII(+1) 0.011 -0.022 -0.018 -0.018 -0.021
(0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Cstat(+1) -0.057* -0.045 -0.044 -0.043 -0.047
(0.031) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A31: Reduced Form, Only Able to Run Less than 100 Meters
MtypI 0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
MtypII 0.004 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Mstat 0.074* 0.122** 0.083 0.086 0.081
(0.037) (0.055) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061)
CtypI -0.010 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
CtypII -0.012** 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Cstat -0.071* -0.133** -0.099 -0.101 -0.101
(0.036) (0.055) (0.062) (0.063) (0.059)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) 0.014*** 0.012** 0.014** 0.014** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
MtypII(−1) 0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Mstat(−1) 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
CtypI -0.014*** -0.014** -0.024 -0.024 -0.019
(0.003) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
CtypII -0.010 -0.006 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Cstat -0.007 -0.029 -0.034* -0.034* -0.036*
(0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI 0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
MtypII -0.007 -0.014 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Mstat -0.020 -0.016 -0.022 -0.022 -0.027
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
CtypI(+1) -0.009* -0.012* -0.011 -0.011 -0.012
(0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
CtypII(+1) -0.002 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.006) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Cstat(+1) 0.023 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A32: Reduced Form, Number of Long-term Illnesses
MtypI 0.019 -0.034 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026)
MtypII -0.038 -0.048 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015
(0.024) (0.031) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Mstat -0.600*** -0.661** -0.665** -0.684** -0.699**
(0.203) (0.289) (0.280) (0.283) (0.267)
CtypI -0.022 -0.038 -0.083 -0.079 -0.076
(0.022) (0.024) (0.070) (0.073) (0.072)
CtypII 0.004 0.003 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017
(0.026) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032)
Cstat 0.608*** 0.592* 0.608** 0.625** 0.631**
(0.208) (0.298) (0.285) (0.288) (0.271)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) 0.005 -0.064*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.083***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
MtypII(−1) 0.001 0.006 0.024 0.024 0.019
(0.030) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Mstat(−1) -0.018 -0.024 0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.046) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.056)
CtypI -0.008 -0.004 -0.076 -0.074 -0.063
(0.024) (0.032) (0.073) (0.076) (0.074)
CtypII -0.016 0.027 0.021 0.021 0.024
(0.030) (0.045) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Cstat 0.032 -0.051 -0.053 -0.053 -0.060
(0.043) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI 0.021 -0.030 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035
(0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
MtypII -0.018 -0.033 -0.023 -0.023 -0.025
(0.023) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
Mstat -0.069 -0.085 -0.052 -0.051 -0.058
(0.076) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085)
CtypI(+1) -0.014 -0.015 0.003 0.002 -0.005
(0.016) (0.028) (0.099) (0.104) (0.104)
CtypII(+1) -0.001 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.025
(0.021) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
Cstat(+1) 0.074 -0.013 -0.039 -0.039 -0.042
(0.084) (0.091) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A33: Reduced Form, Disabled
MtypI 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
MtypII -0.003 -0.015** -0.011** -0.012** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Mstat 0.005 0.027 -0.008 -0.013 -0.014
(0.027) (0.044) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046)
CtypI -0.004 -0.009* 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
CtypII 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Cstat -0.004 -0.037 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005
(0.026) (0.046) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) -0.001 -0.007* -0.008** -0.008** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
MtypII(−1) 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Mstat(−1) 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.006
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
CtypI -0.002 -0.009** 0.002 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
CtypII -0.003 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Cstat -0.011 -0.023* -0.028* -0.029* -0.029**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
MtypII -0.006 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mstat -0.022 -0.025* -0.031* -0.031* -0.033*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
CtypI(+1) -0.003 -0.009*** 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
CtypII(+1) 0.004 0.012* 0.009* 0.010* 0.010*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cstat(+1) 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.025
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A34: Reduced Form, ln of Gross Labor Income
MtypI -0.039* -0.047 -0.067 -0.066 -0.063
(0.019) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
MtypII -0.077** -0.080 -0.082 -0.084 -0.068
(0.032) (0.052) (0.059) (0.061) (0.058)
Mstat -0.241 -0.359** -0.083 -0.110 -0.040
(0.168) (0.166) (0.200) (0.203) (0.221)
CtypI 0.032 0.018 0.059 0.064 0.080
(0.022) (0.025) (0.099) (0.103) (0.096)
CtypII 0.045 0.049 0.058 0.057 0.039
(0.030) (0.050) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061)
Cstat 0.263 0.410** 0.182 0.206 0.126
(0.173) (0.191) (0.222) (0.224) (0.231)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) 0.050** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.076***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018)
MtypII(−1) 0.022 0.030 0.044 0.044 0.040
(0.024) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029)
Mstat(−1) 0.006 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.076
(0.045) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.050)
CtypI -0.000 0.054 -0.079 -0.085 -0.046
(0.019) (0.032) (0.093) (0.099) (0.102)
CtypII -0.029 -0.064 -0.067 -0.067 -0.062
(0.028) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051)
Cstat 0.035 0.082 0.138** 0.139** 0.084
(0.045) (0.056) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI -0.038* -0.045 -0.068 -0.066 -0.062
(0.021) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
MtypII -0.035 -0.032 -0.047 -0.049 -0.051
(0.034) (0.060) (0.066) (0.067) (0.055)
Mstat 0.150* 0.141* 0.192** 0.188** 0.161**
(0.078) (0.081) (0.089) (0.087) (0.076)
CtypI(+1) 0.027 0.034 0.104 0.114 0.113
(0.019) (0.036) (0.094) (0.110) (0.095)
CtypII(+1) 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.020
(0.029) (0.044) (0.053) (0.053) (0.042)
Cstat(+1) -0.126 -0.146 -0.151 -0.150 -0.116
(0.081) (0.099) (0.096) (0.096) (0.090)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5.A35: Reduced Form, Secondary Education or Higher
MtypI 0.010 0.021 0.021 0.024 0.025
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
MtypII -0.009 -0.039 -0.006 -0.009 -0.000
(0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
Mstat -0.107 -0.185 -0.166 -0.220 -0.149
(0.138) (0.170) (0.188) (0.197) (0.210)
CtypI -0.006 -0.058*** -0.057 -0.046 -0.035
(0.013) (0.014) (0.044) (0.051) (0.046)
CtypII -0.014 -0.004 -0.058* -0.059* -0.061*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Cstat 0.131 0.173 0.158 0.205 0.156
(0.134) (0.181) (0.195) (0.203) (0.216)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
MtypI(−1) 0.006 -0.003 -0.009 -0.010 -0.001
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
MtypII(−1) 0.036* 0.045* 0.055* 0.054* 0.052*
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Mstat(−1) 0.030 0.014 0.022 0.017 0.032
(0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
CtypI 0.004 -0.031* -0.060* -0.050 -0.035
(0.014) (0.017) (0.034) (0.046) (0.045)
CtypII -0.043* -0.036 -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Cstat 0.005 -0.016 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008
(0.028) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.042)
Observations 6524 6524 6524 6524 6524
MtypI 0.009 0.020 0.014 0.016 0.018
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
MtypII -0.023 -0.043** -0.047* -0.049** -0.041
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
Mstat 0.007 -0.010 -0.001 -0.007 0.008
(0.061) (0.055) (0.058) (0.059) (0.055)
CtypI(+1) -0.002 -0.053*** -0.036 -0.021 -0.019
(0.012) (0.014) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
CtypII(+1) 0.006 0.013 0.005 0.006 0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Cstat(+1) 0.015 -0.020 -0.023 -0.022 -0.009
(0.066) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.070)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990 6990
Avg. income 1930
√
Occ. shares 1930
√
County fixed effects
√ √ √ √
Regional time trends
√ √ √
Physician rate
√ √
Social background
√
Social background variables: occupation of father, parental foreign background, number of
siblings. Regressions include birth year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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